













# **GANDHI VS JINNAH**

## **THE DEBATE OVER THE PARTITION OF INDIA**

**ALLEN HAYES MERRIAM**



**INDIA**

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***TO***

**SHARAN, LAURA and PAUL**

**"No power on earth can prevent Pakistan"**

**—Jinnah, 1940**

**"So long as I am alive, I will never agree to the  
partition of India"**

**—Gandhi, 1947**

## PREFACE

**MY INTEREST** in Asia and the challenges of communication between people from different cultures and nations has been stimulated by two trips. From 1965 to 1967 I served with the U. S. Peace Corps in Kabul, Afghanistan and traveled extensively in India and Pakistan. In 1974 I returned for post-doctoral research in India.

This work represents a wedding of my two major academic pursuits : Asia and communication. No Westerner, in my view, can claim to be more than half-educated who has not attempted to understand Asia—home to half of humanity. And no one can fully comprehend historical events without investigating communication—the process by which ideas are articulated, images formed, and public opinion mobilized.

The Gandhi-Jinnah debate involved a clash between two important personalities of the twentieth century. But it also personified the tensions between two major ideological systems, Hinduism and Islam. It is my conviction that anyone concerned with the issues of world peace and intercultural communication can profit from studying the developments within India in the 1940s.

In combining the methods of the historian and rhetorical critic, I have sought to interpret the Partition debate as fairly and objectively as possible. One should not minimize the deep-seated misgivings of Indian Muslims faced with the threat of permanent discrimination by a frequently insensitive and occasionally hostile Hindu majority. At the same time, one must recognize that ultimately Partition was motivated more by politics than theology, and that it not only failed to resolve, but in many ways intensified, the problems of religious and cultural pluralism on the subcontinent.

Many persons have contributed to the completion of this book. Especially deserving of my appreciation for their insights and encouragement are Professor Paul H. Boase of Ohio University ; Robert T. Oliver, Professor Emeritus at the

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**July, 1978**

**Allen H. Merriam**

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
<b>PREFACE</b> ...            ...            ...            ...	viii
 <b>CHAPTER</b>	
<b>I. THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND</b> ...            ...	1
Introduction to the Topic	1
Goals and Methodology of Research	3
Hindu-Muslim Relations in Indian History	5
The British Role in Communalism	10
Eastern Rhetoric and Western Critics	19
<b>II. THE PERSONAL BACKGROUND</b> ...            ...	29
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi	29
Mohammed Ali Jinnah	37
Gandhi-Jinnah Relations Prior to 1937	43
<b>III. PROGRESS OF THE DEBATE, 1937-1942</b> ...	56
<b>IV. PROGRESS OF THE DEBATE, 1943-1944</b> ...	88
<b>V. PROGRESS OF THE DEBATE, 1945-1948</b> ...	114
<b>VI. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION</b> ...            ...	147
Summary of the Findings	147
An Evaluation of the Debate	156
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> ...            ...            ..	166
<b>INDEX</b> ...            ...            ...            ...	179





## CHAPTER I

### THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND

#### INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

THE EMERGENCE of India and Pakistan as separate, independent nations in August, 1947 represented the culmination of two major crusades in modern Asian history : India's attempt to rid itself of British colonialism and, simultaneously, Muslim India's desire to create an Islamic state free from Hindu domination. This growth of a religious nationalism produced conflicts and contradictions, which not only confused Western observers but heightened communal tensions in Asia.<sup>1</sup> Factional violence at the time of Indian Partition resulted in as many as 600,000 deaths, and subsequent outbreaks of war between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 painfully underscored the crucial importance of Hindu-Muslim interaction.

In the late 1930's and early 1940's when Indian independence from Britain appeared imminent, some Muslim leaders began despairing of the fate of the Muslim minority in a free, Hindu-dominated India. One apparent solution was the creation of a separate Islamic state.

The proposition that India should be divided into two nations, one Hindu and one Muslim, sparked controversy involving many Indian leaders. They included Mohammad Iqbal, Liaquat Ali Khan, Jawaharlal Nehru, Morarji Desai, Vallabhbhai Patel, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari and Subhas Chandra Bose. But the debate over the partition of India perhaps reached its greatest dramatization in the clashes between Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869-1948) and Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948). "These two leaders were to change ...the entire course of history of this sub-continent."<sup>2</sup> The British historian, H. V. Hodson, has asserted that in the events surrounding Indian Independence all personalities except Gandhi and Jinnah could have been replaced "without there being any radical change in the final dénouement."<sup>3</sup>

Both Gandhi and Jinnah were British-educated lawyers dedicated to Indian Independence. Early in their careers, each had been an active member of the Indian National Congress, the primary organizational vehicle of Indian nationalism. But the legalistic and aristocratic Jinnah disapproved of Gandhi's methods of massive civil disobedience, and in the 1920's became disillusioned by failures of the Congress to insure minority rights for Muslims, who represented about one-fourth of the population.

After 1935, Jinnah dedicated himself to strengthening the loosely-organized Muslim League, a lobbyist group formed in 1906 to promote Muslim interests with the British. Under Jinnah's leadership, the League eventually passed its historic Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, calling for the creation of Pakistan. Thereafter, Jinnah became Pakistan's chief advocate, and today he is regarded as the founding father of the country.

To Mohandas Gandhi, the effort to split India along sectarian lines was totally undesirable. Long an advocate of communal unity, Gandhi emerged, in Malik's estimate, as "undoubtedly the most outspoken and vociferous Hindu opponent of Pakistan and Moslem nationalism."<sup>4</sup> But despite his fastings, speeches, essays, letters, and his discussions with Jinnah, Gandhi was unable to persuade the Muslims to end their secessionist demands. The Congress Party and the British finally agreed to the creation of Pakistan in an effort to avoid civil war, and Jinnah became its first Governor-General in 1947. Gandhi remained distraught over Partition, and even refused to attend Independence celebrations, saying, "Why all this rejoicing ? I see only rivers of blood."<sup>5</sup>

The Gandhi-Jinnah debate, which essentially spanned the decade 1937-47, represented one of the significant rhetorical confrontations of the twentieth century. Not only did it bring into opposition the ideas and feelings of two world figures, but it also personified much of the underlying hatred and mistrust prevailing between the Hindu and Muslim communities. This debate is thus important both as a forensic activity in itself, and as a symbol of the deeper issues of intercultural communication.

## GOALS AND METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

The methodology to be used in this study corresponds to the philosophical basis of inquiry stated recently by J. Jeffery Auer: "Historical studies must, of necessity, investigate rhetoric, identify persuasive appeals, and examine the causative factors influencing men's minds, impelling them to act one way or another."<sup>6</sup> More specifically, this research shares the assumptions of Marie Hochmuth, who observed that rhetorical criticism involves an investigation of speaker, audience, time, place, purpose, effect, premises, ideas, style, and language :

The criticism of speeches, like the criticism of all art, involves both analysis and synthesis. It is concerned with naming and identifying its object, locating its connections with the culture of which it is a part, and seeing it in relation to other similar phenomena. It is "discriminating among values."<sup>7</sup>

The rhetoric to be investigated in this study consists of the English-language speeches, essays, letters, and interviews of both Mohandas K. Gandhi and Mohammed Ali Jinnah as they concerned the single topic of the partition of India. This study does not attempt to cover the entire rhetorical career of either man, nor does it seek to analyze the entire partition debate which, as already noted, involved numerous other people. The study limits itself to the rhetoric of each man as he challenges the other regarding this one major issue.

In this analysis, the Gandhi-Jinnah debate is traced chronologically, with emphasis on the period from 1937 to 1947 when the dispute reached its greatest intensity. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the social and personal background which underlay the Gandhi-Jinnah interaction. The remaining chapters seek to identify and assimilate :

- (1) the major arguments of each man ;
- (2) the nature and extent of the evidence used to support these arguments ;
- (3) the major assumptions undergirding the arguments, including assumptions about Hindu-Muslim relations, the purpose of government, and the nature of man ;

#### 4     **GANDHI VS JINNAH : THE PARTITION DEBATE IN INDIA**

- (4) the style and language usage of each man ;
- (5) the apparent impact of effect of each man's advocacy on his adversary as well as on the Indian public ;
- (6) the historical and cultural factors in Hindu-Muslim relations which may have influenced the debate ;
- (7) speculation about the psychological motivations within each man which may have furthered their disagreement.

Printed texts of Gandhi's and Jinnah's verbal interaction provide the primary source of data. The analysis also includes observations and insights from secondary sources such as biographies, historical writings, newspaper accounts, journal articles, and conversations with Asian authorities.

It is anticipated that this research may contribute positively to the body of knowledge in the disciplines of both rhetorical communication and Asian studies. Hopefully, this study will result in :

- (1) greater knowledge of both Gandhi and Jinnah as public speakers and communicators ;
- (2) increased understanding of a significant period in Asian history ;
- (3) further appreciation for both the Hindu and Muslim value systems, which represent two important, and divergent, rhetorical patterns ;
- (4) more insight into practical problems of intercultural communication ;
- (5) better understanding of some of the historical roots of the persistent tension between Pakistan and India.

Several definitions and explanations of terminology are necessary. The phrase "the partition of India" denotes the geographical dividing of British India into two sovereign nations, India and Pakistan. In referring to the followers of Islam, the word "Muslim" will be used, although some sources employ other terms, including "Moslem, Musalman, Mussulman, Mussalman," and "Mohammedan." The Islamic scripture, the *Koran*, is sometimes spelled "*Qur'an*." Variations in the Islamic name "Mohammed" include "Muhammad, Mohammed," and "Mahamed." Similarly, the anglicized word,

“India,” will occasionally be exchanged for the term “Hindustan” (meaning “Land of the Hindus”) in some of the sources.

Another important term in this study involves the concept of “communalism.” Somewhat akin to the more familiar Western idea of “provincialism,” communalism refers to an attitude of allegiance to one’s own community, which in India means a sectarian devotion to either Hinduism or Islam. Jawaharlal Nehru noted the importance of communal affairs in Indian life :

Minorities in India, it must be remembered, are not racial or national minorities as in Europe ; they are religious minorities.....In political matters, religion has been displaced by what is called communalism, a narrow group mentality basing itself on a religious community but in reality concerned with political power and patronage for the group concerned.<sup>8</sup>

As already noted, any meaningful rhetorical analysis must include an understanding of the historical and social milieu from which the rhetoric emerged. Certainly the Gandhi-Jinnah debate did not develop in a vacuum ; in a sense it was a climactic milestone of twelve centuries of Hindu-Muslim interaction on the Indian sub-continent. Therefore, a brief survey of Hindu-Muslim relations in Indian history is necessary.

#### HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN INDIAN HISTORY

The first contacts between Muslims and Hindus resulted from eastward Islamic expansion in the seventh century A. D. Since such contacts largely represented military campaigns aimed at spreading both Islamic civilization and Arab political power, relations between the two groups often produced hostility and bloodshed. In 711 A. D., the Arab commander Imad-ud-din reported to his superior at Basra of successes in the Sind Province :

The nephew of Raja Dashir, his warriors and principal officers have been executed, and the infidel rank and file either converted to Islam or destroyed. Idol-temples have been razed to the ground and mosques have been erected in their place. Friday-prayer is read, and the

call to prayer is raised so that devotions are performed at stated hours. Praise to almighty Allah is offered every morning and evening.<sup>9</sup>

In the eleventh century, Mahmud of Ghazni (d. 1030) gained fame as an "Idol-Breaker" who entered India seventeen times to extract large amounts of Hindu wealth for his luxurious capital at Ghazni in Afghanistan. According to a contemporary Muslim writer, Mahmud

utterly ruined the prosperity of the country, and performed wonderful exploits by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions, and like a tale told in the mouth of the people. Their scattered remains cherish, of course, the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims.<sup>10</sup>

After Qutb-ud-din Aibak established the Delhi Sultanate in 1206, he displayed scant sympathy for his indigenous Hindu subjects, and reportedly built a great mosque with materials salvaged from the destruction of 27 Hindu temples.<sup>11</sup>

When the great Arab traveller Ibn Battuta visited India in the fourteenth century, he recorded that Hindus and Muslims lived widely-separate lives, with little social interaction, intermarriage, or even inter-dining allowed :

It is the custom among the heathen of the Malabar country that no Muslim should enter their houses or use their vessels for eating purposes. If a Muslim is fed out of their vessels, they either break the vessels or give them away to the Muslims.<sup>12</sup>

Behavior such as Ibn Battuta described would have been consistent with traditional Indian society where status and caste membership prescribed rigid practices concerning cleanliness and social interaction. Caste consciousness remained strong among Hindus into the twentieth century, and continued to annoy Indian Muslims.<sup>13</sup>

Another significant wave of Muslim invasions occurred in 1398-99 under the leadership of Timur (Tamerlane), whose descendents finally consolidated Muslim power in India during the Moghul Dynasty. The notorious Aurangzeb (ruled 1659-1707, and last of the powerful Moghul emperors) pursued

policies that intensified Hindu-Muslim hostility. Destroying Hindu temples, he imposed a hated poll tax (*jizya*) on non-Muslims, and treacherously plotted the murder of the religious leaders of the Punjabi Sikhs. Indeed, the religious and political persecution suffered under Aurangzeb constituted a major cause for the continuing hostility between Sikhs and Muslims, which flared anew at the time of Partition in 1947.<sup>14</sup>

While the Moghul Empire fell into disarray following the death of Aurangzeb, India continued thereafter to experience Muslim military assaults from the north and west. In 1739 the Persian king Nadir Shah sacked Delhi, taking with him the jewelled Peacock Throne which now sits in a Teheran vault. By 1761 the Afghan chieftain Ahmad Shah Durrani conquered much of northern India following repeated invasions against both the weak Moghuls and Hindu armies of the Marathas.

Despite the many wars and outbreaks of iconoclastic fervor characterizing Muslim attitudes toward Hindus prior to the British conquest of India, there is also evidence of tolerance and cooperation between the two groups. It must be remembered that

except in the Punjab and some other parts of northern India, where there are many descendents of the old Moslem conquerors, the majority of the Moslems in India consisted chiefly of converted Hindus, most of whom accepted Islam as a way of escape from the tyranny of the upper castes in the hierarchy of the Hindu caste-system.<sup>15</sup>

Thus most Muslims outside of Northwest India shared a common heritage with the Hindus. They did not differ racially, and often spoke a common language as in Bengal and Orissa.

Among the noteworthy attempts to harmonize relations between Hindus and Muslims were those of Guru Nanak (1469-1538), the founder of Sikhism, and Akbar, the Moghul emperor who ruled from 1556 to 1605. Akbar abolished discriminatory taxes on Hindus, appointed Hindus to his administration, and actually formulated a new religion, *Din Ilahi* (Divine Faith),



which sought to fuse elements of Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity.<sup>16</sup> Lamb has suggested that if Akbar's religious tolerance had been pursued by his successors, the Partition of India in 1947 might never have occurred.<sup>17</sup>

In discussing the vicissitudes of Hindu-Muslim interaction, historians have noted areas in which the two groups influenced each other positively, such as dress, food, social manners, language, art, literature, and particularly architecture.<sup>18</sup> But such cultural assimilation was limited primarily to the educated, upper classes from each community, while the masses of Hindus continued to view Muslims as rigid, iconoclastic, and unclean, while most Muslims viewed Hindus as *kafirs* (infidels) and culturally inferior :

...there was no sympathetic understanding of each other's religion and culture, no give and take in a real sense, and no renaissance. Whatever mutual impact there was during centuries of contact of the two civilisations was due to the accident of their living together in the same land rather than to any enthusiasm on their part to learn from each other for their mutual benefit.<sup>19</sup>

Perhaps the major reason why Islam and Hinduism failed to achieve social amalgamation despite their contacts extending over 1000 years is that they represent such widely divergent world-views. Islam insists on one God (Allah) whereas Hinduism recognizes millions of gods. Salvation in Islam comes from submitting oneself to God's will as revealed through the prophets, especially Mohammed. Whereas uniformity of worship is practiced in all mosques, Hinduism emphasises individual meditation rather than dogma. Islam counsels a theocracy or religious state, a concept absent in Hinduism. Image worship is rejected by Muslims as idolatry ; Hindus revel in artistic imagery, statues, and ceremonial pageantry. The sacred literature of Islam is in Arabic, that of Hinduism in Sanskrit. Islam professes belief in a final day of judgment, whereas Hindu doctrine suggests continual rebirth and reincarnation. Devout Muslims focus their spiritual attention outside India, toward Arabia and the holy

city of Mecca, which they symbolically face five times a day during prayers. For Hindus, one's spiritual life is India-centered, with the Ganges River and Himalayan mountains held as sacred.

Additional insight in contrasting the Islamic and Hindu value systems was provided by Northrup's distinction between the world's "theistic" and "aesthetic, non-theistic" religions. Northrup described Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Shintoism as "theistic" religions, all characterized by a Book of Truth, a Prophet or divinity necessary for salvation, a sense of being God's "Chosen People," and (except for Jews) an aggressive missionary zeal to convert non-believers. Northrup listed Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism as the major "non-theistic" religions, all of which exhibit tolerance toward other faiths and require little adherence to specific dogma or creed. Chinese can consider themselves Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist all at the same time. The presence of Islam in India, Northrup contended, is of greater significance than its number of adherents might suggest because of its aggressive, theistic nature: "For an orthodox Mohammedan, missionary zeal, military power, and political control go together."<sup>20</sup>

At another level of analysis it may be helpful to view Hinduism as an essentially feminine doctrine and Islam as being far more masculine in character. The Hindu worships the cow as the symbol of motherhood and fertility; many Hindu deities are female, and Hindu art is full of voluptuous female figures. Indians often refer to their homeland as "Mother India," and the theme song of the National Congress Party was based on Bankimchandra Chatterji's (1838-94) poem, *Bande Mataram*, "Hail to thee, Mother."<sup>21</sup> Muslims, on the other hand, worship a very masculine Allah; only men are allowed inside a mosque, and in most Islamic societies women are veiled when in public. It would be quite unusual to have a woman prime minister in an Islamic nation.

It is important to note that contrasting concepts of social organization emerged from Hindu and Muslim ideology. The dominant force in Hindu society was the caste system, a belief

## 10 GANDHI VS JINNAH : THE PARTITION DEBATE IN INDIA

that men are born unequal, with status determined by one's behavior in a previous incarnation. The development of thousands of sub-castes in traditional India produced a decentralized social structure which resisted the penetration of outside forces and insured the continuity of Hindu culture even during centuries of Muslim rule. While rigid regulations often prohibited social interaction between members of one caste and another, or between Hindus and non-Hindus, the caste system paradoxically bred an attitude which viewed cultural multiplicity as the social norm. This acceptance of diversity prompted the distinguished Asian scholar Najime Nakamura to declare: "Toleration is the most conspicuous characteristic of Indian culture."<sup>22</sup>

The Islamic *Weltanschauung* was significantly different. In Muslim thought, all men are born equal. We have already noted that it was the appeal of the democratic nature of Islamic society which caused many low-caste Hindus to convert and thereby escape inferior status. In Islam, all people are called to unite and conform to the community of believers. As William Brown put it, "With the high importance which Muslims attach to dogma and their generally democratic social order, they have developed a strong sense of community," especially in India where they represented a minority.<sup>23</sup> The orthodox Muslim, therefore, would not be as sympathetic to social diversity as the typical Hindu.

Clearly, a number of basic differences exist in the theological and social assumptions of Hinduism and Islam. In his summary of these distinctions the British scholar, C. H. Philips, offered a highly succinct contrast of the two systems: Islam is "simple, clear-cut, assertive" while Hinduism is "elaborate, roughly defined, absorptive."<sup>24</sup> Communal differences were already an important aspect of Indian life when the British gained control of India. The British response to communalism greatly influenced events in the twentieth century, and thus must be considered.

### THE BRITISH ROLE IN COMMUNALISM

The nature of the impact of British colonialism on com-

munal relations in India is a topic of lively historical debate. One view is that the British pursued a policy of "divide and rule," suggesting that the British purposely sought to foment Hindu-Muslim tension as a means of weakening any unified resistance to their imperialism. Mohandas Gandhi held this view, writing in 1925 with dubious historicity that "there is nothing to prove that the Hindus and the Mussalmans lived at war with one another before the British rule" and stating in 1931 that "this quarrel is not old ; this quarrel is coeval with the British advent."<sup>25</sup>

Obviously, such an extreme position was motivated more from an intense opposition to British colonialism than from an accurate reading of history. Certainly there is some truth to the claims of British historians that the arousal of Muslim consciousness in the twentieth century was a natural result of the self-protective instincts of a minority community which could foresee the British tendency toward Indian self-government.<sup>26</sup> And as already noted, much evidence points to sharp Hindu-Muslim friction covering centuries prior to the British arrival, indeed since the first Arab invasions in the seventh century.

But if it is impossible to defend the assertion that British colonialism *caused* communalism in India, it would be equally difficult to deny that British policy *furthered* the communal division already existing. The early British activities in India were largely confined to the commercial interests of the East India Company, chartered in 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I. When the Moghul Empire fell into disarray in the eighteenth century, India represented a diverse conglomerate of princely states and small military units. With no central force ruling India, the East India Company turned local divisions to its own advantage.

A primary example of the self-seeking policies of Company leaders was the penetration of eighteenth-century Bengal by Robert Clive and Warren Hastings. The Company derived considerable financial resources from its unregulated trading and lending operations, thus permitting the hiring of *sepoys* (mercenary soldiers) to protect and expand company interests.

Clive and Hastings were especially adept at gaining permanent economic and territorial concessions in exchange for temporary support of local Muslim *nawabs* (rulers) such as Mir Jafar, Mir Kasim, and the Persian ruler of Dacca, Sayid Muhammed Reza Khan. Through bribery Clive insured his victory at the Battle of Plassey (1757), an important landmark in the growth of British power in eastern India.<sup>27</sup> As the East India Company aggressively expanded its economic and military advantages over local leaders, it also increased its control of the revenue collecting system, administered largely by Hindu *zamindaris* (tax collectors). Here again, Company policies took advantage of conflicting traditional Hindu and Muslim law regarding the relationship between political power and land ownership.<sup>28</sup>

The opportunistic policies pursued by Company leaders in Bengal provided for both the establishment of British influence and the amassing of great personal wealth for men like Clive.<sup>29</sup> As far as the Indian communities were concerned, the British expansion in the long run worked more to the advantage of the Hindus. James Michener pointed out that the British

...had to defeat Moslem rulers in order to win India. Naturally the British allied themselves with the Hindus and, when they gained ascendancy, selected Hindus as their managers and clerks. The role of the Moslem declined swiftly from that of alien ruler to that of workman at the lower levels.<sup>30</sup>

The British political penetration of the sub-continent continued during the first half of the nineteenth century. The expansion of the East India Company's domain was directed by a succession of Governor-Generals, including Cornwallis, Shore, Wellesley, Bentinck, and Dalhousie. Hindus continued to win British sympathy, since the British feared that aggressive Muslims might attempt a restoration of the Moghul Empire. Muslims were also suspect for association with the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, which triggered sporadic violence throughout India.<sup>31</sup> To consolidate British control, Queen Victoria disbanded the East India Company the following year, putting all of its territorial domain under the government in London.

The pronouncements of numerous British officials during this period left little doubt that the existing cleavage between the religious communities facilitated colonial domination. As early as 1821, a British officer wrote that "*Divide et impera* should be the motto of our Indian administration, whether political, civil, or military." Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, was quoted in 1859 as saying "*Divide et impera* was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours."<sup>32</sup> The British Secretary of State in India from 1905 to 1910, Lord Morley, publicly declared that communal division was deep-rooted :

Let us not forget that the difference between Mohammedanism and Hinduism is not a mere difference of articles of religious faith and dogma. It is a difference of life, in tradition, in history, in all the social things as well as articles of belief that constitute a community.<sup>33</sup>

British recognition of Hindu-Muslim antipathies soon worked its way into colonial policy. In 1905, for example, Viceroy Curzon partitioned the huge area of Bengal including at that time sections of the present provinces of Orissa and Bihar. The partitioning was intended to promote more efficient administration, but the new boundary cut across Bengali language communities and Hindu ethnic groupings. Widespread agitation and violence followed, and the partition was nullified in 1911. Brown has argued that this Bengal partition "brought the Indian National Congress unequivocally into politics," as opposed to its earlier emphasis on social reform.<sup>34</sup>

A second important policy decision tending to increase communalism was the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. These Reforms established the principle of "separate electorates," meaning that representation in provincial legislative councils would thereafter be based on minority and communal apportionment. In evaluating the importance of this policy, Brown stated that the Morley-Minto Reforms "inaugurated modern Indian political communalism."<sup>35</sup> Fischer noted that once the British had introduced separate electorates, "a Moslem could vote only for a Moslem candidate, and a Hindu only

for a Hindu. The mischief produced by this institution was incalculable because it made religious differences the deciding factor in every political contest.”<sup>36</sup>

The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 reenforced the principle of separate electorates. Somewhat conciliatory in tone, the Act implied future parliamentary government for India with eventual Dominion status. But it also acknowledged separate political representation for the Muslim and Sikh communities.

Still another instrument of British policy with communal implications was the Government of India Act of 1935. This legislation sought to incorporate the several hundred surviving princely states into an Indian federation, and to expand provincial autonomy as urged in the Simon Commission Report of 1930. The India Act also broadened the franchise to women and to a small percentage of the “Untouchable” caste, and provided for separate electorates for Sikhs, Muslims, Indian Christians, and Europeans. Thus, British legislative policy, while ostensibly aimed at protecting minority rights, tended to accentuate sectarian allegiances.

The British view of the two major communities was undoubtedly reenforced by the reactions to Western influences on the part of the two groups. Many upper-class Hindus readily emulated British customs and adopted the English language as a means of advancement. Muslims, however, tended to avoid Western education and habits as alien to the Islamic tradition. Therefore, the British presence in India produced an indirect yet very perceptible spur to communalism in the form of a Hindu cultural renaissance precipitated by contact with Western thought.

The renaissance of Hinduism grew out of attempts by Indians to reconcile and re-interpret classical Hindu values in light of challenges from Christianity and Western Science. The British decision in 1835 to make English the official language of India increased Western cultural infiltration. British colonialism, in addition to bringing economic exploitation and military conquest, also brought railways, postal services, ideas of social reform from men like Charles Kingsley and William

Wilberforce, and concepts of self-government from Locke and Mill. In short, the introduction of Western education by the British "revolutionized the thought and life of India."<sup>37</sup>

Rammohun Roy (1772-1833), considered the Father of Modern India, became a leading symbol of the Hindu revival. He founded the Brahmo Samaj (Society of God's Worshipers) in 1828, which sought to "purify Hinduism and to immunize it against the Christian virus by a partial incorporation of Christian ideas and practices."<sup>38</sup> Roy was followed by a number of significant religious thinkers and Hindu social reformers, including Debendranath Tagore (1817-1905), Keshub Chunder Sen (1839-84), Dayananda Saraswati (1824-63), Ramakrishna (1836-86), Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), and Gopal Gokhale (1866-1915). Interestingly, several Britishers also took active roles in the Indian revival, including the retired civil servant Alan Octavius Hume, who organized the Indian National Congress at Poona in 1885, and Annie Besant, a fiery orator and eccentric Theosophist who founded the Home-Rule League in 1916.

The resurgence of Hinduism, combined with the steady growth of British influence in India, inevitably triggered a similar partisan revival of Islam. One of the first Indian Muslims to urge reconciliation with British power and Western education was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98). Calling for a synthesis of Islamic faith and Western knowledge, Syed established the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875, later the most important Muslim university in India. Syed must be recognized as an important precursor in Partition thought, for in 1867 he claimed that "It is now impossible for Hindus and Moslems to progress as a single nation," and in 1882 stated that "All individuals, joining the fold of Islam, together constitute a Nation of the Muslims."<sup>39</sup>

Another spokesman for the rising Muslim consciousness was Sir Syed Amir Ali (1849-1928), a jurist and historian who told a London audience in 1910 :

It is only by remembering the two elements (Muslims and Hindus) deserve equal consideration, that both of them are important factors in the administration of the



country, by endeavoring to understand the idiosyncracies of the two nations, by not allowing the interests of the one to be subordinated to the interests of the other that you will make the projected reforms successful.<sup>40</sup>

Seven years later Jabbar and Sattar Kheiri reportedly told a Socialist International Conference in Stockholm that an Indian federation should be established with separate, sovereign Muslim states.<sup>41</sup>

It was only natural that the growth of Muslim consciousness should express itself in institutionalized form, and thus the "All-India Muslim League" was formed at Dacca on December 30, 1906. At its inception, the League professed three main objectives :

(1) To promote, amongst the Mussalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intentions of Government with regard to Indian measures.

(2) To protect and advance the political rights of the Mussalmans of India and respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government.

(3) To prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other foresaid objects of the League.<sup>42</sup>

Although the League succeeded in creating British sympathy for Muslim electorates, it did not gain significant popular support until Jinnah mobilized the Pakistan movement in the 1940's. In 1927, for example, the League could claim only 1,330 members, and as late as the provincial elections in 1937 won only 4.6% of the total Muslim vote.<sup>43</sup>

In the early part of the twentieth century, the League competed for a following with a number of other Muslim organizations. Among these were the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, composed of classical Islamic scholars and holy men, the Ahrar which enjoyed lower-middle class support in the Punjab, the Momins, an organized group of weavers, the Krishak Sabha, a peasant group in Bengal, and the Khaksars, a militant extremist group founded in 1931 and led by Inayatullah Mahriqi.

One event in the early history of the Muslim League warrants special notice because it foreshadowed later developments. The annual League session of 1930 was presided over by Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938), who must be regarded as a major figure in the renaissance of twentieth-century Islam. A poet-philosopher with an earned doctorate in metaphysics from Munich, Iqbal was imbued with a deep sense of the unity and purity of Islamic faith. Iqbal was a communalist who believed that a separate Muslim state was necessary for the full expression and development of the Islamic social order. In his Presidential Address to the League session at Allahabad, Iqbal made this prophetic declaration :

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.<sup>44</sup>

Professor de Bary noted that although Iqbal's suggestion was "vague and aroused no immediate response, this was the first time that the idea of a separate state for the Muslims had been put forward from the platform of a political party."<sup>45</sup>

To summarize, British colonialism in India fostered communalism in at least three ways : by the official policies of "*divide et impera*," by legislation providing for separate electorates based on religion, and by the introduction of Western values stimulating cultural resurgence by both Hindus and, later, the Muslims. In assessing the British tendency to view the two communities as distinct entities, it should be recognized that the geographical distribution of the two groups dramatized the Hindu-Muslim dichotomy. Most Muslims were, after all, concentrated in two areas : the northwestern part of India which had been the major path of Muslim conquest in earlier centuries, and the northeastern corner of the country, where an especially rigid caste system made conversion to Islam attractive to many Hindus. The extent of this concentration can be illustrated by figures from the 1941 Census of India, which

established the national population at 388,997,955 with 270,187,283 Hindus (69.5% of the total) and 94,446,544 Muslims (24.3%).<sup>46</sup> The six areas of Muslim concentration were as follows :<sup>47</sup>

<i>Area</i>	<i>Total pop.</i>	<i>No. of Muslims</i>	<i>Muslim %</i>
Bengal	62,451,354	33,377,547	53.4
Punjab	35,013,017	18,515,379	52.9
Sind	4,535,008	3,208,325	70.7
Kashmir	4,021,616	3,073,540	76.4
N-W Frontier	3,084,334	2,810,865	91.1
Baluchistan	857,835	785,181	91.5
Total	109,963,164	61,770,837	56.2%

Thus, nearly two-thirds of Indian Muslims lived in the six areas listed above, with the result that Muslims represented only 11.8% of the resident population throughout the remainder of India. This concentration at the two ends of the Ganges River Plain not only facilitated the British tendency to view Muslims as a separate community ; it also allowed communalists like Iqbal and Jinnah to envision an Islamic state since the two communities were already largely divided. Davis observed that had the Muslims been distributed evenly throughout India, the idea of Pakistan might have never occurred.<sup>48</sup>

During the brief period from about 1915 to 1921, the British presence helped promote Hindu-Muslim cooperation. For example, in 1916 the Congress Party and the Muslim League signed the Lucknow Pact, naming Indian independence as their common goal. Indian nationalism gained additional strength in reaction to the oppressive Rowlatt Acts, passed on March 18, 1919, which imposed strict censorship on speech and the press. Hindus and Muslims alike joined in mass strikes against colonial rule following the Amritsar "Massacre" of April 13, 1919, when British troops surrounded and killed 379 unarmed Indians and wounded over 1200.<sup>49</sup> Public indignation grew so intense that in 1919 Hindus actually preached from some Muslim Mosques.<sup>50</sup> Another important anti-British issue from 1920 to 1924 involved the Muslim Khilafat Movement, which sought the preservation of the Islamic caliph (spiritual head) in

Turkey.<sup>51</sup> Gandhi supported the movement to further stimulate communal cooperation.

However, the Hindu-Muslim unity was short-lived. The withdrawal of British troops from Turkey defused the Khilafat issue, and Kemal Attaturk finally abolished the office of Caliph in 1924. The Congress Party Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920 failed, and sporadic communal violence broke out in the Moplah Rebellion (1921), the Kohat Riots (1924), and in urban rioting in Calcutta (1926), Bombay (1929), Dacca (1930), and Cawnpore (1931). Numerous factors contributed to communal violence, including cow-slaughter by Muslims, noisy Hindu processions in front of mosques, private quarrels, economic tensions, increasing political participation by the masses, and the emergence of groups dedicated solely to communal aims.<sup>52</sup> Thus, the militant Muslim Khaksar Party was counter-balanced by the extremist Hindu Mahasabha, formed in 1925 by Lajpat Rai and opposed to any cooperation with Muslims.

On balance, British colonialism contributed significantly to Indian communalism, whether as a result of deliberate policy or not. Louis Fischer put it succinctly :

The British, feeling insecure in India, naturally took advantage of Hindu-Moslem friction. Britain did not *divide* and rule. The Indians were divided. Britain merely divided them a little more in order to rule more easily.<sup>53</sup>

#### EASTERN RHETORIC AND WESTERN CRITICS

Some years ago Ernest Bormann posed a crucial question : "Do the means of persuasion vary from culture to culture ?"<sup>54</sup> Indicating a growing awareness that Bormann's question must be answered affirmatively, Huber Ellingsworth told the 1968 convention of the Speech Association of America :

Anthropologists, perhaps the most exciting and imaginative scholars working in the field of rhetorical theory, have defined national (or cultural) rhetorics as the communication styles of a particular culture, including appropriate themes, modes of expression, standards, purposes, sources, and receivers of communication.

Each culture has its own styles and standards which makes its rhetorical system unique.<sup>55</sup>

Much of the current understanding of the influence of culture on one's communicative behavior stems from the pioneering work in language study by Edward Sapir (1884-1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941). Following years of intensive research, Sapir and Whorf concluded that one's language reflects cultural assumptions and therefore directs thought and perception :

Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown by the study of language. This study shows that the forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language—shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a language—in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which is culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.<sup>56</sup>

While rhetorical criticism has traditionally acknowledged a kinship to philosophy and history, there is increasing recognition that it must also ally itself with insights from anthropology and linguistics.

Westerners have often found it meaningful to draw some general distinctions between the "mind" of Asia and the mentality of the West. Perhaps the following are among the most commonly-held differences between the Orient and Occident :

- (1) Asians seek harmony with nature, while Westerners desire to conquer nature ;
- (2) The East is concerned with propriety, ritual, and form, while the West glorifies cold logic and efficiency ;

(3) The Orient is structured on collectivism, with one's allegiance usually to family, clan, tribe, or caste, while the West values individualism and private initiative ;

(4) Asians generally seem able to believe that something can simultaneously be good and bad, right and wrong, black and white, whereas Westerners think in a more Aristotelian, either-or manner.

(5) The Eastern man is mystical and meditative ; the Westerner adventurous and aggressive.<sup>57</sup>

If there be any truth in these generalizations, they hold great significance for the study of Asian public address. Certainly, the values and methods of thinking by which people live strike at the heart of rhetorical analysis, for they decisively shape the kinds of arguments used by a speaker and the types of appeals which would be effective with an audience.

In his penetrating analysis of the rhetorical implications of the classical Indian mind, Robert T. Oliver emphasized that perhaps the major concept underlying the entire Upanishadic tradition is the conviction that an underlying unity encompasses all existence :

The world and all its creatures are thus viewed as individual particles that possess essentially a primordial unity...Opposites are coordinates. Contradictions are illusory. The world is a dramatic portrayal of God playing hide-and-seek with Himself, trying to reassemble all the divergent parts back into their original unity. There is no other principle in Indian philosophy that had so great a rhetorical significance.<sup>58</sup>

Oliver then discerned a traditional Indian tendency to avoid conflict in interpersonal relations :

Here is a major characteristic of Indian rhetoric. Matters worthy of discussion should not be presented in such partial or personal terms that the listeners find themselves becoming partisans who disagree with one another...Far from it. Solutions should represent what the community truly understands to be essentially right. The discussion should concern itself with accepted or self-evident principles.<sup>59</sup>

The Hindu mind looks for the truth of universal principles rather than for the partial truth of particular propositions. The great Hindu philosopher Radhakrishnan supported this view of Indian thought as a synthesizing tradition which seeks to apprehend truth intuitively, as opposed to the analytical mind of the West which seeks to know truth through rational demonstration.<sup>60</sup> Oliver, too, contrasted the ego-consciousness of the West with the orthodox Hindu effort to negate self in order to achieve unity with the monistic universe :

Rhetorically, this means that whereas the West has emphasized purpose and persuasion, in the form of an eternal conflict between a speaker who seeks to dominate and a listener who seeks to defend his own conceptions, in orthodox India the emphasis has been upon avoidance of both purpose and persuasion, thereby renouncing the concept of conflict. The only tenable aim of speaker and of listener is to try to comprehend the unity which encompasses them. Differences become illusions...It is a rhetorical point of view which has exerted continuing influence upon Indian society and the Indian mind.<sup>61</sup>

An Indian tendency to minimize particulars and stress universal truths and the unity of all things was also observed by the Asian scholar Nakamura. He noted a heavy emphasis on passive sentences in classical Sanskrit, where the subject is often omitted. Such linguistic evidence reflects

the Indian preference for propositions stated impersonally...a feature of their way of thinking which places importance on unrevealed and hidden power, rather than on the spontaneity of overt individual action.<sup>62</sup>

The significance of such a world-view will become apparent in the Gandhian rhetoric to be discussed later.

While Gandhi's thought emanated largely from the heritage of the *Upanishads* and *Bhagavad Gita*, Jinnah's life was influenced by an additional "cultural rhetoric" (to use Ellingsworth's phrase), that of the Islamic tradition. It is therefore necessary to probe the rhetorical implications of this value-system as well.

The life and teachings of the Prophet Mohammed (570-632) provided a sense of moral earnestness and religious zeal which transformed the Arab world's pre-Islamic tradition of storytellers and entertaining poets. Hamod noted that "Mohammed's ideas became the basis for all future Islamic preachings; the goal became persuasion instead of entertainment, truth served by beauty". Hamod implied that Islam is almost anti-rhetorical in the sense that the *Koran*, in Sura 26, warns that "the strayers follow the rhetoricians."<sup>63</sup> That passage is translated slightly differently by Dawood :

Poets are followed by none save erring men. Behold  
how aimlessly they rove in every valley, preaching what  
they never practice.<sup>64</sup>

Despite these minor variations in translation, the intent of this passage seems to caution against the manipulators of language. For devout Muslims, ultimate Truth is Allah's Word and the ultimate in linguistic beauty is the *Koran*, in classical Arabic.

But if, as Hamod suggested, "Moslems were always aware of the difference between the ultimate truth of the *Koran*...and the truth of logic and dialectical skill combined with *Balagha* (eloquence)...which was used to capture the crowds and convert them," they by no means refrained from using the "lesser" truth of rhetoric.<sup>65</sup> The anthologies of sermons left by Muslim preachers, some of whom enjoyed substantial oratorical prowess, illustrated the use of verbal persuasion in the spread of Islam.

Another indication of the importance Muslims attached to oral communication was the prominent position its discipline held in medieval education. Since the Abbasid Caliphate which began in 750, rhetoric has been included among the "native sciences" of the Islamic curriculum, along with grammar, lexicography, literature, Koranic studies, and jurisprudence.<sup>66</sup> Since 1500, Al-Azhar University in Cairo, perhaps the most prestigious Muslim institution in the world, has taught public speaking in a manner cognizant of emotional appeals, voice pitch, rhythmical sounds, fluency, and



gestures, although naturalness and clarity of communication are stressed.<sup>67</sup>

Muslim rhetoric thus tends toward an earnestness and directness of statement, whereas Hindu rhetoric tends toward a more elusive, intuitive search for universal principles. But while the classical traditions of each system can provide insight into the significance of the communal tensions of twentieth century India, Gandhi and Jinnah responded to specific issues from the perspective of their individual personalities and from the demands of the moment. The danger of forcing any individual into the mold of his cultural heritage was stated by Stephen Hay :

“Hinduism” was for Gandhi something quite different from what it was for Rammohun Roy in the nineteenth century or for Tilak or Nehru in the twentieth ; nor was the “Islam” of Syed Ahmad identical with that of Iqbal, Jinnah, or Maudoodi. Indeed, the chief characteristic of Hindu and Islamic thought in modern South Asia has been the diversity of interpretations placed upon ancient traditions by a succession of leading thinkers, each of whom faced a different situation within his own community, within the India of his day, and with regard to the world outside India.<sup>68</sup>

Clearly then, the unique personalities and aspirations of Gandhi and Jinnah must be considered next. While intercultural research can thus entail special problems, three factors in this study tend to mitigate the difficulty of an accurate Western analysis of Eastern rhetoric : (1) both of the men to be analyzed were influenced by Western thought themselves, thus reducing the cultural gap, (2) all of the rhetoric to be studied is in the English language, thus eliminating the perceptual barriers noted by Whorf, and (3) the relative absence of emotional involvement by the researcher in the events to be studied will hopefully produce an objectivity so blatantly absent in many accounts by Indian, Pakistani, and British sources.

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## CHAPTER II

### THE PERSONAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1 surveyed the social and historical factors leading to the dispute over Indian partition. To further illuminate the setting for the Gandhi-Jinnah debate, it is necessary to review the characters of these two major personalities. This chapter, therefore, seeks to explain the essential biographical background, personality traits, ideas, values, and communicative behavior of each man. It concludes by summarizing the Gandhi-Jinnah interaction prior to 1937.

#### MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI

Hegel once suggested that the trouble with famous people is that scholars never cease studying them. Such is the case with Mohandas Gandhi. Between 1933 and 1976, more than thirty doctoral dissertations in the United States alone were devoted to his thought and influence.<sup>1</sup> An Indian historian in 1954 counted 3,671 books on Gandhiana.<sup>2</sup> The unending fascination with Gandhi testifies to his unique fusion of ethical principles and political tactics, and his unusual ability to influence large numbers of followers.

Gandhi was born October 2, 1869 in Porbandar, coastal town on India's Kathiawar Peninsula. His father was a wealthy local official, and his mother a devout, orthodox Hindu. A frail and shy youth, Gandhi once contemplated suicide, and later admitted to traumatic fears in childhood :

Darkness was a terror to me. It was almost impossible for me to sleep in the dark, since I would imagine ghosts coming from one direction, thieves from another, and serpents from a third. I could not therefore bear to sleep without a light in the room.<sup>3</sup>

Consistent with traditional Indian custom, Gandhi was married at the early age of thirteen, and his child-bride, Kasturbai Makanji, remained his faithful wife until her death in 1944. After his family agreed that he should pursue legal training in

England, Gandhi's high school classmates at Rajkot gave a farewell party which taxed the introverted youth's self-confidence :

I had written out a few words of thanks. But I could scarcely stammer them out. I remember how my head reeled and how my whole frame shook as I stood up to read them.<sup>4</sup>

On September 4, 1888, Gandhi sailed from Bombay for London, where he completed a twelve-term residency requirement at the Inner Temple. He took his studies seriously, and read Justinian in Latin. By June 10, 1891, Gandhi passed the required examinations in Common Law and Roman Law, and was admitted to the bar. He later wrote that his law curriculum had been quite easy, with its most demanding aspect being the attendance at evening dinners. Concerning his examinations, Gandhi thought that the "question papers were easy and examiners were generous."<sup>5</sup> Indeed, he considered his legal training to have been inadequate, complaining that he did not learn even "how to draft a plaint" or anything relative to Hindu or Islamic law. He left England in 1891 entertaining serious doubts about his future career.<sup>6</sup>

Gandhi's interests and capacities extended far beyond the boundaries of law. While in England, he engaged in extra-classroom activities which, in terms of future significance, may have been more important than his legal studies. He read newspapers to improve his English, briefly studied French, dancing and Western music, and took up elocution by reading *Standard Elocutionist* by Alexander Melville Bell, father of the telephone inventor.<sup>7</sup> He read through the entire *Bible* and was especially impressed by Jesus' Sermon on the Mount. He met Madame Blavatsky, a founder of the Theosophical Movement, who introduced him to the *Bhagavad Gita*. Gandhi also wrote articles for the British press interpreting Indian customs and festivals. In numerous essays he vigorously defended vegetarianism, and became an active member of the London Vegetarian Society. He later reminisced that perhaps the greatest achievement during his years in England was his abstinence from meat and wine.<sup>8</sup>

Upon returning to India, Gandhi took up legal practice, but his first performance in court was disastrous :

I stood up, but my heart sank in my boots. My head was reeling and I felt as though the whole court was doing likewise. I could think of no question to ask. The judge must have laughed...I sat down and told the agent that I could not conduct the case....I hastened from the Court...ashamed of myself, and decided not to take up any more cases until I had courage enough to conduct them.<sup>9</sup>

Returning to Rajkot, he worked in a law office until 1893, when he accepted an invitation to serve in South Africa as a legal aid for the Dada Abdulla Company of Bombay. In his first legal case in South Africa, Gandhi helped the contending parties to reach a settlement through compromise, an accomplishment he considered exceptionally significant :

I realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases.<sup>10</sup>

Gandhi's objective was to find a unity underlying apparent diversity, a Hindu characteristic noted previously.

His legal practice exposed Gandhi to the peculiarities of South African society. He soon became acutely aware of the racist policies of the government, which imposed heavy restrictions on the mobility and economic opportunities of Asians. In Pretoria in 1893, just one week after he had been thrown off a whites-only train, Gandhi devoted his first public speech in Africa to condemn racism.<sup>11</sup> During the following two decades, he formulated and tested the methods of non-violent no-cooperative opposition to evil which he later launched against colonialism in India. Working mainly with Indian minority residents, he led strikes by miners and sugar plantation workers, directed resistance to discriminatory laws, and taught the techniques of noncooperation at his commune named Tolstoy Farm. For his disruptive tactics, Gandhi was ridi-



culed, beaten, and jailed.<sup>12</sup> But the campaign which he waged in South Africa resulted in passage of the Indian Relief Bill of 1914, which considerably relaxed legal discrimination.<sup>13</sup>

The essence of Gandhi's political methodology sprang from the deep spiritual nature of the man himself. As Brown put it, "Gandhi was first of all a religious genius, and his basic objectives were morally oriented."<sup>14</sup> Taking elements from Jesus, Ruskin, Thoreau, Tolstoy, and his own Upanishadic heritage, Gandhi developed the technique of *satyagraha* (truth-force). Incorporating the three essential ingredients of truth, non-violence (*ahimsa*), and self-suffering, such a strategy sought to convert opponents through moral suasion rather than by violent force. Gandhi consistently emphasized the necessity of absolute self-discipline and belief in the redemptive power of personal sacrifice for a great cause. He characterized his own life as a search for self-purification.<sup>15</sup> The fusion of traditional moral values and practical political objectives gave *satyagraha* its power.<sup>16</sup>

When Gandhi returned to India in 1915, he was widely acclaimed as a national hero for his successes in South Africa. He joined the All-India Congress Party, supporting its efforts to achieve independence through constitutional means. Nationalist leaders were encouraged by British indications, notably in the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals of 1917, that the increased Indian autonomy embodied in the dyarchy reforms portended imminent dominion status for India. But passage of the oppressive Rowlatt Acts and the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 disillusioned Indians about British intentions.<sup>17</sup>

Frustrated by Britain's stern colonial policies, Gandhi decided that non-violent civil disobedience could best solve India's political and social ills. On August 1, 1920, he launched a non-cooperation movement, exhorting students and workers to leave their schools and factories and join in massive demonstrations and boycotts against British rule. The Congress Party endorsed the militant program at its annual session at Nagpur in December, 1920, throwing the country in turmoil. Tens of thousands were arrested. Violence broke out, and Gandhi called off the campaign in February, 1922, convinced

that his followers were insufficiently trained in the techniques of *satyagraha*.

Despite his failure to inculcate non-violence, Gandhi nonetheless consolidated his position as undisputed leader of the Indian nationalist cause. Much of his strength resulted from his skillful uniting of both Hindus and Muslims within the movement. He frequently attended Muslim League sessions between 1915 and 1922, and his strong support of the Khilafat Movement pleased most Muslims. In 1924, after the Khilafat issue had withered and Hindu-Muslim riots erupted, Gandhi undertook a three-week fast for communal unity.

The firm belief that all religions expressed truth enabled Gandhi to win the respect and cooperation of diverse religious groups. He read Hindu, Muslim, and Christian scriptures, and often referred to his Muslim playmates in childhood and his Muslim clients in South Africa. As early as 1908, Gandhi declared that India's two major religious groups were united by their common citizenship :

India cannot cease to be one nation because people belonging to different religions live in it...In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous terms ; nor has it ever been so in India...Should we not remember that many Hindus and Mohamedans own the same ancestors and the same blood runs through their veins ? Do people become enemies because they change their religion ? Is the God of the Mohamedan different from the God of the Hindu ? Religions are different roads converging to the same point. What does it matter that we take different roads so long as we reach the same goal ? Wherein is the cause of quarrelling ?<sup>18</sup>

During the latter half of the 1920's, Gandhi's influence in the Congress waned, due partly to the failure of the first non-cooperation campaign and in part to increased opposition to his tactics. Undaunted, Gandhi journeyed widely throughout rural India, crusading against colonialism and untouchability and urging a spiritual renewal of society. In many of his speeches he portrayed pre-British India as a village paradise

where women wove their own cloth, and often he invited peasants to burn their foreign-made cloth.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, the spinning wheel (*charkha*) came to symbolize the Mahatma's movement, and he once suggested that *Swaraj* (Independence) would exist the moment Indians answered the call of the *charkha* by learning to "spin and weave".<sup>20</sup>

Gandhi's deliberate search for symbols meaningful to the illiterate masses characterized his unique qualities as a communicator. He mastered a variety of non-verbal forms of communication, all designed to help him identify more closely with India's peasantry.<sup>21</sup> Besides the spinning wheel, he utilized mud-baths, days of silence, and apparel common to rural India. During his days in England and South Africa, Gandhi wore Western-style clothes, but soon after returning to India switched to the simple loin-cloth (*dhoti*) and sandals of the impoverished peasantry. In adopting such dress, he expressed the traditional Hindu virtue of *aparigraha* (non-possession), undoubtedly increasing his credibility with the masses.<sup>22</sup>

Gandhi captured further national attention through dramatic symbolic acts, marches, and demonstrations against British rule. Especially noteworthy was his great "Salt March to the Sea" in 1930. From March 12 to April 5, he led a procession, at times stretching for two miles, on a 241-mile journey to the sea town of Dandi. During the March his disciples placed green leaves on the dusty path. Upon reaching the coast, and amid shouts of "Hail, Deliverer!", Gandhi took salt from the ocean in open defiance of the law forbidding possession of salt not purchased from the government monopoly.<sup>23</sup> This defiant act sparked the second major non-cooperation campaign in India, and led to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931 which gained the release of political prisoners and liberalized salt manufacture laws.<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps the Indian leader's major means of non-verbal persuasion was fasting. He undertook seventeen fasts during his lifetime, for objectives ranging from workers' rights to communal harmony. Political opponents claimed, perhaps with some justification, that Gandhi used hunger strikes and

the threat of death to blackmail anyone he disagreed with. He countered by arguing that physical fasting combined with mental discipline taught one self-restraint.<sup>25</sup> But whatever his motives, Gandhi employed fasts with noteworthy success.<sup>26</sup> The coercive power of this technique emanated from the very nature of hunger, a universally-operative force possessing additional immediacy in a land of recurring famine and starvation such as India.<sup>27</sup> Gandhi recognized that by weakening his own frail body, he paradoxically strengthened his hold on public sympathy.

Although exhibiting unusual effectiveness non-verbally, Gandhi by no means neglected the spoken and written word. A prolific writer, he edited *Young India*, a weekly paper published by the Navajivan Publishing House in Ahmedabad from 1919 to 1931. In 1933, Gandhi founded *Harijan* (Children of God), a weekly published by the Servants of the Untouchable Society in Poona. These two journals became major vehicles in the dissemination of Gandhian thought.<sup>28</sup>

Gandhi's early uneasiness in the speaking situation gradually gave way to increased confidence on the public platform. His appearances before the Congress Party and negotiations with the British afforded ample opportunities for political debate. Audiences for his informal discourses during daily prayer meetings numbered in the thousands and, after the advent of broadcasting, in the millions.<sup>29</sup> His wanderings throughout India exposed him to large crowds. Frequently he spoke from a cross-legged, sitting position. Sloganeering and the singing of patriotic songs helped stimulate his listeners, and for many the mere sight of the diminutive man was an act of purification.<sup>30</sup>

Clearly, Gandhi possessed attributes frequently associated with "charisma," that elusive quality suggestive of a supernatural power over other people.<sup>31</sup> As early as 1912, the moderate Indian politician, Gopal Gokhale, noted that "Gandhi has in him the marvelous spiritual power to turn ordinary men around him into heroes and martyrs."<sup>32</sup> A Muslim historian acknowledged that many Indians "elevated him in their minds to the status of an *Avatar*, or incarnation of the deity, and it

was, therefore, obvious that his spoken and written word had special emotional appeal for the general mass of Hindus."<sup>33</sup>

But despite his undeniably charismatic qualities, Gandhi remained something of an enigma. Typical for a man given more to impulsive action than to reasoned consistency, Gandhi's thought and behavior involved ambiguities and contradictions which bewildered even his closest associates. One admirer admitted that the task of interpreting Gandhi was like trying to understand Mount Everest.<sup>34</sup> Yet, he, himself, recognized his numerous incoherencies, and once cautioned his readers :

...I am not at all concerned with appearing to be consistent. In my search after Truth I have discarded many ideas and learnt many new things...What I am concerned with is my readiness to obey the call of Truth, my God, from moment to moment, and, therefore, when anybody finds any inconsistency between any two writings of mine, if he has still faith in my sanity, he would do well to choose the later of the two on the same subject.<sup>35</sup>

To summarize, Mohandas Gandhi was an independent and creative man, at once both charismatic and enigmatic, and unswervingly dedicated to the goal of a free, united India. The deep spiritual springs of his nature combined with his flair for dramatic political maneuvers enabled him to dominate much of Indian life for nearly half a century. Biographer Robert Payne offered a cogent summation of Gandhi's personality :

He did not arrive at his conclusions by any known process of reasoning ; he would listen to the voices that spoke in the early dawn, in the pure hours before the sun rose. His preference for intuitive knowledge rather than logic, his disconcerting belief in the absolute rightness of these God-given commands often frightened his followers, who wanted to know the steps of his reasoning. There were no steps. He was a law unto himself, and so he would remain to the end of his life.<sup>36</sup>

## MOHAMMED ALI JINNAH

In comparison to that of Gandhi, the career of Mohammed Ali Jinnah has prompted relatively little scholarly analysis.<sup>37</sup> Jinnah kept no diary and wrote no autobiography. Prior to 1935, he remained primarily on the periphery of Indian politics, concentrating his considerable legal abilities on successful practices in Bombay and London. Whereas Gandhi's entire life seemed to compel attention and publicity, Jinnah's period of international recognition was limited largely to the final decade of his life. Even then, he emerged as the spokesman for limited, sectarian interests, in contrast to the more universal themes and appeals of Gandhi. But during the years preceding partition Jinnah cleverly garnered sufficient power so as to prevent any Indian settlement without his consent. Nichols may not have exaggerated in claiming that by 1944 Jinnah had become "the most important man in Asia."<sup>38</sup>

Tradition holds that Jinnah was born in Karachi on Christmas Day, 1876, making him seven years younger than Gandhi. His father was a successful businessman, and belonged to the Khojas, a Hindu sect of recent converts to Islam. Indeed, the name "Jinnah" is of Hindu origin, translating from Gujarati as "lean."<sup>39</sup> Jinnah's ancestors lived in the Kathiawar area of India in which Gandhi grew up, and thus, the mother tongue of each man was Gujarati.

A bright and serious student, Jinnah attended both the Sind Madrasah High School and Christian Missionary Society School in Karachi before sailing to England in 1892. In London he enrolled in Lincoln's Inn because, as he later recalled, the Prophet Mohammed was included over its portals as among the world's great law-givers.<sup>40</sup> Jinnah's evaluation of his legal studies resembled closely that of Gandhi. When asked by a close associate about his program of study, Jinnah jokingly retorted that "it was no more difficult than to give a number of dinners, some twenty-two of them, in honour of some big members of the Inn or other lawyers of eminence."<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, he spent much time listening to lectures at Lincoln's Inn and attending debates in the House of Commons.

Considerably impressed by British statesmen like Morley and Gladstone, he took an active interest in the campaign of Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), who in 1892 became the first Indian elected to the British Parliament. During his stay in England Jinnah also took up acting, and toured the country with a Shakespearian company. British manners, customs, dress, and legal concepts became deeply ingrained in his personality, and remained with him for the rest of his life.

Upon returning to Bombay in 1896, the young Muslim soon established a successful law practice, gaining a reputation for his penetrating mind, forceful courtroom presence, and austere, almost insolent, manner. One observer noted Jinnah's "pure, cold logic" while another praised his earnestness and power of argument :

When he stood up in Court, slowly looking towards the judge, placing his monocle in his eye—with the sense of timing you would expect from an actor—he became omnipotent.<sup>42</sup>

The biographer, Allana, wrote that "his method of penetrating cross-examination, his gift of persuasive pleading, aided by irrefutable arguments and supported by laws and cases, cast a spell in the court room."<sup>43</sup> M. R. Duggal described Jinnah's speaking ability this way :

As an orator, he has the triple asset of a magnetic personality, an impressive delivery, and a fluent voice. His small mannerisms, gestures, rhetoric, and influence of his tone—all play their part in making him a good debator. He has the cogent force of a brilliant advocate rather than the glowing fervour of a fiery orator. And it is not at the public platform but at the bar that he finds full scope for his unusual power of persuasions, luminous expositions and searching arguments.<sup>44</sup>

Yet, Jinnah rarely emphasized the aesthetic qualities of English. His prose was bald and factual, and once, while drafting a statement, he impatiently declared, "I don't care for beautiful language. I only wish to see my idea come through."<sup>45</sup>

Jinnah gradually became associated with the growing

*Swaraj* (Independence) movement in India. In 1906, he served as Naoroji's secretary at the National Congress Party session in Calcutta. Three years later, he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council from a Bombay Muslim constituency. Interestingly, his first speech after assuming official status supported Gandhi's crusade on behalf of South African Indians.<sup>46</sup> Jinnah joined the Congress Party and supported its goal of political independence through constitutional reform.

During a vacation trip to England in 1913, Jinnah was persuaded by Maulana Mohamed Ali and Syed Wazir Hassan to join the Muslim League (founded seven years earlier). He joined, however, only after being convinced that the League's objectives coincided with those of the Congress. Jinnah thus belonged to both the Muslim League and the Congress Party, a plausible circumstance since each group, at that time, sought Indian self-rule through Hindu-Muslim co-operation. The Lucknow Pact of 1916, which Jinnah helped draft, gave tangible evidence of their common goals.<sup>47</sup>

Jinnah believed that the minorities in any nation need to feel secure, and he consistently advocated constitutional safeguards for the political and religious rights of Muslims. But the outstanding factor in Jinnah's ideology prior to 1937 was his assurance that such safeguards could be achieved through legal means, and that Hindu-Muslim unity was a necessary prerequisite in the Indian struggle for independence. Given his complete change of attitude after 1937, one may indeed conclude that "there were two Jinnahs—the Jinnah of the twenties and the Jinnah of the late thirties and of the forties."<sup>48</sup>

The dramatic reversal in Jinnah's thinking portended such great significance for Indian history that his pre-1937 views require some illustration. Certainly, his early beliefs justified Gokhale's appraisal that "the freedom from all sectarian prejudice...will make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity."<sup>49</sup> In his presidential address to the Muslim League session in Lucknow in 1916, Jinnah said :

Toward the Hindus our attitude should be of good-



will and brotherly feelings. Co-operation to the cause of our motherland should be our guiding principle. India's real progress can only be achieved by a true understanding and harmonious relations between the two great sister communities.<sup>50</sup>

To the League session in Lahore in 1924, when a resolution was passed supporting Hindu-Muslim unity, he declared, "One essential requisite condition to achieve Swaraj is the political unity between Hindus and Muslims...I am almost inclined to say that India will get Dominion Responsible Government, the day the Hindus and Muslims are united."<sup>51</sup> At the All-Parties National Convention in Calcutta in 1928, Jinnah remarked :

Believe me there is no progress for India until the Mussalmans and the Hindus are united, and let not logic, philosophy, or squabble stand in the way of coming to a compromise and nothing will make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.<sup>52</sup>

In September, 1934, he was quoted as saying, "I am an Indian first, and a Muslim afterwards."<sup>53</sup> In February, 1935, he restated his belief that "so long as Hindus and Muslims are not united, let me tell you, there is no hope for India and we shall both remain slaves of foreign domination."<sup>54</sup> To the Jamiut-ul-ulema Conference in Delhi in April, 1936, Jinnah said, "The eighty millions Muslims of India are willing and even more anxious than any other community to fight for the freedom of mother India, hand in hand with other communalities."<sup>55</sup> At Calcutta University in August, 1936, he stated that "India's salvation lies in the unity of all communities especially the Hindus and Muslims."<sup>56</sup> His radical about-face in 1937 will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Jinnah's consistent advocacy prior to 1937 of the need for Hindu-Muslim co-operation was accompanied by a notably uneven course of involvement in Indian politics. In 1916, he resigned from the Imperial Legislative Council in opposition to the repressive Rowlatt Acts. In 1920, he resigned from the Congress Party in frustration over its new program of militant non-cooperation, led by Gandhi. Jinnah viewed politics as the business of educated lawyers working through a constitu-

tional process, not the work of illiterate masses roaming the streets. He also left the Home-Rule League at this time, since it, too, had come under the strong influence of Gandhi. Jinnah's only organizational affiliation thereafter was with the Muslim League. But the League, during the 1920's and early thirties, attracted primarily educated lawyers and wealthy landowners, and thus enjoyed little popular following.

In 1928, Jinnah again sought accord with Congress Party forces at the nation-wide All-Parties conference held in Calcutta in December. The Conference was called in an attempt to unite political sentiment in India, and specifically, to discuss the Motilal Nehru Report, which rejected the idea of separate electorates. Jinnah, as already noted, urged Hindu-Muslim unity, but also pleaded for the recognition of minority rights and proposed that one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature be reserved for Muslims. The Conference completely rejected Jinnah's plan, and he was denounced by a Mahasabha delegate as unrepresentative of most Muslim sentiment in India, and characterized by another Hindu speaker as a "spoilt child."<sup>57</sup> Jinnah left the Conference in disgust, but Sayeed observed that he may have learned an important lesson, "...that political leadership did not rest merely on one's forensic ability to plead a political case. It also depended on political strength, that is, the actual support that one had among the masses of people."<sup>58</sup>

Perhaps as a response to the Nehru Report, Jinnah issued his "Fourteen Points" in March, 1929 (undoubtedly imitating Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" of 1918). They called for a federal constitution with provincial autonomy, adequate representation for minorities, an option for separate electorates, protection of Muslim territorial rights, insurances of religious liberty, and promotion of Islamic culture. But possessing no powerful political base from which to promote his case, Jinnah could muster little support for his ideas.

His failure to influence political events effectively was compounded by personal problems. In 1918, Jinnah had married Ruttenbai (Ruttie) Petit, the attractive, socially active daughter of a wealthy Bombay Parsee. Marital trouble ensued

and Ruttie separated from Jinnah just before her early death of peritonitis in 1929. Public humiliation over the collapse of his marriage probably hastened Jinnah's decision to withdraw from Indian politics and move to England.<sup>59</sup>

Accompanied by his sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah, who remained his devoted companion and assistant, Jinnah returned to London in 1930 and bought a house on West Heath Road. He took up a law practice before the Privy Council, resolving to watch Indian constitutional developments from the British capital. England proved a good vantage point, for between 1930 and 1932 London hosted three Round-Table Conferences on the political future of India. The meetings did little to weaken Britain's colonial ambitions. Although he attended, Jinnah played no significant role in the Conferences.<sup>60</sup> He did, however, frequently see Round-Table delegate Muhammad Iqbal, the Urdu poet who in 1930 had advanced the idea of a separate state for Indian Muslims. Jinnah did not at the time share such a view.

The year 1933 proved to be noteworthy in the life of Jinnah. That year a Cambridge student named Chaudhri Rahmat Ali coined the word "Pakistan" to refer to what he hoped would become the nation of Muslim India. The name was disseminated in Ali's revolutionary pamphlet, "Now or Never", in which he pictured the death of Islamic India unless strong political measures were taken to preserve Muslim culture.<sup>61</sup> In July, Jinnah received a visit from Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951) who was honeymooning in London. The bright Muslim lawyer urged Jinnah to return to India and resurrect the disorganized Muslim League.<sup>62</sup> Four months later, the League officially petitioned Jinnah to aid the Muslim cause in India. After two trips to assess his potential following, he finally left England in October, 1935 to assume the leadership of the League.

Political thought among Indian Muslims during this period ranged widely, from full support for the Congress Party to complete rejection of cooperation with Hindus. As only one among several contending Muslim organizations and still lacking popular support, the League represented little political power in 1935.<sup>63</sup> Jinnah therefore spent his first months back

in India in attempting to ascertain Muslim opinion. He did, however, speak out frequently against the Government of India Act of 1935, calling it insufficient in protecting minority rights and incomplete in granting India self-government. In the spring of 1936, Jinnah went to Lahore and helped calm passions aroused by conflicting Sikh and Muslim claims to the Shahid-ganj Mosque. Trying to formulate a compromise ending Muslim civil disobedience in exchange for the release of political prisoners, Jinnah called on Muslims to abide by constitutional action and seek conciliation with "the sister community" of Sikhs.<sup>64</sup>

Jinnah's career prior to 1937 promoted the image of a self-reliant and highly prosperous lawyer dedicated to both Indian independence and communal cooperation. Hindus, Muslims, and the British alike respected his incisive mind and admired his undisputed integrity. Jinnah had spent nearly ten years in England, and his personality bore clear impressions of Western influence. English was the only language he spoke fluently, and he dressed in striking Western-style business suits and ties. One British lady who met Jinnah in 1929 described him as "a great personality...He talks the most beautiful English. He models his manners and clothes on Du Maurier, the actor, and his English on Burke's Speeches."<sup>65</sup> The aristocratic and legalistic Jinnah thus contrasted sharply to the peasant-like, spiritually-oriented Gandhi, even prior to their great ideological cleavage of 1937-1947.

#### GANDHI-JINNAH INTERACTION PRIOR TO 1937

A full understanding of the Gandhi-Jinnah clash during the decade preceding India's partition must take account of the fact that these two men had already known each other for nearly a generation. Their association reached back to the days of Gandhi's campaigns in South Africa. On February 22, 1908 Gandhi wrote a Gujarati letter to *Indian Opinion* defending his *satyagraha* philosophy against charges that his program divided Hindus and Muslims. The charges had reportedly been made in a letter to Jinnah, and Gandhi wrote that he knew of Jinnah and regarded him "with respect."<sup>66</sup> That summer

Gandhi wrote another letter suggesting that the Muslim lawyer might even come to South Africa to support the Indians' cause.<sup>67</sup> That possibility never materialized, although Jinnah's first speech after his election to the Imperial Council in 1909 endorsed Gandhi's objectives.

For his successful efforts in South Africa Gandhi became a hero and was honored at several receptions. Jinnah attended one such event at London's Cecil Hotel on August 8, 1914 at which Gandhi again evidenced hesitancy in public speaking by telling his admirers : "I do not even know that I can struggle through what I have to say."<sup>68</sup> The following January Jinnah was present for another garden party in Gandhi's honor at the home of Sir Jehangir Petit in Bombay. Gandhi later recalled the occasion :

Mr. Jinnah was present, being a Gujarati, I forget whether as president or as the principal speaker. He made a short and sweet little speech in English. As far as I remember most of the other speeches were also in English. When my turn came, I expressed my thanks in Gujarati, explaining my partiality for Gujarati and Hindustani, and entering my humble protest against the use of English in a Gujarati gathering.<sup>69</sup>

The socially elite attending that reception may have been a bit dismayed and even insulted that Gandhi should appear barefoot dressed only in a *dhoti*, and flaunt established practice by speaking in Gujarati. One biographer asserted that "Mr. Jinnah was definitely hurt."<sup>70</sup>

Nevertheless, the next four years saw Jinnah and Gandhi cooperate in their common devotion to Indian nationalism. Both participated in the Muslim League meeting held in Bombay on December 30, 1915. The following October they attended a Provincial Conference in Bombay where Gandhi nominated Jinnah to serve as President of the Conference, describing him as "a learned Muslim gentleman...an eminent lawyer...and not only a member of the Legislature but also President of the biggest Islamic Association in India."<sup>71</sup> Three months later they appeared together at the Muslim League session at Lucknow. Jinnah moved a proposal condemning the mistreat-

ment of Indians in British colonies ; Gandhi then spoke and urged Muslims to promote Urdu but to learn Hindi as well.<sup>72</sup>

In 1918, at the height of Hindu-Muslim unity, their cordial relationship continued. In a speech at Ahmedabad on June 14, Gandhi stated that he had talked with Jinnah and Annie Besant and that all agreed to support the British effort in World War I.<sup>73</sup> Two days later, Gandhi and Jinnah led Home Rule Day celebrations in Bombay attracting a crowd estimated at 15,000. Jinnah used the occasion to criticize British policy concerning the Indian army.<sup>74</sup> A month later Gandhi wrote to Jinnah asking for cooperation in recruiting soldiers for the British and support for proposed amendments to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.<sup>75</sup>

On June 28, 1919, Gandhi wrote a cordial letter to his Muslim friend who was then vacationing in England. He enumerated his political goals, which included repeal of the Rowlatt Acts, protection of Transvaal Indians, and the training of helpers on his paper, *Young India*. He expressed the hope that Mrs. Jinnah would join a hand-spinning class as soon as they returned and urged Jinnah to learn Gujarati and Hindi "as soon as possible."<sup>76</sup> That December, at the National Congress Party session in Amritsar, Jinnah seconded a motion by Gandhi supporting the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms : "I, therefore, say that Mahatma Gandhi does not propose to do anything more than what this house has expressed over and over again—that we must work the Reforms Act."<sup>77</sup>

As noted earlier, Gandhi's frustration at British failures to grant complete self-government prompted the national Non-cooperation Movement launched in 1920. The decision to encourage massive civil disobedience throughout India ended the generally cordial relationship between Gandhi and Jinnah. As a legalistic aristocrat, Jinnah felt that non-cooperation would produce chaos and violence without securing independence (and two years later his view had been vindicated). Gandhi, however, enjoyed almost universal support among Indians at this time, and it was said that he "could have started a violent revolution with a word, so much power did he have."<sup>78</sup> In fact, of all the Muslim delegates on the Subjects

*Committee of the Special (Calcutta) Session of the Congress in September, 1920, Jinnah cast the only vote against Gandhi's non-cooperation resolution.*<sup>79</sup>

Jinnah's disapproval of Gandhi's increasing militancy caused him to resign from the Home Rule League in October, 1920. In his letter of resignation, Jinnah accused the nationalist leader of ignoring the League's Charter, of becoming a dictator and the sponsor of illegal activities. He wrote, "... your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and illiterate. All this means disorganization and chaos."<sup>80</sup>

Gandhi responded in an article published in *Navajivan*. He defended his actions and said the resignations of Jinnah and the other nineteen people "pained" him. However he concluded that "when basic ideals are in question, one has to part from one's dearest friends and be happy in doing so."<sup>81</sup> On October 25, Gandhi wrote a personal letter again justifying his programs and inviting Jinnah to reconsider his resignation so that he might join in the "new life" opening before the country. Writing that he still held Jinnah's legal knowledge in "high regard," Gandhi argued that "to disregard a tyrannical administrative order may be contrary to law but it is not an 'illegal activity'."<sup>82</sup>

Jinnah's opposition to Gandhi's methods reached a showdown at the Congress Party Conference at Nagpur in December 1920. Jinnah was "the only dissentient" to the resolution supporting Non-cooperation among the 14,582 delegates, of whom 1,050 were Muslims.<sup>83</sup> In a speech at Nagpur Jinnah offered his doubts about civil disobedience and referred to "Mr. Gandhi" and "Mr. Mahammad Ali" (the Khilafat leader), a breach of decorum, which, according to Majumdar, created a tremendous uproar among the audience who shouted that Mr. Jinnah must prefix Mahatma and Maulana whenever he mentioned the names of Gandhi and Mahammad Ali. Jinnah refused to be coerced and was shouted down....This was the last Congress meeting in which Jinnah actively participated.<sup>84</sup>

**Jinnah further clarified his opposition to non-cooperation**

while speaking in Bombay on February 19, 1921 at ceremonies marking the sixth anniversary of Gokhale's death. He admitted to continuing respect and admiration for Gandhi, but suggested that his methods possessed spiritual qualities lacking in basic political principles. He feared that violence would inevitably result from popular movements because the Indian people were human beings and not saints.<sup>85</sup>

Significantly, Gandhi and Jinnah remained on speaking terms despite their disagreements. Both took part in a Leaders' Conference held in Bombay in January, 1922, in which the possibility of a Round-Table Conference with the British was discussed.<sup>86</sup> Undoubtedly each man's commitment to Hindu-Muslim unity facilitated their continuing mutual respect. In the May 29, 1924 issue of *Young India*, Gandhi wrote :

I agree with Mr. Jinnah that Hindu-Muslim unity means swaraj. I see no way of achieving anything in this afflicted country without a lasting heart unity between Hindus and Mussalmans of India. I believe in the immediate possibility of achieving it, because it is so natural, so necessary for both, and because I believe in human nature.<sup>87</sup>

On November 20, Gandhi met Jinnah in Bombay and they agreed on a Resolution condemning British criminal practices which included power to arrest persons without a trial or even a statement of reason for the arrest.<sup>88</sup> During the winter of 1924-25, both Gandhi and Jinnah worked at sessions of the All-Parties Conference seeking ways to insure communal harmony, but nothing tangible resulted from the Conference.<sup>89</sup> Their paths crossed again on November 2, 1927 when both went to the Viceroy's house to receive news of Royal Commission appoints.<sup>90</sup>

Gandhi and Jinnah met several times in 1929. In August they conferred privately over the communal question. Two months later, Viceroy Irwin announced British acceptance of a Round-Table Conference and hinted at eventual Dominion status for India. On December 12, Jinnah travelled to Gandhi's *ashram* (retreat) at Sabarmati to discuss the Viceroy's vagueness concerning Independence. On December 23, both men met



with Viceroy Irwin in Delhi concerning the Round-Table Conference and release of political prisoners. Saiyid reported that "perfect cordiality prevailed throughout the interview," but Gandhi was not satisfied with Irwin's refusal to make assurances concerning independence.<sup>91</sup> Under the guidance of Gandhi and his heir-apparent, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Party met in Lahore a week later and renewed its threat of civil disobedience unless full Independence were granted. Jinnah reacted by referring to the violence of the 1920's and said Gandhi seemed "mentally and constitutionally incapable of learning and unlearning things."<sup>92</sup>

Jinnah's retirement to England in the early 1930's temporarily eliminated his direct association with Gandhi, who turned much of his own attention in those years to the problems of the caste system and the removal of Untouchability. The foregoing survey indicates that prior to their clash concerning Indian Partition these two men had already learned to respect each other, to talk, to cooperate, and to disagree. Prior to 1937, both men were united by a common dedication to Indian independence and Hindu-Muslim unity. They radically differed as to the best means of achieving *swaraj*. Jinnah's elitist view of politics prevented his acceptance of Gandhi's deliberate appeal for popular involvement in opposing the British. In the next decade, however, Jinnah would adopt Gandhi's methodology and consciously marshal the Muslim masses in the campaign for Pakistan.

The two men also differed significantly in their personalities and life-styles. Jinnah's opulent house in Bombay symbolized the aristocratic lawyer, just as the humble huts of Gandhi's *ashrams* epitomized his asceticism. Jinnah was undoubtedly irked by Gandhi's simple dress, while Jinnah's failure to learn any native Indian languages obviously disturbed Gandhi. As Nanda put it,

Gandhi's religious frame of mind, his habit of self-analysis, his emphasis on such abstractions as truth and non-violence, his conscious humility, his voluntary poverty—all these were alien to Jinnah's own make-up and struck him either as a political irrelevance or

as downright hypocrisy. There are indications that Jinnah even suffered from a feeling that he had been unfairly edged out of the forefront of the political stage by Gandhi.<sup>93</sup>

Each man had proven himself to be steadfast in his convictions. Thus when Jinnah, beginning in 1937, reversed his beliefs concerning Hindu-Muslim relations in India, the stage was set for a monumental controversy.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Jagdish S. Sharma, *Mahatma Gaudhi : A Descriptive Bibliography* (Delhi : S. Chand and Co., 1955).
3. Quoted in C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi, His Own Story* (New York : Macmillan, 1931), p. 56.
4. M K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, I (Delhi : Government of India, Publications Division, 1958), p. 1.
5. M. K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography : The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, trans. Mahadev Desai (Washington, D. C. : Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 104.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
7. Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York : E. P. Dutton, 1969), p. 70.
8. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works*, I, 63. Gandhi's vegetarianism and interest in dietary theories persisted throughout his life. In general, his stay in England made him more aware of Indian values and ideas. Broadened vision, discovery of one's own values, and increased self-confidence are commonly recognized results of overseas study. See John and Ruth Useem, *The Western-Educated Man in India* (New York : Dryden Press, 1955).
9. M. K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography*, p. 120.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
11. Louis Fischer, *Gandhi : His Life and Message for the World* (New York : Mentor, 1954), p. 22.
12. He ultimately spent 2,338 days, or nearly six and a half years of his life in jail. M. K. Gandhi, *The Gandhi Reader*, ed. Homer A. Jack (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1956), p. 516.
13. For a thorough description of this segment of Gandhi's life, see Robert A. Huttenback, *Gandhi in South Africa ; British Imperialism and the Indian Question, 1860-1914* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1971).
14. W. Norman Brown, *The United States, India, and Pakistan* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1963) p. 92.
15. M. K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography*, pp. 615-16. In 1906, Gandhi took the vow of *brahmacharya* (celibacy) which he kept until his death. He considered abstinence from sex a means of spiritual development. Perhaps he also felt lingering shame for having left his father's death bed in 1885 due to lust for his wife. See Payne, *Life and Death*, p. 42.
16. Gandhi formulated elaborate codes of discipline and behavior patterns for practitioners of *satyagraha*. His loosely-knit philosophy possessed elements at once both conservative and anarchistic. For a lucid analysis of *satyagraha*, see Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence : The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1958).
17. See Chapter I, p. 29.
18. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, ed. Anand T. Hingorani (Karachi : Anand T. Hingorani, 1947), pp. v-vi.
19. Payne, *Life and Death*, p. 343. The burning of foreign cloth and love of civil disobedience brought Gandhi into conflict with Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), an important Bengali poet-philosopher who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913. The humanistic poet held reservations about Gandhi's ardent nationalism, and disliked the somewhat naive and reactionary emphasis Gandhi placed on the past. However, they greatly respected each other and remained friends. See Fischer, *Life and Message*, pp. 50-51, and Sibnarayan Ray, "Tagore-Gandhi Controversy", *Gandhi, India and the World*, ed. Sibnarayan Ray (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1970), pp 119-41.
20. Payne, *Life and Death*, p. 351.
21. Gandhi is thus a prime example of the Burkeian doctrine of consubstantiality. Burke wrote that the desire of interpersonal identification admits to division : "If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be man's very essence." See Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York : George Braziller, 1955), pp. 20-23 and 55-58 ; For an

extended discussion of Gandhi's nonverbal strategies, see my "Symbolic Action in India : Gandhi's Nonverbal Persuasion," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* LXI (October, 1975), pp. 290-306.

22. The effect on the aristocratic and empire-minded Winston Churchill was quite different. He later denounced Gandhi as a "seditious fakir, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceregal Palace to parley on equal terms with representatives of the King Emperor." Syed Abdul Lateef, *The Great Leader* (Lahore : Lion Press, 1961), p. 117.

23. Payne, *Life and Death*, pp. 389-93.

24. In his mastery of non-verbal forms of persuasion, Gandhi resembled other twentieth-century leaders such as Hitler, Mao Tse-tung, and Martin Luther King, Jr. For a sampling of recent scholarship concerning the political and social significance of symbolic physical acts, see Haig A. Bosmajian (ed.), *The Rhetoric of Nonverbal Communication : Readings* (Glenview, Ill. : Scott, Foresman, 1971) ; and Bosmajian : *Symbolic Behavior and Rhetorical Strategies* (Dissent, Boston : Allyn and Bacon, 1972).

25. M. K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography*, p. 406.

26. Gandhi's first fast occurred in Ahmedabad in 1918, his last in New Delhi in 1948. One of his most publicized was the "Fast Unto Death" in 1932, occasioned by Prime Minister Macdonald's granting of separate electorates to "Untouchables." Gandhi opposed the plan since it would perpetuate the caste system ; he wanted the abolition of untouchability and the political unification of all Hindus. Officials hastily agreed to the "Yervada Pact" which stated that no one would be considered untouchable by reason of birth. The impact of the fast on Indian society was great : "...weddings were postponed, and most Hindus refrained from going to cinemas, theaters, and restaurants. A spirit of reform, penance, and self-purification swept the land." Fischer, *Life and Message*, p. 123.

27. In his theory of human motivation, psychologist Abraham Maslow lists hunger as the most basic of man's instinctoid needs, a hierarchy of elements essential to self-fulfilment or self-actualization. By flaunting this natural human need, Gandhi gained some measure of supernatural power. See Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York : Harper and Row, 1954).

28. A summary of Gandhi's journalistic history can be found in M. K. Gandhi, *The Way to Communal Harmony*, ed. U. R. Rao (Ahmedabad ; Navajivan Publishing House, 1963), pp. 409-10.

29. Margaret Bourke-White, *Halfway to Freedom* (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1949), pp. 38-39.

30. The primacy of Gandhi's character, personality, and program as persuasive tools is discussed in Robert T. Oliver, *Leadership in 20th Century Asia* (State College : Pennsylvania State University, Center for Continuing Liberal Education, 1966), pp. 199-209.

31. Such attributes usually include a high degree of spiritual energy including an aura of "Messiahhood," high credibility, a demand for obedience by one's followers, innovative techniques of action, a hazardous message, and an ability to manipulate cultural myths. See George P. Boss, "Essential Attributes of the Concept of Charisma," *Southern Speech Communication Journal* XLI (Spring, 1976), p. 301.

32. Fischer, *Life and Message*, p. 43.

33. Gulam Ali Allana, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah : The Story of a Nation* (Lahore : Ferozsons, 1967), p. 103. Singer found that some Hindus revered Gandhi as a *sadhu* (ascetic pilgrim) possessing *sattva-guna* (the quality of discrimination and divine illumination). See Philip Singer, "Hindu Holy Men : A Study in Charisma" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Syracuse University, 1961), pp. 13-33.

34. E. Stanley Jones, *Mahatma Gandhi : An Interpretation* (New York : Abingdon Press, 1948), p. 5.

35. Originally in *Harjan*, April 29, 1933 ; quoted from M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule* (2nd ed : Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1962), p. 4. Several illustrations may demonstrate his inconsistencies. He advocated non-violence and yet actively recruited troops for Britain in World War I. He withdrew from the Congress in 1934, yet its leaders rarely made a decision without his advice and consent for a decade thereafter. He claimed to be a Muslim in spirit, yet stoutly defended cow protection and idol worship. He denounced coercion, yet his fasts were coercive. Perhaps it is the challenge of systematizing his complexity which has stimulated such extensive scholarship on Gandhi.

36. Payne, *Life and Death*, p. 383.

37. The half-dozen or so Jinnah biographies contrast to the thousands of Gandhi, and in *American Doctoral Dissertations on Asia* Strucki reported only one devoted to Jinnah, compared to eighteen on Gandhi.

38. Beverley Nichols, *Verdict on India* (Bombay : Thacker, 1946), p. 215.

39. Lateef, *The Great Leader*, p. 10. Jinnah was only a second-generation Muslim, his grandfather having been a Hindu. Fischer suggested that the constant rebuffs to Khoja efforts to return to Hinduism in the nineteenth century may have been a subconscious factor in his later hatred of Hindus. Fischer, *Life and Message*, p. 151.

40. Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (London : John Murray 1954), p. 9.

41. Matlublal Hasan Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah (A Political Study)* (Lahore : Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1945), p. 3.

42. Quoted in Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 18.

43. Allana, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah*, p. 29.

44. Quoted in Lateef, *The Great Leader*, p. 173.
45. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 13.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
47. The full text of the Lucknow Pact, which called for a broadened franchise, special electorates for Muslims, and detailed constitutional reforms for both provincial and central governments, can be found in G. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement ; Historic Documents* (Karachi : Paradise Subscription Agency, 1967), pp 25-33.
48. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Personality of Jinnah and His Political Strategy," *The Partition of India : Policies and Perspectives*, 1935-1947, ed. Cyril Henry Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (London : Allen and Unwin, 1970), p 277.
49. Quoted in Lateef, *The Great Leader*, p. 47.
50. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 26.
51. *Ibid* , p. 107.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-13.
53. Allana, *Quaid-e-Azcm*, p. 239.
54. Lateef, *The Great Leader*, p. 125.
55. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 160.
56. Quoted in Z. H. Zaidi "Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47," *Partition of India*, ed. Philips and Wainwright, p. 251.
57. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 94.
58. Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan : The Formative Phase. 1857-1948* (2nd ed. ; London : Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 75.
59. For a discussion of Jinnah's incompatibility with his wife and his rejection of their only child because she married a Christian, see Bourke-White, *Halfway to Freedom*, pp. 96-97.
60. The first Round-Table Conference spanned November 12, 1930 to January 19, 1931 ; the second, September 7, 1931 to December 1, 1931 ; and the third, November 17, 1932 to December 24, 1932 The Congress Party boycotted the first Conference. Gandhi, just released from jail, was its sole representative at the second Conference. In his speeches, he emphasized the broad-based support in India for the Congress Party's nationalist campaign. See Cyril Henry Philips (ed.), *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947 : Select Documents* (London : Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 242-44 ; and James D. Hunt, *Gandhi in London* (New Delhi : Promilla, 1978), pp. 192-225.
61. The name "Pakistan" has a double meaning. It can be interpreted as an acronym, with the "P" standing for the Punjab, "A" for the Afghan (Northwest Frontier) area, "K" for Kashmir, "I" for Islam, "S" for the Sind, and "TAN" for Baluchistan. The word can also connote "Land of the Pure" since "pak" is the Persian-Urdu word for clean and pure.
62. Educated at Aligarh and Oxford, Liaquat Ali Khan became

Jinnah's chief aid in the fight for Pakistan, and served as the nation's first Prime Minister until his assassination in 1951. During his North American tour in 1950, he justified Pakistan's creation with language almost identical to that used by Jinnah during the Partition debate. See Liaquat Ali Khan, *Pakistan, The Heart of Asia : Speeches in the United States and Canada, May and June, 1950* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1951).

63. For discussions of Muslim League weakness and the fragmented nature of Muslim politics during this period, see Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 437 and 553-54, and Sayeed, *Pakistan*, pp. 176-77.

64. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 530-33.

65. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 96. *New York Times* correspondent George E. Jones wrote in 1946 that Jinnah was "undoubtedly one of the best dressed men in the British Empire". Fischer, *Life and Message*, p. 150.

66. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, VIII (Delhi: Government of India, Publications Division, 1962), p. 100.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 368 and 381.

68. *Ibid.*, XII (1964), p. 523.

69. Quoted in Lateef, *The Great Leader*, p. 32.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

71. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works*, XIII (1964), p. 304.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 325-26

73. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works*, XIV (1965), p. 452.

74. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 194-201.

75. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works*, XIV (1965), p. 562.

76. *Ibid.*, XV (1965), pp. 398-99

77. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 51. It is significant that at this time Jinnah referred to Gandhi by the laudatory title "Mahatma" (Great Soul) given to him by Tagore. He later refused to use the term.

78. Harlan J. Lewin, "Charismatic Authority and Technological Integration" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation. University of California, Berkeley, 1969), p. 158.

79. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 76.

80. Richard Symonds. *The Making of Pakistan* (London : Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 58.

81. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works*, XVIII (1965), p. 366.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 371-72.

83. Symonds, *Pakistan*, p. 58.

84. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 78.

85. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 268-79.

86. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works*, XXII (1966), p. 179.

87. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works*, XXIV (1967), p. 153.

88. *Ibid.*, XXV (1967), p. 340.

89. Possible reasons for the failure were lack of urgency on the part of the participants, British bureaucracy, and the difficulty in trying to gain the cooperation of India's masses. See Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 324 and 340.

90. B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi; A Biography* (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 274.

91. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 467.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

93. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 405.



### CHAPTER III

#### PROGRESS OF THE DEBATE, 1937-1942

(MOHAMMED ALI Jinnah's convictions concerning Hindu-Muslim relations underwent a clear and discernable change in 1937. Previously he had advocated minority safeguards through communal cooperation, and even as late as May, 1937, wrote to Gandhi that "nobody will welcome an honourable settlement between the Hindus and the Musalmans more than I."<sup>1</sup> By the end of 1937, Jinnah had sharply increased his attacks on the Congress Party and redirected the Muslim League toward a more militant policy of communal power.

A major cause of Jinnah's switch involved the provincial elections of 1937. The Government of India Act two years earlier provided for provincial autonomy, and elections were held early in 1937 to fill provincial ministries. As the dominant political power in India, the Congress Party won overwhelming victories throughout the nation; the Muslim League did poorly in winning only 4.6 % of the total Muslim vote.<sup>2</sup> Buoyed by their strong showing, Congress leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected any cooperation with the Muslim League, dismissing it as a handful of upperclass misfits. On several occasions Jinnah unsuccessfully approached the Congress seeking the participation of non-Congress Muslim elements in the provincial ministries. Nehru felt no need for accommodation, believing that the British and the Congress were the only two important groups in Indian politics. An incensed Jinnah retorted, "There is a third party...the Muslims."<sup>3</sup>

The Congress Party's refusal to compromise with the Muslim League following the 1937 elections intensified Muslim fears that Indian independence would mean a virtual dictatorship by the Hindu-dominated Congress. Philips observed that by ignoring the Muslim League the Congress had "completely miscalculated" and paved the way for a strong Muslim backlash.<sup>4</sup> Percival Griffiths called the Congress policy a "grave tactical blunder" enabling Muslims to feel excluded

from office because of religion.<sup>5</sup> Even Nehru's biographer concurred :

Had the Congress handled the League more tactfully after the elections, Pakistan might never have come into being...Jinnah certainly created Pakistan. But the Congress by its sins of omission and commission also helped to make it possible. Misreading the poor showing of the Muslim League at the polls...the Congress spurned Muslim League overtures for a coalition. The result was not to drive the League into political wilderness but to strengthen Jinnah's hands as the foremost champion of Muslim claims and rights.<sup>6</sup>

The British scholar Penderel Moon similarly concluded that Congress failure to cooperate with the League following the elections was "the prime cause of the creation of Pakistan."<sup>7</sup>

In the face of the intransigence and non-cooperation of the Congress Party, Jinnah also came increasingly under the influence of the separationist-minded Muhammad Iqbal. Iqbal viewed Jinnah as the strongest leader in Muslim politics, and during 1937 sent a series of letters to Jinnah expressing fears about the Hindu domination of Islam. On May 28 he wrote that the only alternative to "a free Muslim state or states" would be civil war and condemned Nehru's "atheistic socialism" as inimical to "the original purity of Islam."<sup>8</sup> On June 21 Iqbal again wrote to Jinnah, mentioning communal riots in the Punjab, instances of vilification of the Prophet, and the burning of the *Koran* by Hindus and Sikhs :

To my mind the new constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces...is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are ?<sup>9</sup>

Jinnah later admitted that Iqbal played a decisive role in converting him to the belief that India must be divided.<sup>10</sup>

Thus 1937 saw an erosion of Jinnah's early dedication to communal unity. Constant rebuffs by the Congress Party, the influence of Iqbal, personality clashes with Hindu leaders like Nehru and Gandhi, and his own ambitions to assert power contributed to Jinnah's change. The first major indication of his break appeared in his Presidential Address to the annual session of the Muslim League meeting in Lucknow in October, 1937. That speech is noteworthy for its strong condemnation of the Congress Party :

The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Mussalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu...The result of the present Congress Party policy will be, I venture to say, class bitterness, communal war and strengthening of the imperialistic hold as a consequence.<sup>11</sup>

To support his claim that the Congress was becoming increasingly Hindu-oriented, Jinnah cited the efforts to make Hindi the national language and *Bande Mataram* (an invocation to the Hindu goddess, Kali) the national anthem. He also objected to the loyalty oaths required of all Muslim provincial ministers and the growing pressure on Indians to revere the Congress flag.<sup>12</sup> He charged that the Congress had "done nothing" to insure security for Muslims and had pursued "suicidal and futile" programs of civil disobedience.<sup>13</sup>

Exhibiting a decidedly Machiavellian attitude, Jinnah said all safeguards of Muslim rights "would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed up by power" for "politics means power and not relying only on cries of justice or fair-play or good will."<sup>14</sup> He served notice that "the All-India Muslim League has now come to live, and play its just part in the world of Indian politics."<sup>15</sup> He also attacked the British proposal to partition Palestine to create a "national home for the Jews"—an act he said would represent "the complete ruination and destruction of every legitimate aspiration of the Arabs in their homeland."<sup>16</sup> Throughout his speech, Jinnah included urgent appeals to India's Muslims to organize around the League :

God only helps those who help themselves...I want the Musalmans to believe in themselves and take their destiny in their own hands. We want men of faith and resolution who have the courage and determination and who would fight single-handed for their convictions...Enlist yourselves by hundreds and thousands as quickly as you can as members of the All-India Muslim League...Organise yourselves, establish your solidarity and complete unity. Equip yourselves, as trained and disciplined soldiers...a well-knit, solid, organised, united force can face any danger, and withstand any opposition to its united front and wishes. There is the magic power in your own hands.<sup>17</sup>

Nowhere in his Lucknow speech did Jinnah mention the possibility of a separate Islamic nation. Obviously his primary goal in the address was to unify India's Muslim masses behind the League. By emphasizing words like "unity, solidarity," and "organization," he showed concern for popular support. Cognizant of the League's weakness in relation to the powerful Congress, Jinnah sought to create a base of power for future skirmishes, rather than espouse any immediate cause or ideology. The aloof, constitutional lawyer now recognized the truism grasped by Gandhi decades earlier—that the ultimate source of political power lay in organizing the masses. Bolitho aptly described the Lucknow speech as the beginning of Jinnah's "ascent towards final power."<sup>18</sup>

The address drew an immediate response from Mohandas Gandhi, who wrote that "the whole of your speech is a declaration of war."<sup>19</sup> On November 5 Jinnah replied by writing "I am sorry you think my speech at Lucknow is a declaration of war. It is purely in self-defence. Kindly read it again and try to understand it...Evidently you have not been following the course of events of the past twelve months."<sup>20</sup>

Correspondence between the two leaders increased. Jinnah intensified his criticism of the Congress Party while Gandhi sought to subordinate communal division to the quest for independence. In February, 1938, Gandhi wrote :

In your speeches, I miss the old nationalist. When in

1915 I returned from the self-imposed exile in South Africa, everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both Hindus and Muslims. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah ? If you say you are, in spite of your speeches, I shall accept your word.<sup>21</sup>

Gandhi correctly perceived that Jinnah was not the same man of earlier years. Indeed, the Muslim leader was moving inexorably toward a new and radically different political philosophy. Twelve days later Jinnah replied, denying that he was no longer a nationalist and protesting that "nationalism is not the monopoly of any single individual, and in these days it is very difficult to define it ; but I do not wish to pursue this line of controversy any further."<sup>22</sup>

In his letter of February 24, Gandhi expressed a desire to confer and asked Jinnah to "regard me as at your disposal."<sup>23</sup> He also stated he was now being guided on Hindu-Muslim relations by Abul Kalam Azad, a scholarly Congress Muslim strongly opposed to Indian partition. Gandhi urged Jinnah to meet with Azad, a proposal perhaps motivated by the assumption that the communal issue was largely an internal Muslim conflict. Jinnah shared no such view. In fact, that same month he spoke to students at Aligarh University, branding the Muslim members of Congress as "traitors."<sup>24</sup> In his Aligarh speech Jinnah labeled the Congress Party "communistic and socialistic" and, said he, "Call it by whatever name you like, but it is Hindu and Hindu Government."<sup>25</sup> Writing to Gandhi on March 3, Jinnah further denied that the Congress served any legitimate Muslim interests :

We have reached a stage when no doubt should be left that you recognise the All-India Muslim League as the one authoritative organisation of Muslims of India and, on the other hand, you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and devise a machinery of approach.<sup>26</sup>

Jinnah's rhetorical strategy sought to create a clear dichotomy between Gandhi as a Hindu spokesman and himself

as the major Muslim representative. Such a maneuver was unacceptable to Gandhi, who consistently maintained that the Congress Party was not a communal but a trans-religious, national organization. Thus Gandhi's answer on March 8 referred to "various debatable points" and reiterated his reluctance to "represent either the Congress or the Hindus in the sense you mean, but I would exert to the utmost all the moral influence I could have with them in order to secure an honourable settlement."<sup>27</sup> Jinnah nevertheless continued to promote dichotomy, writing to Gandhi the following week that his refusal to represent exclusively the Hindus left him "helpless", although he still hoped they could meet together in April.<sup>28</sup> Prior to their meeting, however, Jinnah addressed a special League session in Calcutta, using the occasion to emphasize the growth of the Muslim League during the previous six months. He claimed that "today there are hundreds of thousands of Muslims who are under the banner of the League" including "every thinking and patriotic Musalman," and warned that the League would "soon be a power to reckon with."<sup>29</sup>

Gandhi met Jinnah in Bombay on April 28, 1938. The new Congress president, Subhas Chandra Bose, also attended since Gandhi held no office in the Party. During the conference Jinnah insisted that he be recognized as the sole authoritative spokesman for Muslims but Bose refused, stating that the Congress could not abandon its relation to other Muslim groups nor admit to being a communal Hindu organization. The meeting accomplished little. Then, in a move clearly designed to promote separation, Jinnah wrote to Gandhi on June 6 requesting the Congress not to appoint any Muslims to its central committee. Working in close cooperation with Gandhi, Bose replied on July 25, stating that the Congress could not spurn its Muslim supporters and reminding Jinnah that the communal spirit was "detrimental to the growth of pure and undefiled nationalism."<sup>30</sup> The negotiations between Jinnah and Bose during the following months finally collapsed after the League president insisted that his organization represented the only authoritative Muslim viewpoint.<sup>31</sup>

In dealing with Gandhi and Congress leaders in the late 1930's, Jinnah asked for an exclusive recognition which Congress could not grant and which was, in fact, unjustified by the political situation in India. As already noted, the Muslim League had done very poorly in the 1937 elections. Moreover, the Congress Party still enjoyed the support of many Muslims. Faced with limited bargaining power resulting from his lack of popular support, Jinnah's rhetorical task was to establish the League as a viable and potent force. Toward this end, he travelled extensively throughout India urging Muslims to unite behind the League. Speaking at Allahabad University during the winter of 1937-38, Jinnah pictured his partisan approach to politics as the hope of the impoverished masses :

Gentlemen—if for bettering the conditions of the teeming millions of this country ; if for uplifting the social, economic and political standards of the Mussalmans of India, I am branded a communalist, I assure you, Gentlemen, that I am proud to be a communalist.<sup>32</sup>

Seeking to further his own cause, Jinnah portrayed the Congress Party as hostile to Muslim political interests and Islamic culture. Typical of this approach was his Presidential Address to the annual Muslim League session in Patna in December, 1938. There he denounced the Congress as “nothing but a Hindu body” and charged its leaders with an “intoxication of power.” Characterizing the Muslim members of Congress as “misled and misguided,” he singled out Gandhi as “the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism and for the establishment of Hindu Raj in India.”<sup>33</sup>

In addition to his personal campaigning, Jinnah directed a variety of League activities aimed at creating communal solidarity among the Muslim masses. For example, on October 18, 1937 the League passed a Resolution urging Muslims to foster the use of Urdu. The League sponsored “Palestine Day” throughout India on August 26, 1938 to promote sympathy for Muslims in the Middle East. The deaths of Ataturk and Iqbal in 1938 provided an opportunity for the League to eulogize

those to Muslim heroes. On March 26, 1939 at Meerut, the League's Working Committee under Jinnah's leadership passed two highly partisan resolutions. One called on Muslims "to effectively organise themselves forthwith in order to protect their liberties, rights and interests" against Hindu coercion. The other condemned the Arya Samaj and Mahasabha Parties whose "shouting of provocative slogans has created intence [sic] bitterness among the Muslims."<sup>34</sup>

During 1938-39 the League published two reports, the Pirpur Committee and Shareef Reports, alleging atrocities against Muslims by the Congress provincial ministries. The grievances often involved small incidents by negligent local officials, but also sprang from opposition to Hindi, the Congress flag and anthem, and educational policies requiring that school-children pay homage to Gandhi's portrait.<sup>35</sup> The League sponsored fiery orators, newspapers, and public demonstrations to spread anti-Hindu propaganda.<sup>36</sup> In 1939 alone, Muslim scholars and politicians advanced at least six separate constitutional schemes for the creation of independent Islamic states.<sup>37</sup>

The British entry into World War II in September, 1939 created new opportunities for Jinnah to increase his political power. Angered at Britain's involving India in a war without her consent, the Congress Party resigned from all provincial offices in October. Sensing the predicament of the British, Jinnah and the League passed a Resolution on October 22 hinting support for the war effort, provided Muslim interests would be protected in any future Indian constitution.<sup>38</sup> The Muslim leader thus sought to turn the British-Congress cleavage to his own advantage. Gandhi reflected nationalist frustration over such clever opportunism by writing on November 4 in the *Harijan* :

No pact seems to be in front of us. Janab Jinnah Sahab looks to the British power to safeguard the Muslim rights. Nothing the Congress can do or concede will satisfy him. For he can always, and naturally from his own standpoint, ask for more than the British can give or guarantee. Therefore there can be no limit to the Muslim League demands.<sup>39</sup>



Unlike Jinnah, the Congress still viewed the communal issue as secondary to independence. Jinnah's willingness to delay independence and even cooperate with the British until Muslim rights could be insured prompted Congress leaders to doubt his sincerity in opposing colonialism. Jinnah undoubtedly disliked British rule, as evidenced by his frequent condemnations of the 1935 Federal Constitution and British policy in Palestine. However, he recognized that the continuation of British rule in India forestalled the imposition of a Congress dominated government. Therefore, Jinnah and the British shared a temporary affinity out of common opposition to the Congress.

The resignation of the Congress Party provincial governments delighted Jinnah and the Muslim League. He designated December 22, 1939 as a "Day of Deliverance" from what he viewed as the tyranny and oppression of Hindu ministries. The day was celebrated with speeches, marches and anti-Congress demonstrations, and triggered still another round of correspondence between Gandhi and Jinnah. In an effort to reverse the growing communal division, Gandhi wrote a conciliatory letter on January 16, 1940. By opening with "Dear Mr. Qaid-e-Azam," he acknowledged Jinnah's newly-acquired honorary title meaning "Great Leader." Gandhi enclosed an advanced copy of an article written for publication in the *Harijan* four days later.<sup>40</sup> In his article, Gandhi referred to Jinnah as "an old comrade" and asked : "What does it matter that today we do not see eye to eye in some matters ? That can make no difference in my goodwill towards him."<sup>41</sup> Gandhi noted that members of several anti-Congress Hindu parties had joined Muslims in celebrating Deliverance Day, and approvingly noted the apparent coalition between several groups :

He (Jinnah) is thus lifting the Muslim League out of the communal rut and giving it a national character. ...I regard this development as perfectly healthy. Nothing can be better than that we should have in the country mainly two parties—the Congress and the non-Congress, or anti-Congress, if the latter expression

is preferred. Jinnah Sahib is giving the word "minority" a new and good content....If the Qaid-e-Azam can bring about the combination, not only I but the whole of India will shout with one acclamation : "Long live Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah." For he will have brought about permanent and living unity for which, I am sure, the whole nation is thirsting.<sup>42</sup>

Gandhi reflected his Hindu tendency to find unity out of apparent diversity. Specifically, he sought to portray Jinnah's politics as becoming broadly-based and secular rather than communally-based and divisive. Jinnah promptly replied, by letter of January 21, and clearly denied the suggestion that he had abandoned communalism :

There is so much in your article which is the result of imagination. It is due partly to the fact that you are living a secluded life at Segaon, and partly because all your thoughts and actions are guided by the "inner voice." You have very little concern with realities, or what might be termed by an ordinary mortal "practical politics"...It is true that many non-Congress Hindus expressed their sympathy with the Deliverance Day...But I am afraid that the meaning which you have tried to give to this alignment shows that you have not appreciated the true significance of it. It was partly a case of "adversity bringing strange bed-fellows together," and partly because common interest may lead Muslims and minorities to combine. I have no illusions in the matter, and let me say again that India is not a nation, nor a country. It is a sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations. Today you deny that religion can be a main factor in determining a nation, but you yourself, when asked what your motive in life was, "the thing that leads us to do what we do,"... said : "Purely religious !..."<sup>43</sup>

Jinnah then pleaded with Gandhi to abandon his "chase after a mirage" and suggested that India's freedom could not be achieved by weekly discourses on philosophy and ethics nor

by “peculiar doctrines” about *ahimsa* and spinning. He called on Gandhi to exert action and statesmanship on behalf of the Hindus.<sup>44</sup>

Jinnah had thus torpedoed Gandhi’s attempt to secularize Muslim League politics. Nevertheless, Gandhi still minimized his cleavage with Jinnah, by writing in *Harijan* January 27 :

I hope that Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s opinion is a temporary phase in the history of the Muslim League. Muslims of the different provinces can never cut themselves away from their Hindu or Christian brethren. Both Muslims and Christians [in India] are converts from Hinduism or are descendents of converts. They do not cease to belong to their provinces because of change of faith. Englishmen who become converts to Islam do not change their nationality. I hope Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah does not represent the considered opinion even of his colleagues.<sup>45</sup>

Gandhi’s almost naive hopes failed to grasp the intensity of Jinnah’s convictions. In fact, less than two months later Jinnah delivered a vigorous defense of his belief that the Hindus and Muslims of India represented two distinct nations.

Jinnah’s Presidential Address to the annual session of the Muslim League in Lahore on March 22, 1940 undoubtedly represented one of the most important political speeches in modern Indian history. The speech set forth unequivocally Jinnah’s argument that Hindus and Muslims could not coexist in a united, free India. A correspondent for the *London Times* estimated that “more than 100,000 Moslems” heard the speech, and reported that “prolonged cheering almost drowned Mr. Jinnah’s reply to a questioner who asked what course he would pursue if he did not succeed in his policy of division—‘I will give my life to achieve it’.”<sup>46</sup> A day later the Muslim delegates adopted the “Lahore Resolution,” perhaps the most significant document in the crusade for Pakistan. The Resolution’s chief passage read :

...no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely, that geogra-

phically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.<sup>47</sup>

Jinnah provided the rationale for such a declaration in his address. He reviewed League successes in organizing in every province, and said the Viceroy's invitation to him following Britain's declaration of war shocked Gandhi and the Congress because "it challenged their authority to speak on behalf of India."<sup>48</sup> Jinnah effectively humored his partisan audience by portraying Gandhi as the League's primary scapegoat. In a reference to Gandhi's habitual practice of calling Jinnah "my brother," the League president drew laughter by declaring "the only difference is this, that brother Gandhi has three vote and I have only one vote!"<sup>49</sup> Jinnah thus attacked the Congress proposal for a Constituent Assembly on the grounds that Hindus would outnumber Muslims three-to-one; he categorically stated that "Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government."<sup>50</sup> He again drew laughter by quoting Gandhi's comment that he would not give up hope for communal unity unless Muslim delegates to a Constituent Assembly declared that there was nothing in common between Hindus and Muslims, "but even then I would agree with them because they read the Koran and I have also studied something of that holy Book."<sup>51</sup> Jinnah satirized the notion that Muslim political rights would somehow be insured simply because Gandhi had read the *Koran*.

Jinnah argued that the solution to India's constitutional dilemma lay in "dividing India into autonomous national states."<sup>52</sup> The primary assumption undergirding his analysis was that "Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state."<sup>53</sup> In emphasizing that India's problem was

international, rather than inter-communal in nature, Jinnah quoted Lajpat Rai of the radical Mahasabha Party who concurred on the impossibility of Hindu-Muslim unity. Jinnah argued that the creation of independent states would produce peace because communal competition and rivalry would cease, allowing the new nations to "live in complete harmony with their neighbors."<sup>54</sup> He then detailed his two-nation theory :

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real natures of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, quite different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They neither intermarry, nor interdine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.<sup>55</sup>

Containing numerous phrases like "servants of Islam, sacred duty," and "the genius of our people," the Lahore speech typified an emotional appeal to India's Muslims. There were no specific proposals concerning machinery to establish sovereign Muslim states; Jinnah had projected an ultimate goal

rather than an immediate program of action. While asserting the Muslim hopelessness resulting from minority status, Jinnah pictured an inevitable and eternal *kulturkampf* (culture-struggle) between the communities.<sup>56</sup> Nearly ten years had passed since Iqbal proposed a sovereign Muslim area, and Jinnah had finally adopted the poet's view. Metz suggested that Jinnah hesitated in advocating partition because he didn't believe it would work and because such a step contradicted his long years of struggle for Indian unity. But the Lahore session, said Metz, marked Jinnah's final break with the hope for a single nation and was wholly "consonant with the natural course of the growing Muslim nationalism."<sup>57</sup>

Mohandas Gandhi responded to Jinnah's challenge in the very next issue of *Harijan*. He denied that the Congress Party was a Hindu organization since it had a Muslim president and four of the fifteen members on its Working Committee were Muslims. He maintained that the Constituent Assembly would not seek to coerce anybody, and that any Muslim demands concerning communal relations would be "irresistable." Gandhi admitted that "if the vast majority of Indian Muslims feel that they are not one nation with their Hindu and other brethren, who will be able to resist them?" But he questioned that the "50,000 Muslims who listened to Qaid-e-Azam" represented the feelings of India's eighty million Muslims.<sup>58</sup> In the same issue, Gandhi published another essay, "We Are All Brothers," in which he said Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, and Christians all worship one God. He emphasized that "even the Qaid-e-Azam is my brother" and expressed his desire to "win him over." Gandhi concluded that "the *Quran* makes no distinctions between Hindus and Mussalmans," a claim difficult to support in view of the *Koran's* well known condemnations of idolaters.<sup>59</sup>

In the April 6 issue of *Harijan*, Gandhi expanded his rebuttal to Jinnah's Lahore speech. He doubted that Muslims would ever choose "vivisection" and "the obvious suicide which the partition would mean." Writing that "the 'two nation' theory is an untruth," Gandhi said most Indian Muslims were converts and argued that people do not change

nationality when they change religion. He then offered several specific examples of cultural similarities between the communities : Bengali Muslims and Hindus spoke a common language, ate the same food, dressed alike, enjoyed the same amusements. Of Jinnah, Gandhi wrote, "...his name could be that of any Hindu. When I first met him, I did not know that he was a Muslim. I came to know his religion when I had his full name given to me. His Indian nationality was written in his face and manner."<sup>60</sup> Gandhi asserted that his opponent's allegation that Islam and Hinduism were antagonistic philosophies misinterpreted "the message inherent in the very word Islam."<sup>61</sup> Gandhi said he was "deeply hurt over what is now going on in the name of the Muslim League" and reiterated that "Hindu-Muslim unity has been and is my life's mission."<sup>62</sup>

A week later Gandhi restated his theological opposition to the politics of partition :

Partition means a patent untruth. My whole soul rebels against the idea that Hinduism and Islam represent two antagonistic cultures and doctrines. To assent to such a doctrine is for me denial of God. For I believe with my whole soul that the God of the *Quran* is also the God of the *Gita*, and that we are all, no matter by what name designated, children of the same God. I must rebel against the idea that millions of Indians, who were Hindus the other day, changed their nationality on adopting Islam as their religion.<sup>63</sup>

Writing in *Harijan* May 4, Gandhi reiterated his faith that most Muslims rejected the partition cause : "Pakistan cannot be worse than foreign domination....But I do not believe that the Muslims really want to dismember India."<sup>64</sup> At that time, Gandhi's analysis was undoubtedly correct. The Azad Conference, meeting in Delhi in the spring of 1940 to oppose the Muslim League, assembled groups still representing "a majority of India's Muslims."<sup>65</sup>

Undeterred, Jinnah single-mindedly pursued his goal. In a message to the Muslim League Conference meeting at Hubli

in May, 1940 Jinnah argued that a united India was an illusion resulting from British colonialism :

It is amazing that men like Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalacharya should talk about the Lahore resolution in such terms as "vivisection of India" and "cutting the baby into two halves." Surely today India is divided and partitioned by nature. Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the physical map of India. I fail to see why there is this hue and cry. Where is the country which is being divided? Where is the nation which is denationalised? India is composed of nationalities, to say nothing about the castes and sub-castes. Where is the 'central National Government' whose authority is being violated?<sup>66</sup>

Jinnah continued that the "reconstitution" of the existing provinces into "contiguous, homogeneous, independent zones is a most feasible and practicable scheme..., more practical than 'ahimsa' and 'charka', or, for the matter of that, the ideal of *Ram Raj* or *Swaraj* and complete independence of Mr. Gandhi's conception."<sup>67</sup> While he belittled the spiritual aspects of his opponent's politics, Jinnah still offered no concrete plan by which partition could be accomplished. In all likelihood, he had not yet formulated a definite scheme regarding the nature of Pakistan.

During this period Gandhi's opposition to partition intensified. In September, 1940, he made one of his most impassioned rejections of the Lahore demand :

To divide it [India] into two is worse than anarchy. It is vivisection which cannot be tolerated—not because I am a Hindu, for I am speaking from this platform as a representative of Hindus, Muslims, Parsis and all else. But I will say to them, "Vivesect me before you vivesect India. You shall not do what even the Moghuls who ruled over India for over two centuries, did not do."<sup>68</sup>

Such a statement revealed the speaker's intense emotional involvement with Indian unity. But he failed to recognize that, during the Moghul Dynasty, Muslims held the power in India and thus felt little fear of the Hindu majority.



In an effort to bridge the widening communal gulf the eminent Indian jurist, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, sought a face-to-face meeting between Gandhi and Jinnah early in 1941. Responding to the appeal in his letter of February 10, Jinnah assured Sapru that "I have always been ready and willing to see Mr. Gandhi or any other Hindu leader on behalf of the Hindu community and do all I can to help the solution of Hindu-Muslim problem."<sup>69</sup> Neither leader, however, took the initiative in approaching the other, and so the proposal died. Jinnah obviously wanted Gandhi to come forth as the representative of Hindu India, a move antithetical to the latter's claim to speak for all Indians. Similarly, Gandhi and most Congress officials rejected the proposition that Jinnah alone represented Muslim opinion.<sup>70</sup>

By the spring of 1941, Gandhi had already enumerated a series of arguments against partition. Jinnah chose his address to the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation on March 2, 1941 as his forum to answer the charges. Since it dealt with several of the major criticisms against partition, this speech became an important reflection of Jinnah's thought. For example, he referred directly to an article dated January 27, 1940 in which Gandhi asserted that an Englishman retained his nationality even if he converted to Islam. Arguing against what he considered a faulty analogy, Jinnah claimed that the situation in India was totally different because, in Hindu society, a convert was branded a *mlechha* or "untouchable" and "the Hindus ceased to have anything to do with him socially, religiously, and culturally or in any other way." Thus, the convert became a member of "a different order." And whereas Gandhi had, in his article, pictured the Muslim conversion in India as occurring only "the other day," Jinnah exaggerated in the opposite direction :

It is now more than a thousand years that the bulk of the Muslims have lived in a different world, in a different society, in a different philosophy, and a different faith. Can you possibly compare this with that nonsensical talk that mere change of faith is no ground for a demand for Pakistan ?<sup>71</sup>

Interestingly, the partition debate even involved a dispute over language usage. To describe the proposed act of partition, Gandhi frequently employed such loaded words as "cut, carve, dismember," and "vivisect," all strong verbs connoting pain and violence. Jinnah, on the other hand, used words more positive in emotional impact, such as "reconstruct, reconstitute, demarcate," and "provide." Recognizing the persuasion impact of the emotion-laden word, Jinnah utilized the Punjab speech to condemn the style of his Hindu opponents. He objected specifically to Gandhi's use of "vivisection," complaining that the term "gives you at once a feeling of horror."<sup>72</sup> He also criticized Gandhi's "disciple," Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, who had recently likened partition to a quarrel between two Hindu brothers in which "one wants to cut the mother cow into two halves!" Using a semantic orientation, Jinnah accused his opponents of using words to arouse "the religious feelings of the Hindus." He obviously missed the irony that his own crusade rested firmly on rousing the religious sentiments of Muslims.

Indicative of Jinnah's own manipulation of a partisan audience was his response to Gandhi's charge that partition would be contrary to the spirit of Islam :

Ladies and gentlemen—I am not learned Maulana or Maulvi. [sic] Nor do I claim to be learned in theology. But I also know a little of my faith and I am a humble and proud follower of my faith. (Cheers). May I know in the name of Heavens, how it is this Lahore resolution against Islam? Why is it against Islam?<sup>73</sup>

Undoubtedly oblivious to the contradictory claim of simultaneous humility and pride, Jinnah's listeners apparently relished the inference that any Muslim knows more about Islam than a Hindu. The posing of two questions, however, did not answer Gandhi's allegation. Likewise, Jinnah skirted the charge that partition would be against the best interests of Muslims, again appealing effectively to partisanship :

I say to my Hindu friends, please do not bother us. (Cheers). We thank you most profusely for

pointing out to us our mistake...We are prepared to take the consequences...Please look after yourselves.<sup>74</sup>

In dealing with the economic argument against division, Jinnah contended that the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and North-West Frontier Province were currently bankrupt because "the bulk of revenue of this continent is in the hands of the Centre."<sup>75</sup> After partition, he claimed, the "independent zones" would collect their revenue directly. Jinnah gave no statistics to support his views, although his Muslim audience probably interpreted the comments as derogatory references to the wealthy Hindu capitalists who supported the Congress Party.<sup>76</sup>

To answer the criticism that partition would result in a sizable Hindu minority in Pakistan, thereby compounding the communal problem, Jinnah simply asked "what about the Muslim minority in the Hindu zones?" In calling for safeguards for all minorities, the speaker posed a rhetorical question :

Do you suggest as an argument that because the Hindu minority or minorities in the Muslim zones will be minorities, therefore the 90 million of Muslims should remain as a minority in an artificial 'one India' with unitary form of central government, so that you can dominate over them all...?<sup>77</sup>

Quite clearly, Jinnah recognized that partition could not eliminate the existence of minorities. He simply reasoned that for thirty million Muslims to live under Hindu rule was preferable to all ninety million being in that condition.<sup>78</sup>

The League president demonstrated admirable adaptation to his largely student audience in the Punjab speech. He urged his listeners to attempt to "reason and to persuade our opponents," and rejected "sentimental or emotional considerations," structuring his speech to appear objective and systematic in refuting all arguments against partition.<sup>79</sup> Actually, he evaded several significant issues, and relied heavily on an emotional appeal to communal sentiment. Typically, in his peroration he pictured Pakistan to be "a matter of life and death to the Musalmans and...not a counter for bargaining."<sup>80</sup>

Throughout 1941 and 1942, the themes in Jinnah's speeches

remained essentially the same. Muslims were engaged in a life-and-death struggle and must, therefore, unite, organize, and develop self-reliance. Democracy in India was unworkable because Muslims would remain a perpetual minority. The Congress Party implemented the belief in Hindu supremacy openly espoused by the Mahasabha. And during this period, Gandhi remained the major scapegoat. At the Aligarh University Union in November, 1941, Jinnah emphasized the generosity of his demands, arguing that the Hindus would still possess three-fourths of India : "I only want a share and Mr. Gandhi wants the whole."<sup>81</sup> To a Muslim Students' Federation meeting at Nagpur on December 26, 1941, Jinnah combined ridicule, derision and fear appeal, branding Gandhi as the Congress "highpriest" whose concept of communal unity inscribed the Muslim "death warrant" through surrender to Congress.<sup>82</sup>

For his part, Gandhi held unswervingly to the premise that religion alone did not constitute a legitimate basis for nationhood. He wrote in the January 25, 1942 issue of *Harijan* :

What conflict of interest can there be between Hindus and Muslims in the matter of revenue, sanitation, police, justice, or the use of public conveniences ? The difference can only be in religious usage and observances, with which a secular State has no concern.<sup>83</sup>

Jinnah, obviously, did not share the assumption that secular government could exist in India. He viewed the social elements in both Islam and Hinduism as so pervasive that even the distribution of wealth and administration of justice followed communal lines. Louis Fischer noted this curious paradox of the worldly and pragmatic Jinnah who "wanted two religious states, while the religious Gandhi would countenance only a united secular state."<sup>84</sup>

The recurrence of strongly anti-Hindu articles in the Muslim League press triggered an exchange between Gandhi and Jinnah in March, 1942. In an essay, "An Appeal to Qaid-e-Azam", printed in the March 8 issue of *Harijan*, Gandhi quoted from an especially virulent attack. The writer had denounced Hinduism as "the greatest curse of India," and a "faith of

primitive barbarians” based on “intolerance and inequality”.<sup>85</sup> Noting that the article appeared in a paper founded by Jinnah, Gandhi pleaded for moderation :

The policy adopted in the papers must lead to the promotion of bitterness and strife between the two communities. If the end is to be attained through strife and force and not by persuasion and argument, I can have nothing to say. But I observe from Qaid-e-Azam’s speeches that he has no quarrel with the Hindus. He wants to live at peace with them. I plead, therefore, for a juster estimate of men and things in papers representing the policy and programme of the Muslim League.<sup>86</sup>

On March 11, Jinnah issued a Statement in reply, complaining that Gandhi’s article was “calculated to poison the Hindu mind against the Muslim League and myself.”<sup>87</sup> He pointed out that the article Gandhi cited was written by a non-Brahmin Hindu from southern India in response to a recent Gandhi address at Benares University praising the catholicity of the Hindu heritage. Noting that Gandhi had extracted only a small passage from the article, Jinnah reprinted another, less vitriolic portion, emphasizing that the writer’s purpose was “certainly not an attack on Hindu faith and Hindu religion” but only an exposé of the intolerance which had crept into Hindu society. Jinnah recalled that Gandhi himself often criticized “untouchability” and the caste system.<sup>88</sup>

Jinnah had not apologized for the insults against Hinduism but had in fact implied agreement with the assessment of Hindu injustice and inequality. In the *Harijan* of March 22, Gandhi bemoaned “Qaid-e-Azam’s answer” which

...caused me deep pain. I had expected a better response...I am sorry that Qaid-e-Azam has resorted to special pleading for defending the indefensible. This unexpected defence of an article designed to wound deep susceptibilities makes ominous reading.<sup>89</sup>

Significantly, Gandhi referred to the Muslim leader by his honorary Urdu title, the Jinnah avoided use of the laudatory “Mahatma,” employing instead the more formal “Mr.

Gandhi." The chasm between them thus widened and Jinnah showed little inclination to compromise or seek conciliation.

The attention of both leaders soon turned to new constitutional initiatives by Britain. Desirous of uniting Indian sympathy behind the war effort, the British Cabinet formulated a plan calling for Independence following the war, with the control of India's defense during the balance of hostilities remaining with Britain. The plan was carried to India and announced publicly on March 30, 1942 by Sir Stafford Cripps. Congress leaders disagreed that Britain should retain command of the Indian army, and disliked the plan's suggestion that any province could later leave the Indian Union. Moreover, Cripps' bargaining position was severely weakened by England's setbacks in the war, and he finally left India in April empty-handed after Gandhi reportedly characterized the proposals as "post-dated cheques on a crashing bank."<sup>90</sup>

The Muslim League reacted ambivalently to the Cripps Plan in a Resolution adopted on April 11 at Allahabad. Noting that the British offered the subsequent accession of any province opposed to continuing under the new Constitution, the League welcomed warmly the fact that "Pakistan is recognised by implication." But they still rejected the proposals for lacking clear and specific procedures for accession and because the proposed plebiscite of a province's entire adult population would "deny the inherent right of self-determination" for Muslims.<sup>91</sup>

Thus, both the Congress Party and the Muslim League rejected the British offer, but for widely-differing reasons. Saiyid concluded that the net effect of the Cripps Mission favored the Muslims since the negotiations enhanced Jinnah's claim as the Muslim spokesman while impressing the Congress leaders that independence was now impossible without some resolution of the communal question.<sup>92</sup> Gandhi himself acknowledged in a *Harijan* article April 19 that "if the vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate nation, having nothing in common with Hindus and others, no power on earth can compel them to think otherwise."<sup>93</sup>

Yet, Gandhi's realistic recognition of the latent power in

a unified Muslim demand in no way suggests that he had waived from his fundamental opposition to Partition. In an interview with Louis Fischer at the Sevagram *Ashram* on June 6, 1942, Gandhi reiterated his belief in national unity :

In actual life it is impossible to separate us into two nations. We are not two nations. Every Muslim will have a Hindu name if he goes back far enough in his family history. Every Muslim is merely a Hindu who has accepted Islam....In the North, Hindi and Urdu are understood by both Hindus and Muslims. In Madras, Hindus and Muslims speak Tamil ; and in Bengal, they both speak Bengali and neither Hindi nor Urdu. When communal riots take place, they are always provoked by incidents over cows and by superstitions that create the trouble, and not our separate nationalities.<sup>94</sup>

Gandhi's reasoning can be fruitfully analyzed when juxtaposed to statements made a few weeks later during Jinnah's interview with Preston Grover of the Associated Press on July 1 :

The difference between the Hindus and the Muslims is deep-rooted and ineradicable. We are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of International Law we are a nation.<sup>95</sup>

The striking feature of these interviews was that each advocate used similar kinds of examples to arrive at opposite conclusions. For example, Gandhi emphasized the common heritage of Indian names for, as discussed earlier, many Muslims (including Jinnah) had surnames of Hindu origin. Yet, the distinctive quality of Muslim first names, such as Mohammed, Abdul, and Ali, enabled Jinnah to use names as evidence for the two-nation theory. Similarly, Jinnah pointed to linguistic differences stemming from Urdu's roots in Arabic contrasted to Hindi's Sanskrit origin. But with equal propriety,

Gandhi observed that both religious communities shared a common language in eastern and southern India. One must conclude, therefore, that Indian society offered sufficient ambiguity to permit the drawing of widely-divergent conclusions.

The political situation in the summer of 1942 frustrated Indian nationalists. England showed little sign of urgency concerning independence, and indeed was staggering under heavy military pressure by both Germany and Japan. Sensing his opportunity, Gandhi counselled massive civil disobedience to finally end British colonialism. Critics cautioned that civil unrest without communal agreement might produce widespread violence. Gandhi replied in the *Harijan* July 12, asserting that thinking Indians could no longer "idle away their time."<sup>96</sup> Admitting that "for the moment" he could not reach the Muslim mind because of the League, Gandhi declared that he had never knowingly committed "a single disservice to any Muslim cause or a Muslim person" and still claimed "numerous Muslim friends." He said he was still unconvinced about the demand for Pakistan, and urged his opponents to meet him and attempt to convert him "in a friendly manner."<sup>97</sup> Gandhi offered, as the best solution, that the Congress and the League "come to terms and set up provisional government acceptable to all."<sup>98</sup> Lacking that, he was willing to attempt a British ouster anyway, "leaving India to her fate."<sup>99</sup>

Jinnah reacted promptly with a public statement. He chided Gandhi for requesting friendly conversion while "rattling the sword of launching a big movement."<sup>100</sup> The League president then noted that the Congress emphatically rejected the idea of Pakistan, and he maintained that Gandhi clearly understood what the Pakistan proposal meant :

From the lines of his writings and the way in which his mind is working it seems that no mere mortal can ever succeed in convincing Mr. Gandhi of the rightness of the Muslim demand except perhaps the 'inner voice' of his Providence !<sup>101</sup>

Charging Gandhi with attempting to "coerce and embarrass the British government to surrender to the establishment of the



Hindu raj," Jinnah insisted that Muslims could not join Gandhi's crusade because his

conception of "Independent India" is basically different from ours. What we want is the independence of Hindus and Muslims and others. Mr. Gandhi by independence means Congress raj.<sup>102</sup>

The Statement concluded by asking Gandhi to stop insinuating that Muslims relied on the British for protection, to drop his claim to Muslim friends, and to show "sincerity and frankness for an honorable settlement."<sup>103</sup>

Gandhi's reply appeared in the July 26 issue of *Harijan*. He argued that no country would willingly consent to a portion of itself becoming an independent state because "this sovereign State can conceivably go to war against the one of which it was but yesterday a part."<sup>104</sup> He thus added an additional argument, the possibility of international war, in his case against Pakistan. Jinnah's insistence that Muslims were self-sufficient to achieve their goal made it difficult to offer one's service, continued Gandhi, and he maintained that he had written the earlier article to show his frankness and sincerity. He then stated his "limitations" :

I cannot speak as a mere Hindu, for my Hinduism includes all religions. I can speak only as an Indian. If Pakistan as defined above is an article of faith with him, indivisible India is equally an article of faith with me. Hence there is a stalemate.<sup>105</sup>

Once more he called on the Qaid-e-Azam to join the Congress in ousting the British, after which "all rival claims" could be adjusted.<sup>106</sup> Such a solution was unacceptable to Jinnah, who reasoned that once the British left, Hindus would dominate the country. From his standpoint, Partition must precede Independence. In a statement issued from Bombay on July 31, Jinnah stated that Congress preparations for civil disobedience represented

...the culminating point in the policy and programme of Mr. Gandhi and his Hindu Congress of blackmailing the British and coercing them to concede a system of government and transfer power to that government

which would establish a Hindu raj immediately under the aegis of the British bayonet, thereby placing the Muslims and other minorities and interests at the mercy of the Congress raj.<sup>107</sup>

He urged the Congress to call off the threatened movement, contending that no practical solution could emerge from such a chaotic situation.

Gandhi would wait no longer. The All-India Congress Committee convened in Bombay, and on August 8, 1942 passed the historic "Quit India" Resolution which called for immediate independence.<sup>108</sup> Gandhi addressed the delegates, and referred to his major opponent :

Jinnah Sahib has been a Congressman in the past. He seems now to be misguided. I pray long life for him and wish that he may survive me. A day will certainly dawn when he will realize that I have never wronged him or the Muslims. I have the fullest confidence in the sincerity of the Muslims. I will never talk ill of them even if they kill me...I cannot wait till Jinnah Sahib is converted for the immediate consummation of Indian freedom.<sup>109</sup>

Gandhi told his listeners : "everyone of you should, from this very moment, consider himself a free man or woman and even act as if you are free and no longer under the heel of imperialism."<sup>110</sup> Civil disobedience followed ; Gandhi and other Congress leaders were arrested the next day, and sporadic violence shook India.

Jinnah immediately blamed the Congress for launching a civil war, and appealed to Muslims to "keep completely aloof from this movement and not to surrender to the threats and intimidations of the Congress workers but to continue their normal avocations peacefully."<sup>111</sup> On August 16, the Muslim League Working Committee officially denounced the Congress for attempting to "coerce the British Government" and trying to "force the Musalmans to submit and surrender to the Congress."<sup>112</sup> The statement dismissed "self-determination for India" as a Congress "euphemism" for "Hindu majority" alleging that the Congress "has persistently opposed the right

of self-determination for the Muslim nation to decide and determine their own destiny.”<sup>113</sup>

Gandhi's detention, which lasted for twenty-one months, essentially isolated him from active politics. Jinnah, meanwhile, remained free to roam India pursuing his campaign to mold Muslim opinion. Saiyid observed that by urging Muslims to boycott the Quit India movement, Jinnah had cleverly staged, for world opinion, the point that Gandhi no longer spoke for or could control Muslim India.<sup>114</sup> In his speeches, Jinnah relentlessly urged Islamic solidarity against what he portrayed as the Gandhi-inspired Hindu revival. He grew increasingly militant, and elicited loud cheers from Muslim students in Aligarh when he said on November 2 :

Even the combined forces of China and America cannot impose on us a constitution which will sacrifice Muslim India. But if such a mad blunder is committed by the United Nations, remember even a worm turns, and notwithstanding the foreign bayonets upholding the Congress Raj, we shall make the administration of the country impossible.<sup>115</sup>

In reviewing the decade prior to Partition, British historian Penderel Moon stated that “the crucial years were 1937-42. It was in this period that mistakes were committed and opportunities let slip which made unavailing the later efforts to avoid the division of the country.”<sup>116</sup> Clearly, this six-year span witnessed a dramatic change in the ideological position of Mohammed Jinnah. Spurred by Congress indiscretions following the 1937 elections, Jinnah was transformed into an apostle for separation. Following the passage of the landmark Lahore Resolution of 1940, his rhetoric became increasingly vitriolic and uncompromising.

Gandhi, justifiably at first, disclaimed the notion that Jinnah's position enjoyed the support of most Muslims. As the years passed, Gandhi perhaps underestimated both the intensity of his opponent's convictions and the latent appeal of Pakistan to the Muslim masses. Consistently maintaining admirable forbearance, he demonstrated a tenacious passion for Indian unity, matching Jinnah in his unwillingness to

compromise such a vital issue. Each man had dedicated his life to a cause. And, by 1942, each had articulated some of the major arguments in their debate.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. R. Palme Dutt, *The Problem of India* (New York : International Publishers, 1943), p. 102.
3. S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi : Their Role in India's Quest for Freedom* (Calcutta : K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1966), p. 163. Nehru and other Congress leaders avoided coalition ministries thinking they would produce internal squabbling and compromises which would weaken Congress opposition to the British. For a discussion of the Jinnah-Nehru cleavage, see Z. H. Zaidi, "Aspects of the Development of Muslim League policy, 1937-47", *The Partition of India*, ed. Cyril Henry Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (London : Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 254-59.
4. C. H. Philips, *India* (London : Hutchinson's Library, 1949), pp. 132 ff.
5. Percival J. Griffiths, *British Impact on India* (London : Macdonald, 1952), p. 340.
6. Francis R. Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru ; a Biography* (New York : Macmillan, 1956), p. 268.
7. Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1962), p. 15. Moon points out that the Congress policy was consistent with its belief that it was a broad-based national party.
8. G. Allana (ed.) *Pakistan Movement ; Historic Documents* (Karachi : Paradise Subscription Agency, 1967), pp. 130-131.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-33.
10. Quoted in William S. Metz, "The Political Career of Mohammed Ali Jinnah" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1952), p. 131.
- Iqbal's influence as a crucial advocate of Partition is further shown in Hafeez Malik (ed.), *Iqbal : Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1971).
11. G. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, p. 143. The full text of Jinnah's Lucknow Address covers pp. 140-51.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-45 and 150-51.
18. Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (London : John Murray 1954), p. 115.
19. Syed Abdul Lateef, *The Great Leader* (Lahore : Lion Press, 1961), p. 157.
20. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 115.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
23. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 586.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 591.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 593.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 587.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 588.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 589.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 601.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 606-11.
31. For the full text of the Jinnah-Bose correspondence, see G. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, pp. 153-162.
32. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 122.
33. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 632-33.
34. G. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, pp. 165-66.
35. B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi ; A Biography* (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 409.
36. Congress Party sympathizers likened the Muslim League's propaganda techniques to those of Hitler in Nazi Germany. For example, see Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York : John Day 1946), p. 392. Meanwhile, pro-Muslim forces drew analogies between Gandhi and Hitler, and charged that congress publicity people "could teach Goebbels a number of tricks." Beverley Nichols, *Verdict on India* (Bombay : Thacker 1946), p. 187. While there were undoubtedly propaganda excesses on both sides, the net result was a widening of the communal gulf, making Jinnah's partisan rhetoric during the following years increasingly credible to the Muslim population.
37. For an analysis of these schemes and a discussion of the ambiguity of Muslim thought on this issue, see Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan : The Formative phase, 1857-1948* (London : Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 108-15. In light of the emergence of Bangla Desh, it is interesting to note that in 1939 Muslims were unclear as to whether one or more than one sovereign state should be formed.
38. G. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, pp. 168-69.
39. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity* (Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1949), p. 246.
40. The full text of Gandhi's letter, article, and Jinnah's reply can be found in M. K. Gandhi, *Communal University*, pp. 211-16.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 258-59.
46. *The Times* (London), March 25, 1940, p. 5.
47. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, pp. 123-29.
48. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 684.
49. G. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, p. 180.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
52. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 688.
53. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, p. 189.
54. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 688.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 688-89.
56. Vidya Dhar Mahajan, "Pakistan," *The Cambridge History of India*, ed. H. H. Dodwell, VI (New Delhi : S. Chand n. d.), p. 819.
57. Metz, "The Political Career of Mohammed Ali Jinnah," p. 169.
58. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 288.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 296. Many Western scholars translate the word "Islam" as meaning "submission to God." It can also be interpreted as a variant of the Arabic greeting "salaam" meaning "peace." Gandhi obviously used the latter interpretation. The two meanings are not mutually exclusive, since the giving of oneself to God presumably would result in inner peace.
62. *Ibid.*, 296.
63. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, ed. Anand T. Hingorani (Karachi : Anand T. Hingorani, 1947), pp. 16-17.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
65. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India, A Social Analysis* (London : Victor Gollancz, 1946), p. 231.
66. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad (Lahore : Sk. Muhammad Ashraf, 1946), p. 189.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.
68. M. K. Gandhi, *The Way to Communal Harmony*, ed. U. R. Rao (Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1963), p. 303.
69. G. Allana. (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, p. 210.
70. Nehru explained the Congress' reluctance to view the Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslim India : "To admit Mr. Jinnah's claim meant in effect to push out our old Moslem colleagues from the Congress and declare that the Congress was not open to them. It was to change the fundamental character of the Congress, and from

a national organization, open to all, convert it into a communal body. That was inconceivable to us." Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 396.

71. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, p. 253.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

76. Prominent millionaires who made large contributions to Gandhi's work were J. R. D. Tata (b. 1904) and G. D. Birla (b. 1894). The Tata enterprise dominates India's steel industry, and holds interests in chemicals, oils, hotels, airlines, and railroads. The Birla financial empire centers around banking, automobile products, and sugar and paper mills. For a discussion of the politics of Indian capitalists, many of whom continue to support the Congress Party despite its often socialistic policies, see Charles Bettelheim, *India Independent*, trans. W. A. Caswell (New York : Monthly Review Press, 1968), pp. 68-70 and 130-33.

77. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, pp. 255-56.

78. For his statements on this issue, *Ibid.*, pp. 183, 238, and 323.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 249 and 251.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 347.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

83. M. K. Gandhi, *The Way to Communal Harmony*, p. 303.

84. Louis Fischer, *Gandhi : His Life and Message for the World* (New York : Mentor, 1954), p. 150.

85. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 323.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 324. Gandhi may have been referring to Jinnah's speech in Karachi October 8, 1938, in which he said Muslims must develop self-reliance while rejecting any quarrel "with the Hindus generally for I have many personal friends amongst them." Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 624.

87. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, p. 398.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

89. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 324.

90. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 186. For the full texts of the documents, letters, and statements, related to the Cripps Mission, see Maurice Linford Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds.). *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, II (London : Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 519-40.

91. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, pp. 217-18.

92. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 772.

93. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 52. \*

94. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

95. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, p. 432.
96. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 336.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 337.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
100. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, pp. 434-35.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 437-38.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 438.
104. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 337.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
107. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, p. 440.
108. For the text of this important document, see Gwyer and Appadorai (eds.) *Speeches and Documents*, II, 541-44.
109. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, pp. 75-76.
110. Quoted in Louis Fischer, *Gandhi*, p. 146.
111. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, p. 449.
112. G. Allana (ed.), *Pakistan Movement*, p. 221.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
114. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 782.
115. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, p. 490.
116. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, p. 272.



## CHAPTER IV

### PROGRESS OF THE DEBATE, 1943-1944

MOHANDAS GANDHI spent the entire year of 1943 in detention at the Aga Khan Palace in Yeravda, near Poona. While he and other Congress leaders endured their prolonged incarcerations, Jinnah and his supporters roamed India preaching Muslim nationalism.<sup>1</sup> Jinnah's speeches rarely deviated from his primary themes: the Congress sought to blackmail the British and subject the Muslims to Hindu rule: Muslims must develop courage, faith, and unity, and the only solution to India's problems lay in the creation of Pakistan.

Frequently Jinnah portrayed Gandhi as the major threat to the welfare of the Islamic community. Especially noteworthy was his bitter attack on Gandhism in his Presidential address to the annual session of the All-India Muslim League in Delhi on April 24, 1943.<sup>2</sup> Seeking to indict Gandhi as a communalist, Jinnah recalled statements of the early 1920's in which Gandhi had admitted his introduction of religion into politics and justified his belief in orthodox Hinduism, the caste system, cow-protection, and idolworship.<sup>3</sup> The League president ridiculed his foe's refusal to speak only for India's Hindus despite the 1924 statement that "every fibre of my being is Hindu."<sup>4</sup> Reciting the institutions established to propagate the Hindi language, cow-protection, and spinning, Jinnah charged an attempt to convert "the whole of India into a Gandhi Ashram."<sup>5</sup> He chided the Quit India movement, correctly pointing out that it represented a reversal of Gandhi's earlier position that independence required communal agreement. Asking the Congress to revise its policy and negotiate with the Muslim League "as equals,"<sup>6</sup> Jinnah issued a direct and personal appeal:

Nobody would welcome it more than myself if Mr. Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you that it will be the greatest day both for

the Hindus and Mussalmans. If he has made up his mind, what is there to prevent Mr. Gandhi from writing direct to me ?<sup>7</sup>

Reading the challenge in the Muslim League's English language newspaper, *Dawn*, the imprisoned Gandhi replied by letter of May 4 :

I welcome your invitation. I suggest our meeting face to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I am in your hands...Why should not both you and I approach the great question of communal unity as men determined on finding a common solution...?<sup>8</sup>

The British government refused to forward Gandhi's letter, stating in a communique May 26 its unwillingness "to give facilities for political correspondence or contact to a person detained from promoting an illegal mass movement."<sup>9</sup> Gandhi's letter was not made public until after his release a year later, but the British authorities did notify Jinnah of its contents. On May 28 the League president issued a Statement suggesting that Gandhi's letter apparently indicated no change of attitude but merely sought to embroil the League and British in controversy for the purpose of gaining his release from prison.<sup>10</sup> A stalemate ensued, and interaction between the two leaders was essentially ended for another year.

Jinnah, meanwhile, continued his campaign to strengthen the League and promote Muslim solidarity.<sup>11</sup> Further dramatization of his unalterable demand for Partition resulted from an interview with the British writer, Beverley Nichols, on December 18, 1943. Defending his failure to offer any specific plans, Jinnah cited the separations of Ireland from Great Britain and Burma from India as proof that once the principle of partition was accepted, the details would follow automatically.<sup>12</sup> In using Ireland as a historical precedent for Partition, Jinnah largely ignored the considerable debate and near-civil war occurring between the Easter Rebellion of 1916 and the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921-22. Similarly, the separation of Burma from India was not wholly analogous to the case of Pakistan. The British Simon Commission, Indian leaders, and the Burma Legislative Council were all in

essential agreement over the desirability of Burmese Partition, a circumstance certainly not present in the Hindu-Muslim debate.<sup>13</sup>

Despite his questionable use of historical precedents, Jinnah grasped clearly the vital principle upon which the entire Partition debate hinged—the assertion that Muslims represented a nation by themselves. In expanding this fundamental assumption of nationhood, Jinnah explained :

You must remember that Islam is not merely a religious doctrine but a realistic and practical Code of Conduct. I am thinking in terms of *life*, of everything important in life. I am thinking in terms of our history, our heroes, our art, our architecture, our music, our laws, our jurisprudence...In all these things our outlook is not only fundamentally different but often radically antagonistic to the Hindus. We are different *beings*. There is *nothing* in life which links us together. Our names, our clothes, our foods—they are all different ; our economic life, our educational ideas, our treatment of women, our attitude to animals—we challenge each other at every point of the compass. Take one example, the eternal question of the cow. We eat the cow, the Hindus worship it. A lot of Englishmen imagine that this “worship” is merely a picturesque convention, an historical survival. It is nothing of the sort. Only a few days ago, in this very city, the cow question became a matter for the police. The Hindus were thrown into the greatest agitation because cows were being killed in public. But the cow question is only one of a thousand.<sup>14</sup>

Such argumentation was largely a repetition of Jinnah's Lahore speech in 1940, in which he described the two communities as “quite different and distinct” ways of life. In the Nichols' interview, Jinnah simply intensified his language, reflecting an absolute and categorical refusal to even consider the possibility of Indian unity. Unyielding consistency had become his dominant rhetorical trait.

By 1944, the Muslim League's single-minded propaganda

campaign had established Jinnah as a potent force in Indian politics. The League now claimed two million members, compared to only 1,330 seventeen years earlier.<sup>15</sup> In the sixty-one provincial by-elections filled by separate Muslim electorates between 1937 and 1943, the League won 47, independent Muslims ten, and Congress Muslims only four.<sup>16</sup> The steady growth of the League can be attributed to a variety of factors : Congress failures to adequately meet Muslim interests, Muslim bourgeoisie fears of the socialistic economic ideas of men like Nehru, the latent sense of group solidarity, and Jinnah's organizational abilities and propaganda campaigns.<sup>17</sup>

Undoubtedly a major factor in the rise of the League's popular following was the emotional appeal of the simplistic, one-word goal of Pakistan. As the partisan Muslim historian Syed Lateef asserted :

Shakespeare was wrong. There is everything in a name, 'Pakistan' soon became a word of magic. It fired the imagination of the millions of Muslims all over the country. Pakistan was born only when its name was born. Previous to that it was only a philosophical idea. Now it became a living voice out of a million throats. It became the irresistible Muslim demand.<sup>18</sup>

Few persons would deny that in 1944 the idea of Pakistan still lacked concrete description ; Jinnah himself often declared that acceptance of the principle of partition must precede any discussion of details. Muslim propaganda, to use the terminology of General Semantics, relied on a highly symbol-directed, intensional orientation. Jinnah effectively avoided consideration of the life-facts of the political, economic, and social implications of partition, concentrating instead on the abstract glories of a national homeland. Perhaps he recognized that detailed plans might invite disagreement and division even among League supporters. By keeping the goal vaguely defined, he enabled the various groups of Muslim India to abstract from the Pakistan idea those aspects most supportive of their own interests.<sup>19</sup> Thus, Muslim businessmen foresaw new markets free from Hindu competition. Landlords hoped for a perpetuation of the *zamindari* system. Intellectuals envisioned

a cultural rebirth free from the British and Hindus. To the orthodox, Pakistan promised a religious state dedicated to the purity of Islam. To officials and bureaucrats a new nation offered a shortcut to seniority.<sup>20</sup> In this way, the very vagueness of the Pakistan demand facilitated Jinnah's task as a persuader.

By the time of his release from prison in May, 1944, Gandhi realized that Jinnah and the League must be reckoned with. But the twenty-one consecutive months in detention had considerably weakened the aging man, now nearing his 75th birthday. On February 22, his faithful wife, Kasturbai, had died following a long illness. Six weeks later Gandhi had contracted a near-fatal case of malaria. Cognizant of his dangerously-low blood pressure, the British freed Gandhi lest his martyr-death in prison spark havoc throughout India. During the early summer, Gandhi's health gradually returned, and he prepared for his most dramatic and intense clash with Jinnah.

The Gandhi-Jinnah confrontation of 1944 must be viewed against the preliminary efforts of Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (commonly called Rajaji). A former premier of Madras, Rajaji was one of the first Hindu leaders willing to grant Jinnah's demand for Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> In March, 1943, Rajaji had visited Gandhi in jail and won his endorsement of a plan calling for League-Congress cooperation in a provisional interim government, with the question of partition to be decided upon by a plebiscite in the Muslim majority areas once the British vacated power. Rajaji engaged Jinnah in correspondence, seeking his support for the proposal. Predictably, Jinnah balked because the partition would occur after the League and Congress jointly ousted the British. He wanted partition agreed-to prior to independence, since he obviously distrusted the Congress to keep its word.<sup>22</sup>

When the collapse of the Rajagopalachari-Jinnah negotiations was publicly announced in early July, 1944, Gandhi decided to approach the League president personally. On July 17, he wrote to Jinnah from Dilkusha (Panchgani) asking for a meeting and saying, "Do not regard me as an enemy of Islam or of Indian Muslims. I have always been a servant and

friend to you and to mankind.”<sup>23</sup> Jinnah replied from Srinagar (Kashmir) by letter of July 24, thanking Gandhi for his letter, hoping his health would soon return, and suggesting a meeting at Jinnah’s Bombay residence in August.<sup>24</sup>

Several insights might be gleaned from this exchange. Gandhi wrote his letter in Gujarati, enclosing an Urdu translation, and opened with the equivalent of “Brother Jinnah” while closing with “Your brother, M. K. Gandhi.” Such a style clearly demonstrated his fraternal-minded nationalism and sense of unity. By contrast, Jinnah wrote in English, “the only language in which I can make no mistake,”<sup>25</sup> and opened his letter with “Dear Mr. Gandhi” and closed with “Yours sincerely.” Jinnah thus illustrated his formal, more Westernized orientation ; while polite, he did not reciprocate the cordiality of his opposite number.

Significantly, Gandhi initiated the invitation to meet—indicative of Jinnah’s newly-acquired stature in Indian politics. As Majumdar recalled :

It may be remembered that, in 1937-38, Jinnah wrote letter after letter to Gandhiji for personal discussion with him on Hindu-Muslim problems, but then Gandhiji took scant notice of Jinnah’s request and asked him to contact Maulana Azad in the first instance. Now the wheel turned the full circle and it was Gandhiji who was suppliant for an interview with Jinnah.<sup>26</sup>

*Time* magazine echoed this sentiment, writing that even his agreeing to a plebiscite was “a momentous concession for Gandhi to make.”<sup>27</sup> Jinnah himself attempted to attribute capitulation to his antagonist, for in Lahore on July 30 he stated, “At last, and it is all to the good and conducive to further progress that Mr. Gandhi has at any rate in his personal capacity accepted the principle of Pakistan,” a comment reportedly greeted with “thunderous applause” by the Muslim League Working Committee.<sup>28</sup> Gandhi, of course, had accepted no such principle, and Jinnah, just as Gandhi had done in 1940, assumed an interpretation truer to his own hopes than to the real beliefs of his opponent.

The face-to-face meetings scheduled for August had to be postponed due to Jinnah's poor health. Intensive campaigning on behalf of the Pakistan idea had considerably weakened the League President. He suffered from exhaustion, dysentery, chest pains, and a cough—early symptoms of the pneumonia which killed him four years later.<sup>29</sup> Following medication and rest, Jinnah's health improved, and between September 9 and 27, 1944 the two aging leaders engaged in the most intense and sustained confrontation of their lives. Their interviews took place in the "vast marble-tiled living room" of Jinnah's house at 10 Mount Pleasant Road on Bombay's residential Malabar Hill.<sup>30</sup> Meeting together in private fourteen times, the men recorded their conversations in a series of letters, containing more than 15,000 words, epitomized the fundamental and irreconcilable clash between the two men.<sup>31</sup>

In Jinnah's letter of September 10, he emphasized that, as President of the Muslim League, he was "subject to and governed by its constitution, rules, and regulations."<sup>32</sup> He recalled that their discussion the day before centered on the Lahore Resolution of 1940, with Jinnah trying to persuade Gandhi to accept its basic principles. Gandhi allegedly "refused to consider it," remarking that there was "an ocean between you and me."<sup>33</sup> As an alternative, Gandhi proposed the Rajaji Formula. The remainder of Jinnah's letter asked for a series of minute details concerning the Rajaji proposal, including the nature of the Interim government, who would appoint the demarcation commission, how mutual agreements could be reached, and how and when British power would be transferred.

In his reply of September 11, Gandhi called Hindu-Muslim unity his "life mission" and remarked, "It is true that I said an ocean separated you and me in outlook. But that had no reference to the Lahore Resolution of the League. The Lahore Resolution is indefinite. Rajaji has taken from it the substance and given it shape."<sup>34</sup> Gandhi then indicated that the formation of an Interim government and the technicalities of the plebiscite must be matters for discussion, and he reiterated his desire that the British relinquish power "as early as possible."<sup>35</sup>

Jinnah responded the same day, asking in what way the Lahore Resolution was indefinite, and rejecting the Rajaji Formula for having "mutilated" the Lahore idea. He argued that "the only solution of India's problem is to accept the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan," and repeated his desire "to convert you to my point of view, if possible." Jinnah said Gandhi's goal of achieving independence first through united effort, followed by the solution of any domestic problems, was "putting the cart before the horse".<sup>36</sup> He charged Gandhi with failure to answer his questions about the Interim government and plebiscite. Clearly, Jinnah wanted Pakistan created before the British relinquished control since he did not trust the Congress to agree to Partition after Independence. He was partially justified in such a belief since the Congress had demonstrated little desire to compromise in 1937-39, and since very few governments ever willingly agree to their self-dissolution.

Jinnah wrote again on September 13 asking for a reply. The following day Gandhi acknowledged his "leisurely fashion" in responding, "hoping that as our talks proceeded and as cordiality increased, mutual clarification would come of itself and that we would only have to record our final agreement."<sup>37</sup> Gandhi's life-long propensity for absorption and transcendent unity evidenced itself again; he spoke longingly of the time when "you have converted me, or I you, or by mutual conversion we have become one mind functioning through two bodies." Given Jinnah's personal dislike for such esoteric statements, one can assume his displeasure at reading such words. Nor would he appreciate the restatement of Gandhi's nationalistic belief that "unless we oust the third party, we shall not be able to live at peace with one another." Gandhi was still more concerned with ending British rule than establishing any Muslim nation, priorities exactly the opposite of Jinnah's. Gandhi also wrote that the Rajaji plebiscite would be "by adult suffrage of all the inhabitants of the Pakistan area," and that any treaties would be handled by the Provisional Government and later by the two governments, if Partition were approved by the voters.<sup>38</sup>



On September 14, Jinnah introduced a petty squabble by charging his opponent with having confused the correct dates of their most recent correspondence. He also requested questions as to how the Lahore Resolution was indefinite, asking for more details concerning the power, composition, and limitations of the Interim Government. Charging that Gandhi had not clarified the Rajaji view of Independence, he implied that if Gandhi held to the interpretation of the August, 1942 Congress Resolution, the Rajaji Formula would be unacceptable to Muslims.<sup>39</sup> To other points in Gandhi's latest letter, Jinnah said "I do not need to press you further, although some of them are not quite satisfactory."<sup>40</sup> The word "press" and the extent of specific details requested by Jinnah suggested an effort on his part to corner Gandhi with demands he was neither inclined to nor even capable of answering authoritatively.

Gandhi took to the offensive in his letter of September 15. He rejected the two-nation theory, stating :

I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendents claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children<sup>41</sup>

He charged Jinnah with introducing "a new test of nationhood" and again appealed for him to join in ousting the British "by our combined effort." Gandhi then listed nineteen specific questions concerning the Lahore Resolution. He asked for the meaning of the word "Pakistan," for the connotation of "Muslims," and for the nature and timing of demarcation, since if it preceded independence then "the proposal must be accepted first by Britain and then imposed upon India, not evolved from within by the free will of the people of India !!!"<sup>42</sup> Again, Gandhi was putting anti-colonialism ahead of the communal issue, thus conflicting directly with Jinnah who sought British sympathy for the Muslim cause.

Additionally, Gandhi asked for his adversary's definition of "minorities" and sought clarification on how the will of the people in the Muslim majority areas would be ascertained under the Lahore Resolution. Gandhi thus anticipated one of

the most troublesome aspects of Partition : the presence of sizable Hindu minorities in both the Punjab and Bengal. He also asked how Partition would materially benefit the states concerned. Gandhi then made a significant concession :

I am prepared to accept the pre-ponderating influence and position of the League and have approached you for that very reason...I know that you have acquired a unique hold on the Muslim masses.<sup>43</sup>

Such statements testified to Jinnah's growing political power, but Gandhi noted that some Muslims remained outside the League, and concluded his letter with the assertion that the Lahore Resolution means "ruin for the whole of India."<sup>44</sup> Gandhi and Jinnah were still separated by an ideological ocean.

The same day Gandhi penned a second letter, negating Jinnah's earlier attempt to attribute a mistaken date to him : "There was no mistake about the date, for I wrote in answer to your reminder of September 13." Stating that his concept of independence did not correspond with that envisaged in the Congress Resolution of August, 1942, Gandhi indicated that the demarcation of boundaries, the plebiscite and partition "if the people concerned vote for partition" would occur after Independence : "The Formula was framed by Rajaji in good faith. I accepted it in equal good faith. The hope was that you would look at it with favour...My co-operation will be available."<sup>45</sup> An appeal to Jinnah's good faith held little hope for persuading the Muslim leader, for back in his 1937 Lucknow address he dedicated himself to power politics free from reliance on good will. Besides, Jinnah completely disagreed that partition should follow Independence, as envisioned by Rajaji.

By letter of September 17, Jinnah complained that his opponent's "individual capacity" made it difficult for him to reach any firm conclusions regarding their topic, but emphasized that "if I can convert you, exercising as you do tremendous influence over Hindu India, it will be no small assistance to me."<sup>46</sup> This statement suggests that Jinnah perhaps sought to use Gandhi for the promotion of his crusade, a campaign to which he was nevertheless committed with or without Gandhi's

aid. Jinnah then offered one of his most impassioned pleas for the two-nation theory :

We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions—in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.<sup>47</sup>

The parallelisms in this passage make it a stylistically forceful statement, and the element listed do, in fact, correspond to many of the components often associated with nationhood.<sup>48</sup>

Jinnah then discussed the specific points raised in Gandhi's first letter of September 15. His discussion, however, frequently evaded the issues. For example, Gandhi had asked how partition would materially benefit the people involved. Jinnah dismissed the query as unrelated to clarification of the Lahore Resolution.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, many critics of the Pakistan idea claimed that partition was economically unsound, but Jinnah steadfastly ignored such charges. A year earlier he side-stepped the economic question by asking his British interviewer whether he would prefer "a rich England under Germany or a poor England free."<sup>50</sup>

Jinnah also avoided the question of how the Lahore Resolution would hasten Independence, writing that it "does not arise out of clarification of the Resolution." He glossed over minority rights in Pakistan as "a matter for negotiation" and Gandhi's question about pan-Islamism was dismissed as "mere bogey."<sup>51</sup> Some critics charged Jinnah with ambitions of resurrecting the nineteenth-century doctrine of pan-Islamism, which envisaged an international Muslim brotherhood stretching from North Africa to East Asia. For example, Payne wrote :

His dream was to form around Pakistan a vast Muslim

empire which would embrace Russian Turkestan and the four western provinces of China, and whatever other Muslim states would eventually fall under the sway of Pakistan. The state of Pakistan was merely the first step in his dream of a federation of Islamic states stretching halfway across the world. He was suffering from heart disease and tuberculosis, and he was all the more eager to bring about his Islamic empire because he knew he was dying.<sup>52</sup>

Payne undoubtedly overstated the case, for there is little evidence that Jinnah expected to acquire territory outside the limits of British India and Gandhi did not pursue the topic.

While the Muslim leader could be vague and evasive when pressed for certain specific details, he nevertheless unequivocally stated his conception of communal representation, insisting that "the Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative organization of Muslim India."<sup>53</sup> Therefore, he completely rejected Gandhi's claim to represent all Indians, stating :

It is quite clear that you represent nobody else but the Hindus, and as long as you do not realize your true position and the realities, it is very difficult for me to argue with you, and it becomes still more difficult to persuade you, and hope to convert you to the realities and the actual conditions prevailing in India to-day.<sup>54</sup>

Jinnah's strategy since 1938 remained consistent : to forge a clear and distinct dichotomy between Hindu and Muslim politics. While Gandhi never agreed to such a distinction, their very meeting tended to imply such a division, and thus worked to Jinnah's tactical advantage. Noted Mahajan :

The only result of those talks was that Mr. Jinnah emerged with greater prestige in India than before. It was realised that Mr. Jinnah occupied a very high position in the politics of the country and that was the reason why Mahatma Gandhi was taking pains to come to a settlement with him.<sup>55</sup>

Gandhi next wrote on September 19. Defending his latest

letter, he stated, "It may be that all my questions do not arise from the view of mere clarification of the Lahore Resolution. But I contend that they are very relevant from the stand-point of a seeker that I am." He thanked Jinnah for his patience, and said "I hope you will never lose it but will persevere in your effort to convert me." Gandhi described himself as "a lover of communal unity" and again placed his services at his opponent's disposal.<sup>56</sup> Acknowledging their stalemate, Gandhi wrote that "if your letter is the final word, there is little hope," and he reiterated his position that "the grave step" of Partition should not be taken without a plebiscite of the people involved.<sup>57</sup>

Jinnah responded on September 21 and summarized the progress of their debate, quoting extensively from four previous letters by Gandhi. Jinnah called the August 1942 Congress Resolution "inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India." Then he accused Gandhi of "not confining yourself to matters of clarification, but introducing other extraneous matters" such as the plebiscite and mutual defense treaties.<sup>58</sup> To Gandhi, of course, such matters were central to their debate but Jinnah sought to avoid any specific details pertaining to Pakistan's formation until his opponent agreed to the principle of the two-nation theory. Jinnah explained his opposition to a plebiscite of the whole population in the Muslim majority areas by chiding Gandhi for "labouring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word 'self-determination' " :

...can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which is our birthright ?...The right of self-determination, which we claim, postulates that we are a nation, and as such it would be the self-determination of the Muslims, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right.<sup>59</sup>

Jinnah thus precluded any democratic procedures in the fight for Pakistan. The outright rejection of a plebiscite was perhaps partially motivated by the recognition that he might not be able to win a majority vote for Partition.<sup>60</sup> Certainly, Jinnah's

claim of the Muslims' "inherent right" was a time-honored justification for nationhood. But traditional arguments were normally advanced in the name of all inhabitants in a given territory, whereas Jinnah claimed nationality for only a religious group. He thereby ignored the possible desires of the non-Muslim residents of the affected areas who, in the Punjab made up 47% of the population. His demands also implied that all Muslims favored Partition, although that was not the case.

Gandhi answered the next day, and insisted on a plebiscite because "there must be clear proof that the people affected desire partition." Asserting that "the more I think about the 'two-nations' theory, the more alarming it appears to be," Gandhi wrote :

I am unable to accept the proposition that the Muslims of India are a nation distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of India. Mere assertion is no proof. The consequences of accepting such a proposition are dangerous in the extreme. Once the principle is admitted, there would be no limit to claims for cutting up India into numerous divisions which would spell India's ruin.<sup>61</sup>

Gandhi had some justification for such a fear. Elements of both the Sikh and Pushtoon (Pathan) communities in north-western India had indicated a desire for separate homelands,<sup>62</sup> and the hundreds of princely states had not yet been incorporated into a central Indian authority. Gandhi was, however, extending the two-nation theory to extremes, whereas Jinnah obviously felt the only likely division would involve the two major communities.

Gandhi then denied that the August, 1942 Resolution was inimical to Muslim ideals, saying "there is no proof for this sweeping statement." Recognizing that "we seem to be moving in a circle," he suggested that a third party be invited to "guide or even arbitrate between us." He emphasized the necessity for the "safeguarding of common interests such as Defence, Foreign Affairs and the like" due to "the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity."<sup>63</sup>

With such a statement, Gandhi seemed to imply a Pakistan which would function as a kind of super-province within India; Jinnah's conception was much different, involving a totally separate and sovereign nation which would not, therefore, have any common interests with India in terms of political administration.

In his letter of September 23, Jinnah unequivocally explained why he believed the August, 1942 Resolution was inimical to Muslims. It would create a "united democratic Government of India..., which means establishing a Hindu Raj," the new Constitution would be formed by a Constituent Assembly "nearly 75 per cent" Hindu, and the Resolution endorsed "mass civil disobedience at your command and when ordered by you as the sole dictator of the Congress".<sup>64</sup> The Muslim leader then asked, perhaps facetiously, how a third party could arbitrate talks with "an individual seeker," again referring to Gandhi's unofficial status. Jinnah concluded unhappily that "I have made every effort all these days and in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence to convert you, but unfortunately, it seems, I have failed."<sup>65</sup>

The debate seemed to be going nowhere. By letter of September 23, Gandhi admitted :

Last evening's talks left a bad taste in my mouth. Our talks and our correspondence seem to run in parallel lines and never touch one another. We reached the breaking point last evening but, thank God, we were unwilling to part. We resumed discussion and suspended it in order to allow me to keep my time for the evening public prayer...In order that all possible chance of making any mistake in a matter of this great importance may be removed, I would like you to give me in writing what precisely on your part you want me to put my signature to.<sup>66</sup>

Jinnah did not comply with the request, perhaps supportive of Sayeed's observation that he was essentially biding time at the meetings, lacking any assurance that Congress leaders would agree with any conclusions reached and lacking the presence of the British, who still maintained control of India.<sup>67</sup> Instead of

submitting a plan for signature, he wrote a one-paragraph reply suggesting that Gandhi could not sign anything until "you clothe yourself with representative capacity and are vested with authority." Remaining faithful to the Lahore Resolution, he again appealed to Gandhi to "revise your policy and programme, as the future of this sub-continent and the welfare of the peoples of India demand that you should face realities."<sup>68</sup>

Thereupon followed perhaps the two most important letters of the debate. In a final effort to seek agreement, Gandhi wrote on September 24 offering his own Formula which, he felt, reasonably satisfied the claims of the Lahore Resolution. Gandhi proceeded from the assumption that India should not be regarded as two or more nations, "but as one family consisting of many members," with the Muslims in the north-west and northeast, where they were in absolute majority desirous of separation. Jinnah, of course, did not share such an assumption, but Gandhi then listed the essential terms of separation to which he could agree :

(1) A Commission approved by the Congress and League should demarcate the Muslim majority areas and ascertain through the votes of the adult population the wishes of the residents ;

(2) If the vote is in favor of separation, these areas would become a separate State "as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination" ;

(3) a Treaty of Separation would provide for matters of common interest such as Foreign Affairs, Defence, Commerce, and Internal Communications ;

(4) the rights of minorities would be safeguarded by treaty ;

(5) the League and Congress would jointly work for Indian Independence, with the League free to refrain from and direct action undertaken by the Congress.<sup>69</sup>

The Gandhi Formula did not differ appreciably from the Rajaji Formula already rejected by Jinnah. Predictably, he rejected Gandhi's proposal as well. By letter of September 25, Jinnah pointed out that Gandhi did not accept that Indian



Muslims were a nation. Neither did he recognize their inherent right to self-determination regardless of what other groups wanted. Therefore, the Hindu leader had "already rejected the basis and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution."<sup>70</sup> If provincial boundaries were demarcated around the areas of absolute Muslim majorities, Jinnah argued, the present provinces would be "maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only with the husk." He could not agree to the plebiscite since non-Muslims had no right to determine the future of Muslims. Likewise, Jinnah balked at the proposal to form Pakistan after Independence, maintaining instead that

...we should come to a complete settlement of our own immediately, and by our united front and efforts do everything in our power to secure the freedom and independence of the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.<sup>71</sup>

Majumdar later contended that the conversations broke down primarily over this issue of the timing of partition.<sup>72</sup> Clearly, just as Gandhi did not want to wait until after World War II for independence, so Jinnah did not want to wait until after independence for partition.

Jinnah further refuted Gandhi's plan by stating that no Treaty to handle common matters was needed, since such matters were "the lifeblood of any State" and would therefore be dealt with by the two independent governments.<sup>73</sup> Jinnah undoubtedly ascertained correctly that the Treaty of Separation outlined by Gandhi implied less than total sovereignty for Pakistan. Obviously, Gandhi still repudiated the spirit of the Lahore Resolution.

The two antagonists differed so widely, in fact, that as the talks neared an end they could not even agree on the cause of their having met. In his letter of September 25, Gandhi wrote :

Our conversations have come about as a result of your correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his Formula and your consultations with the League Working Committee thereon, and my own letter to you suggesting a meeting between you and me.<sup>74</sup>

Jinnah responded :

It is entirely incorrect and has no foundation in fact for you to say that our conversations have come about as a result of my correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his Formula...It is entirely in response to your letter of July 17, 1944.<sup>76</sup>

The significance of this additional disagreement was that Gandhi sought to imply a mutual Congress-League desire to find a settlement, whereas Jinnah emphasized that India's foremost personality had approached *him*. Jinnah even refused Gandhi's request to personally present his case before the Muslim League Council, saying that only delegates could participate in its meetings. Twenty-five years earlier, Gandhi had frequently spoken to Muslim League gatherings ; now he was denied access to the body. Jinnah had characterized Gandhi as the Congress dictator, but showed himself to be the virtual dictator of the League.

In his letter of September 26, Jinnah remarked that "I regret I have failed to convince you and convert you as I was hopeful of doing so."<sup>76</sup> The League President continued to show frustration at Gandhi's unofficial status :

...it was not possible to negotiate and reach an agreement unless both parties were fully represented ; for it is one-sided business, as it will not be binding upon any organization in any sense whatever, but you would as an individual only recommend it, if any agreement is reached, to the Congress and the country, whereas it would be binding upon me as the President of the Muslim League...I hope you see the unfairness and the great disadvantage to me.<sup>77</sup>

It is doubtful, however, that any change in Gandhi's status would have materially influenced the meetings, for their debate centered on fundamental ideology. Gandhi called the constant references to his unauthorized position "irrelevant."<sup>78</sup> Jinnah was unconvinced, however, and in his second letter of September 26, again stressed that "no responsible organization can entertain any proposal from any individual, however great he may be, unless it is backed up with the authority of a

recognized organization and comes from its fully accredited representative.” Why Jinnah should put such emphasis on a point not really related to the partition issue is unclear. Perhaps he sought to remind his adversary of his own newly-won importance as a political leader. Perhaps he gained some subconscious revenge, for in 1928 he had been humiliated by Hindus for his lack of representative authority. In any case, Jinnah’s final letter included one more condemnation of the Rajaji and Gandhi Formulas, as he said “both are calculated completely to torpedo the Pakistan demand of Muslim India.”<sup>79</sup> The talks were finished.

Further clarification of their disagreement emerged in comments made following the meetings. While releasing the text of the correspondence on September 27, Jinnah issued a statement explaining his analysis of the talks :

I have placed before him [Gandhi] everything and every aspect of the Muslim point of view in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence, and we discussed all the *pros* and *cons* generally, and I regret to say that I have failed in my task of converting Mr. Gandhi. ...Nevertheless, we hope that the public will not feel embittered, and we trust that this is not the final end of our effort.<sup>80</sup>

The same day Gandhi spoke following public prayers, acknowledged that the two leaders had never before come into such close personal contact, and described their conversations as friendly and cordial.<sup>81</sup> On September 28, Gandhi read a prepared statement to about forty journalists :

It is a matter of deep regret that we two could not reach an agreement. But there is no cause for disappointment. The breakdown is only so-called. It is an adjournment *sine die*. Each one of us must now talk to the public and put our view-points before them. If we do so dispassionately and if the public co-operate, we may reach a solution of the seemingly insoluble at an early date.<sup>82</sup>

A questioner asked why the talks lasted so long considering the lack of agreement, and Gandhi replied that each advocate

sought to convert the other and recognized that "haste in such cases is a dangerous thing."<sup>83</sup> He further stated that both Rajaji and himself conceded the Muslim claim for a separate state :

That right is conceded without the slightest reservation. But if it means utterly independent sovereignty, so that there is nothing in common between the two, I hold it is an impossible proposition. That means war to the knife. It is not a proposition that resolves itself into a voluntary or friendly solution...the Formula concedes everything that could reasonably be conceded if we consider ourselves one family. Children of the same family, dissatisfied with one another by reason of change of religion, if they should separate, then the separation should be within ourselves and not separation in the face of the whole world. When two brothers separate, they do not become enemies of one another in the eyes of the world. The world will still recognize them as brothers.<sup>84</sup>

While Gandhi's family imagery might be interpreted as an autobiographical allusion to his own sons, one of whom converted to Islam, the above passage clearly indicates that Jinnah had done little to shake his opponent's belief in a transcendent unity between Muslims and Hindus.

On September 29 Stuart Gelder of the *London News Chronicle* interviewed Gandhi in Bombay. The Indian leader expressed belief in Jinnah's sincerity but doubted that "an unnatural division of India could bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned." He then restated the need for permanent "bonds of alliance between Hindustan and Pakistan" with a common policy for Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications.<sup>85</sup> Willing to concede Muslims autonomy for internal and domestic affairs, Gandhi stoutly rejected the two-nation theory "because it is fundamentally wrong in principle".<sup>86</sup> The claim that Muslims represented a completely independent nation lay at the heart of Jinnah's case, and Gandhi later recalled that such a claim became the major stumbling block in their talks :

...apart from conceding the 'two-nations' theory, I accepted the concrete suggestion of division of India as between members of the same family and, therefore, reserving for partnership things of common interest. But Qaid-e-Azam would have nothing short of the 'two-nations' theory, and therefore, complete dissolution amounting to full sovereignty...It was here that we split.<sup>87</sup>

Perhaps the most amazing aspect of the confrontation was that despite their fundamental disagreement, the two advocates remained on speaking terms. Gandhi insisted that "we have parted as friends. These days have not been wasted. I am convinced that Mr. Jinnah is a good man. I hope we shall meet again. I am a man of prayer and I shall pray for understanding."<sup>88</sup> Even the more austere Jinnah admitted in a later interview that the conversations had been held in good faith, although his questioner observed that a relapse of bronchitis made the Muslim leader weak, hoarse, and depressed.<sup>89</sup>

Yet, the spectacle of two aging and sickly antagonists engaging in irreconcilable debate appeared highly pathetic. Of the conversations, Payne observed : "There were long silences. They fought out their battles as though they were creatures from different universes, and they made demands on each other that they knew to be totally unacceptable."<sup>90</sup> Critics in the United States charged each man with a "pre-occupation with the hair-splitting maneuvers of legal debate" while the major issues—the nature of Pakistan's government, the minorities in Bengal, the distribution of wealth—went undiscussed.<sup>91</sup> Brown dismissed the entire three weeks as "futile."<sup>92</sup>

The petty haggling and utter lack of accord prompted the widespread conclusion that the talks had failed. Certainly the encounters produced few concrete guidelines for planning India's future. But Jinnah undoubtedly emerged with at least a small tactical advantage. His uncompromising demand for Pakistan had enjoyed considerable public exposure, and he had finally met Gandhi face-to-face on an ostensibly equal basis. Menon concluded that the only practical results of the conference were clarification of the Muslim League's

previously-vague demands and the enhancement of Jinnah's prestige among Indian Muslims.<sup>93</sup> Maulana Azad, the Muslim president of the Congress Party, unhappily concurred : "I think Gandhiji's approach to Jinnah on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave new and added importance to Mr. Jinnah which he later exploited to the full."<sup>94</sup> Gandhi's wish to again meet his rival would be fulfilled, but not until nearly three years later. And by then, communal passions in India had sufficiently heightened to make the creation of Pakistan a near certainty.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. While in prison, Gandhi was essentially cut off from the Indian public, as the British censored his mail, limited his visitors, and denied him access to the press. He reportedly spent much time trying to teach his wife geography and to read and write Gujarati. See Louis Fischer (ed.), *The Essential Gandhi* (New York : Random House, 1962), p. 348. On February 10, Gandhi undertook a twenty-one day fast to appeal to divine justice in protest of the Viceroy's blaming him for the violence following the "Quit India" crusade. During his own three-year imprisonment at Ahmadnagar Fort, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote his important book, *The Discovery of India*.

2. The full text of the speech can be found in M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Writings and Speeches of Mr. Jinnah*, ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1946), pp. 523-67.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 533.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 534.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 543.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 544.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 552.

8. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, ed. Anand T. Hingorani (Karachi : Anand T. Hingorani, 1947), pp.79-80.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

10. M. A. Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*, pp. 569-70.

11. During this period Jinnah campaigned vigorously for League candidates in provincial elections and actively solicited contributions. On July 26, 1943, he survived an assassination attempt by Rafiq Sabir Mazangavi who attacked him with a knife. The assailant belonged to the Khaksars, a militant Muslim group which felt Jinnah's policies only delayed the end of British imperialism. See Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (London : John Murray, 1954), pp. 144-45.

12. Beverley Nichols, *Verdict on India* (Bombay : Thacker 1946), pp. 217-18.

13. Jinnah's implication that Partition policies easily resolve themselves also ignored the complexity of the Burma separation. Anti-separationists in Burma gained considerable popular support prior to the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1935, and actually won a convincing victory in the 1932 elections. For a detailed analysis of the Burmese partition from India, see W. S. Desai, *India and Burma* (Bombay : Orient Longmans, 1954), pp. 58-68, and John F. Cady, *A History of Modern Burma* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 322-351.

14. Nichols, *Verdict on India*, pp. 218-19.

15. Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan : The Formative Phase, 1857-1948* (London : Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 176-78.

16. Reginald Coupland, *India : A Re-Statement* (London : Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 184.

17. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India, A Social Analysis* (London : Victor Gollancz, 1946) pp. 272-73. For a detailed study of the growth of the Muslim League, see Mary L. Becker, "The All-India Muslim League, 1906-1947 ; a Study of Leadership in the Evolution of a Nation" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1957).

18. Syed Abdul Lateef, *The Great Leader* (Lahore : Lion Press, 1961), p. 124.

19. To explain the human abstracting process, Alfred Korzybski, the founder of General Semantics, devised the "structural differential," a visual description of the multilevel nature of perception and symbolic behavior. See Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity* (Lakeville, Connecticut : Institute of General Semantics, 1958), pp. 386-451.

20. Bal Ram Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi : A Biography* (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 411-12.

21. Born in 1878, Rajagopalachari was an astute lawyer and Tamil scholar, and from 1948-50 served as the first Indian Governor-General of India. As early as April, 1942 he acknowledged the Muslim League's claim for separation as a basis for forming a national administration, but his resolution was defeated by the Congress Committee, 120 to 15. See M. L. Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds.), *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, II (London : Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 547. Rajaji and Gandhi respected each other despite occasional disagreements over fasting, dress, and even the marriage of the former's daughter, Lakshmi, to the latter's son, Devadas, in 1933. See Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York : E. P. Dutton 1969), pp. 355, 452 and 542. However, Jinnah's dislike for Rajaji was well-known.\* Speaking in Karachi on December 24, 1943, Jinnah accused him of "vicious,

sinister, wicked propaganda" in suggesting that the League was indifferent to independence. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, I (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), p. 572.

22. For the complete text of the Rajaji Formula and the Jinnah-Rajagopalachari correspondence concerning it, see M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, II (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), pp. 57-61.

23. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 91.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

25. Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah ; A Political Study* (Lahore : Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1945). p. 806.

26. S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi : Their Role in India's Quest for Freedom* (Calcutta : K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1966), p. 204.

27. "Resurrection," *TIME* (July 24, 1944), p. 34.

28. Gulam Ali Allana, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah : The Story of A Nation* (Lahore : Ferozsons, 1967), p. 362.

29. For a discussion of Jinnah's failing health, and his resistance to doctor's orders during the last few years of his life, see Bolitho, *Jinnah*, pp. 148ff.

30. Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York : E. P. Dutton, 1969), p. 512.

31. M. K. Gandhi, *The Gandhi Reader*, ed. Homer A. Jack (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1956), p. 418. Each side published the text of the Gandhi-Jinnah correspondence : *Gandhi-Jinnah Talks* (New Delhi : Hindustan Times, 1944) and *Jinnah-Gandhi Talks* (Delhi : Central Office, All India Muslim League, 1944). Indicative of the jealous rivalry characterizing communal relations in India, each side put the name of "its" man first in the title.

32. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, ed. Anand T. Hingorani (Karachi : Anand T. Hingorani, 1947), pp. 104-05.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-08.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-13.

39. Jinnah referred to the famous "Quit India" Resolution, which made no provision for a separate Muslim nation, but called for a united, independent India "under the leadership of Gandhiji." For its text, see *Ibid.*, pp. 221-24.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 117-18.



44. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

48. A common language, race, religion, and territory are often regarded as elements of nationhood. However, a prominent political scientist pointed out that perhaps even more important than these are the will and allegiance of the individual citizens. As Jinnah and many Muslims no longer willed a united India, Pakistan became more probable. See Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London : Hutchinson University Library, 1961), pp. 73-81.

49. M. K. Gandhi, *To The Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 121.

50. Beverley Nichols, *Verdict on India* (Bombay : Thacker., 1946), p. 219.

51. M. K. Gandhi, *To The Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 121.

52. Payne, *Life and Death*, p. 511. The chief spokesman for Pan-Islamism was Said Jamal-ud-din al-Afghani (1839-1897). For a discussion of the movement, see Lothrop Stoddard, *The New World of Islam* (New York : Charles Scribner, 1922), pp. 45-89.

53. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 122.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

55. Vidya Dhar Mahajan, "Pakistan," *The Cambridge History of India*, ed. H. H. Dodwell, VI (New Delhi : S. Chand, n. d.), p. 847.

56. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, pp. 123-24.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.

60. Sayeed, *Pakistan*, p. 125.

61. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 128.

62. Followers of a monotheistic variation of Hinduism, Sikhs numbered about one-eighth of the population in the Punjab. For a description of agitation for a Sikh homeland, see Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, II (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 289-91. The Pathans are a proud and militant ethnic group composed of numerous Muslim tribes inhabiting eastern Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. The Durand Line of 1893 demarcated the boundary between Afghanistan and British India, but cut through Pathan territory, paving the way for considerable friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan following Partition. See Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (London : St. Martin's Press, 1958) and Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1965) pp. 247-56. The "Pushtoonistan" issue remains alive to the present day, and challenged the considerable rhetorical abilities of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto following the 1971 war. See "The Perils of Pakistan," *Newsweek* (April 10, 1972), pp. 33-36.

63. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 128.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.
67. Sayeed, *Pakistan*, p. 125.
68. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 131.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
72. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 207.
73. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 137.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
86. *Ibid.* p. 156.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
89. Cited in Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 151.
90. Robert Payne, *Life and Death*, pp. 511-12.
91. "Right and Wrong Conclusions," *Amerasia*, VIII (November 3, 1944), p. 318.
92. William Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 124.
93. Vapal Pangunni Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Bombay : Orient Longmans, 1957), p. 166.
94. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Bombay : Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 93.

## CHAPTER V

### PROGRESS OF THE DEBATE, 1945-1948

THE GREAT confrontation of 1944 accomplished little save to dramatize further the unfathomable gulf separating Gandhi and Jinnah. Portrayed by the biographer, Bolitho, as a pair of "expended boxers," each having failed to land a knock-out punch, the two antagonists retired to their corners steadfast in their opposing beliefs concerning partition.<sup>1</sup> During succeeding years, the evolving conditions of Indian politics led to alterations in the rhetorical strategies of each man.

In January, 1945, Congress Party leader Bhulabhai Desai and his Muslim League counterpart Liaquat Ali Khan reached a tentative "pact" designed to insure cooperation in the formation of an Interim government. The plan collapsed, however, after both organizations later rejected its provisions.<sup>2</sup> Indicative of the difficulty in establishing coalition ministries was Jinnah's persistent refusal to compromise the partition demand. At a press conference in Ahmedabad on January 16, the League president declared :

We are willing and ready to sit down and come to a settlement with the Hindu nation on the basis of a division of India. Otherwise it is not possible to make any progress. It is immaterial whether I go to Mr. Gandhi or he comes to me.<sup>3</sup>

Further evidence of Jinnah's intransigence was contained in his message to Muslim India on March 23, the fifth anniversary of the Lahore Resolution :

It is not possible to believe that any Musalman, who has got the slightest of self-respect and an iota of pride left in him, can tolerate a Ministry in a Muslim majority province, which takes orders from and is subject to the control of Mr. Gandhi at Sevagram or the Congress who are deadly opponents to all Muslim aspirations and their national demands.<sup>4</sup>

The first significant interaction between Gandhi and Jinnah since their September "Talks" grew out of the Simla Conference of June 25 to July 14, 1945. Consistent with British assurances concerning Indian Independence, the Conference was convened at the behest of the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in an effort to gain agreement about the membership of an Interim Executive Council. Twenty-one Indian leaders were invited to Simla, including Gandhi and Jinnah—"the recognised leaders of the two main political parties," phraseology supporting the political dichotomy pursued by Jinnah.<sup>5</sup> Travelling to Simla by third-class railway so as to remain in touch with the "real India" Gandhi declined full participation in the Conference, maintaining that he functioned only as an individual adviser to the official Congress spokesman and president, Maulana Azad. Perhaps Gandhi's strategy was to avoid another direct clash with his antagonist, forcing Jinnah to deal instead with Azad, a Muslim opposed to partition. In any case, such aloofness irked Jinnah who criticized Gandhi for having "withdrawn" from the negotiations.<sup>6</sup> One observer noted that Jinnah treated Azad with "extreme discourtesy," and even refused to sit at the same table with him.<sup>7</sup>

Gandhi and Jinnah did not see each other during the Simla Conference. Apparently neither was willing to initiate a meeting, and undoubtedly both recognized that the ideological cleavage between them remained unchanged. In an interview with Associated Press correspondent Preston Grover on June 29, Gandhi said, "If Mr. Jinnah wants me there, he can take me there. We shall go arm in arm. He can help me up the hill and save strain on my heart."<sup>8</sup> The following day Jinnah told the same journalist that "if Mahatma Gandhi will accept the basis of Pakistan, we need not trouble about this Conference. There will be another Conference of our own." Jinnah also reiterated his claim that Indian freedom could not be resolved until Indian division was agreed to first.<sup>9</sup>

The Simla Conference collapsed, largely because Jinnah refused to agree to any form of unitary central government which would be inevitably Hindu-dominated. Jinnah raised

the necessity for parity (i.e., equal numerical representation of League and Congress members). Gandhi was known to have even urged acceptance of sub-parity for Hindus as a means of gaining a central, united government.<sup>10</sup> Such a concession was unnecessary, however, since Jinnah already insured the Conference's collapse. He deplored Lord Wavell's refusal to guarantee that all Muslim members of the Interim Council would be chosen exclusively from the Muslim League. In his press statement July 14, Jinnah described the Viceroy's proposals as a "snare" representing Muslim India's "death warrant," and again he rejected any plan not calling for the establishment of Pakistan.<sup>11</sup> The collapse of the Conference represented another subtle victory for Jinnah, for he had again demonstrated that little constitutional progress was likely without an accommodation of the League's unbending position.<sup>12</sup>

Gandhi's self-imposed detachment from the negotiations illustrated the new path he sought to follow. Disillusioned by the continued British presence and dismayed by the Muslim demands, he increasingly assumed the role of a saintly prophet while lessening his activity as a political negotiator. This shift partially resulted from the assumption of duties by Congress leaders released at the end of the war in 1945. More important, however, was the spiritual make-up of Gandhi's own personality, which leaned toward the search for universal principles rather than the technicalities of negotiation so adroitly handled by the legalistic Jinnah. In a letter to Bhulabhai Desai in June, Gandhi exposed his mood :

My attitude is becoming stiffer and stiffer every day... Behind it is my growing faith in non-violent non-cooperation and corresponding indifference to parliamentary activity..... It is difficult for me to say where my present mood will ultimately take me, because my faith in the Unseen Power is growing daily. I, therefore, think very little of tomorrow.<sup>13</sup>

Gandhi's eccentric behavior at Simla confounded Jinnah. In a speech at Bombay on August 6, the day an atomic bomb hit Hiroshima, he asked why Gandhi went to Simla if he didn't expect to participate. The Muslim leader suggested that

Gandhi sought to manipulate the Congress, the British, and all of India while claiming to be only an individual consulting his inner voice: "Mr. Gandhi is an enigma.....How can we come to a settlement with him?"<sup>14</sup> Indeed, Gandhi's withdrawal from politics rendered rapprochement more difficult; it continued through the fall of 1945 as he spent three months experimenting with nature-cure at a clinic in Poona.<sup>15</sup>

Gandhi's diversions into philosophy, health, and religion were not inconsistent with his personality. For a seeker of truth, which he professed to be, nothing could be outside his interests and inquiry. Yet, his adventitious ventures added little political force to Indian unification. Holding no official position in the Congress, he was free to pursue non-political activities. Jinnah, meanwhile, concentrated his energies on the single task of campaigning for Pakistan. Speaking in Bombay August 12, he restated his fundamental theme:

.....we want both Hindu India and Muslim India to be free. But we cannot agree to any arrangement, which means freedom for Hindus and establishment of 'Hindu Raj' and slavery for the Muslims—transfer of Muslim India from British Raj to Hindu Raj. That is the real issue.<sup>16</sup>

Three days later a British journalist asked Jinnah if there were not at least some good Hindus, to which he reportedly replied, "There are none!"<sup>17</sup> Jinnah continued his rhetorical technique of belittling Gandhi. Before the Baluchistan Muslim League in Quetta on October 10, he sarcastically criticized Gandhi's method of non-violent non-cooperation:

...to obtain leadership, to sit like goat under the police 'lathi' charge, then to go to jail, then to complain of loss of weight and then to manage release (loud laughter). I don't believe in that sort of struggle, but when the time for suffering comes, I will be the first to get bullet shots in my chest.<sup>18</sup>

Jinnah's accusation that Congress leaders sought to give Indian Muslims "a fate similar to the Jews in Germany" indicated the strong emotional intensity of his appeal.<sup>19</sup> At a public rally in Ahmedabad on October 27, he declared that "Pakistan is

the question of life and death for us. I shall live and die for Pakistan.”<sup>20</sup> Jinnah told the Frontier Muslim Conference in Peshawar on November 21 that the Congress had only two options : “they are either to accept Pakistan or crush Muslims, but 100 million Musalmans cannot be crushed.”<sup>21</sup> Such a statement carried the implication that the denial of Muslim claims for sovereignty might result in civil war. Jinnah again alluded to the possibility of violence three days later, assuring his listeners that

As long as I live I shall never allow a single drop of Muslim blood to be spilt in vain. I shall never allow Muslims to become slaves of Hindus.....Don't forget that your general knows when is the right time to make sacrifices. When the time comes I shall not hesitate and shall not retrace a single step.<sup>22</sup>

These words were reportedly greeted with cheers and cries of “Allah-o-Akbar” (“God Is Great”), a phrase commonly associated with Islamic pride and militancy. Jinnah repeated his relentless determination to achieve Pakistan while addressing Muslim students in Peshawar November 25 : “Mr. Gandhi and the Congress tried their best to crush us,” but “we have reached a stage when no man on earth can crush the Muslim League.....Concede our demand for Pakistan with grace or we shall take it.”<sup>23</sup>

Much of the militancy in Jinnah's speeches during the fall of 1945 sprang from his desire to inspire Muslims to support League candidates in the national elections held that winter. Jinnah unequivocally portrayed the elections as a referendum on his two-nation theory ; every vote for Muslim League candidates was a vote for Pakistan. The results vindicated Jinnah's position, for League candidates captured all of the Muslim seats in the Central Legislative Assembly and nearly 90% of the Muslim seats in the Provincial Assemblies. The performance of the Congress Party was equally as impressive.<sup>24</sup>

The elections of 1945-46 confirmed the existence of three major elements in Indian politics : the British,\* the Congress Party, and the Muslim League, representing the forces

of imperialism, nationalism, and communalism.<sup>26</sup> With pressure increasing on the British to grant independence, the division within India posed a perplexing dilemma for the government of Prime Minister Clement Atlee, who explained to the House of Commons on March 15, 1946: "We are mindful of the rights of the minorities and the minorities should be able to live free from fear," but "on the other hand we cannot allow a minority to place a veto on the advance of a majority." Thereupon, Jinnah promptly issued a statement from New Delhi reminding the British leader that "the Muslims of India are not a minority but a nation and self-determination is their birthright" and restating his belief that "the establishment of Pakistan is the only solution to India's constitutional problem."<sup>26</sup>

Still hopeful of preserving India's unity, the British dispatched a Cabinet-level Mission to study the alternatives and propose specific steps for the the transfer of power.<sup>27</sup> After two months of intensive analysis, the Mission concluded in its Report released May 16, 1946 that India should not be partitioned.<sup>28</sup> The Mission showed that more than 40% of the population in the six provinces claimed by the Muslim League was non-Muslim, while twenty million Muslims would still remain in India. Thus, the creation of Pakistan would not solve the communal minority problem. Moreover, partition would entail serious disruption of the administrative, economic, military, transportation, and communications systems functioning on the basis of a united India. The Mission also noted the problems posed by having the two sections of Pakistan separated by 700 miles of foreign territory. Even a smaller Pakistan, possible if the Punjab and Bengal were themselves partitioned, was rejected because any boundary would unnaturally divide linguistic and cultural units and leave sizable numbers of Sikhs in both countries.

While rejecting complete partition, the Mission nevertheless acknowledged "the very real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindus with their greatly superior numbers must be a dominating element."<sup>29</sup>



Therefore, a compromise was proposed by which India's provinces would be grouped into three sections, corresponding to the two Muslim-majority areas in the Northwest and Northeast with the remainder forming the third group. Each group would form its own constitution and enjoy autonomy in all matters except Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications, which would remain with the "Union of India" at the center. In seeking to preserve India's unity while adequately safeguarding Muslim interests, the plan sparked a complex round of debate, misrepresentations, accusations and denials—the end result of which was the total collapse of the Mission plan.<sup>30</sup>

Jinnah held serious doubts concerning the plan, since it rejected the idea of a sovereign Muslim nation. However, he finally urged the League's Council to accept this proposal as a concrete step toward the ultimate realization of Pakistan, and because the plan gave the entire Punjab and Bengal provinces to the Muslim-majority groups.<sup>31</sup> Gandhi, too, entertained misgivings about the proposals, since the pro-Congress Northwest Frontier and predominantly non-Muslim Assam provinces were both assigned to Muslim-majority Groups. He also objected to the presence of British troops during the Interim period, although he ultimately urged the Congress to consider the favourable aspects of the Cabinet Mission plan and accept it.<sup>32</sup>

Congress decision-making, however, was increasingly in the hands of its younger leaders, notably Jawaharlal Nehru, Krishna Menon, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. These men frequently visited Gandhi at his humble dwelling next to the Bhangi (Sweepers) Colony in Delhi, but the major political negotiations with the British and League were largely theirs. At a press conference in Bombay on July 10, Nehru declared that the Congress would not be bound by any British-imposed settlement and claimed that his party would change the plan at will by virtue of its majority in the Constituent Assembly. Nehru's remarks, combined with Congress refusal to appoint members to the proposed Interim government, stirred Jinnah's anger.<sup>33</sup> Convinced that Nehru was untrustworthy and that the British would capitulate Muslim League safeguards to appease Con-

gress intransigence, he called for drastic measures. On July 29, the League passed a Resolution calling for "Direct Action" throughout India; inspiring Jinnah to indulge in the rhetoric of violence. He told his followers : "This day we bid good-bye to constitutional methods.....we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it."<sup>34</sup>

Communal relations grew increasingly ugly. In his "Id" message to Muslims in August, Jinnah condemned the Viceroy and the British government for surrendering to the "Fascist caste-Hindu Congress".<sup>35</sup> Venemous pamphlets circulated.<sup>36</sup> On August 16, the day appointed for Direct Action, riots broke out in Calcutta. Four days of violence left about 5,000 dead and as many as 25,000 wounded.<sup>37</sup> Within days, Jinnah was quoted in Calcutta *Statesman* as doubting that "any Muslim Leaguer would have taken part in using any violence". He charged the Viceroy, Gandhi, and the Congress with "an organized plot to discredit the Muslim League".<sup>38</sup>

Gandhi promptly responded to the Bengal bloodshed by picturing violence as antithetical to Islam and by bemoaning Jinnah's contention that Hindus were the enemies of Muslims. Writing in the *Harijan* of August 25, he again emphasized the definition of Islam as meaning "sobriety and peace. The very salute '*salam alaikum*' means 'peace be unto you'."<sup>39</sup> Two weeks later Gandhi regretted that Calcutta Hindus abandoned non-violence in their retaliation against Muslims :

If through deliberate courage the Hindus had died to a man, that would have been deliverance of Hinduism and India and purification of Islam in this land...I regard a Muslim or any non-Hindu as my blood-brother, not in order to please him but because he is born of the same mother Hind as I am. He does not cease to be my brother because he may hate or disown me. I must woo him...<sup>40</sup>

Gandhi again demonstrated his characteristic usage of family imagery in seeking to promulgate an essential unity among all Indians.<sup>41</sup>

Stymied in all attempts to form a coalition government, the British viceroy unilaterally asked the Congress to form an

Interim administration. On September 2, Jawaharlal Nehru became the Prime Minister of India. An incensed Jinnah proclaimed a day of mourning and asked Muslims to display black flags that day.<sup>42</sup> The succeeding weeks witnessed conversations and correspondence between Jinnah, Nehru, and Lord Wavell through which the Muslim League finally agreed to join the Interim government.<sup>43</sup> The apparent coalition produced little cooperation between the two major parties, however, as the Muslim League remained adamant in its demand for a division of the country.<sup>44</sup>

While the politicians and bureaucrats displayed their rivalries with subtle maneuvers, the less sophisticated elements of Indian society engaged in open warfare. In October, 1946, communal riots erupted in Noakhali, a predominantly Muslim area in East Bengal. As reports of murder, rape, looting, and the forcible conversion of Hindus to Islam traveled westward, so did bloodshed. Massive violence broke out in Bihar, where more than 5,000 persons (mostly Muslims) were killed during the fall of 1946. The chain-reaction of hostilities spread to the United Provinces, Bombay, and the Punjab.<sup>45</sup>

Gandhi was deeply distressed. The October 6 issue of *Harijan* carried one of his most impassioned statements against partition :

I would have no hesitation in conceding the demand of Pakistan if I could be convinced of its righteousness or that it is good for Islam. But I am firmly convinced that the Pakistan demand as put forth by the Muslim League is un-Islamic and I have not hesitated to call it sinful. Islam stands for the unity and brotherhood of mankind, not for disrupting the oneness of the human family. Therefore, those who want to divide India into possibly warring groups are enemies alike of India and Islam. They may cut me to pieces but they cannot make me subscribe to something which I consider to be wrong.<sup>46</sup>

Such argumentation, rooted in ethics, depended on a distinction of good from evil. India's propensity for making rational decisions and ethical judgments diminished rapidly,

however, in the grip of communal frenzy. Indeed, Gandhi astutely observed, in the same issue of *Harijan*, the increasing difficulty he faced as a communicator : "I know that mine is a voice in the wilderness."<sup>47</sup> The lament recognized his fading influence in both forming Congress policy and dissuading the Indian masses from violence.

Compelled to resist the communal division spreading throughout India, Gandhi decided to tour the ravaged areas of Noakhali and Bihar. On November 6, the 77 year-old man commenced a four-month pilgrimage that took him through 49 villages, affording daily opportunities for preaching the message of brotherly love. Gandhi and his small band of followers walked from place to place, visiting mosques and temples, staying with Muslim and Hindu hosts, holding public prayer meetings, and subsisting on local fruits, vegetables, and goat's milk.<sup>48</sup>

In appealing for communal harmony throughout rural India, Gandhi frequently quoted his chief antagonist, thus employing the time-honored technique of the "reluctant witness."<sup>49</sup> In response to the Bihar violence, Jinnah had issued a Statement from New Delhi on November 12, which read in part :

We must prove politically that we are brave, generous and trustworthy : that in Pakistan areas the minorities will enjoy the fullest security of life, property and honour just as the Musalmans themselves—nay, even greater.

If the Musalmans lose their balance and give vent to the spirit of vengeance and retaliation and prove false to the highest codes of morality and preachings of our great religion Islam, you will not only lose your title to the claim of Pakistan but also it will start a most vicious circle of bloodshed and cruelty, which will at once put off the day of our freedom<sup>50</sup>

On numerous occasions Gandhi urged his listeners to heed "the universal significance" of Jinnah's appeal to justice, integrity, and reason.<sup>51</sup> He also referred to conciliatory passages from other Islamic figures, including the poet Iqbal and the Prophet Mohammed. Such strategy not only reflected his own

interest in all religions ; it represented a clever rhetorical adaptation to his audiences, which at times were as much as 80% Muslim.<sup>52</sup>

Gandhi's public approbation of Jinnah was a persuasive technique in pursuing communal unity, but in no way did it suggest his capitulation to the fundamental demand of partition. In fact, Gandhi even expressed private misgivings that the League president supported the violence out of a desire to restore Muslim supremacy in India.<sup>53</sup> On January 15, 1947 the Indian press quoted Gandhi as saying that no sovereign nation of Pakistan could be agreed to :

I have no objection to a separate Muslim State. The question is what is going to be the character of that State. This point has not been made clear so far. If a Muslim State implied freedom to make unfriendly treaties with the foreign Powers to the detriment of the country as a whole, then obviously it cannot be a matter of agreement. No one can be asked to sign an agreement granting freedom to another to launch hostilities against himself ; it would be a suicidal policy.<sup>54</sup>

Gandhi's wanderings through Noakhali and Bihar must be viewed as another individual attempt to prevent the division of India. He described his journey as a crucial test of his philosophy of *ahimsa* and was driven by the hope that the restoration of communal harmony in those regions would inspire the rest of India by proving that Hindus and Muslims could live in peaceful cooperation.<sup>55</sup> But while Gandhi's presence did bring calm to the localities he visited, he could not be everywhere ; communal relations in the Punjab deteriorated further. Even had Gandhi been able to restore all of India to the relative calm existing prior to the launching of Direct Action, the League-Congress stalemate would still persist. Thus, the spiritual pilgrimage of the wandering saint appeared unlikely to prevent partition.

British Prime Minister Atlee meanwhile made one more attempt to resurrect the Cabinet Mission plan. He invited Nehru, Jinnah, and other Indian leaders to London to discuss

the proposed Constituent Assembly. Their meetings took place December 3-6, but ended in disagreement.<sup>56</sup> Jinnah took advantage of his stay in London to reiterate publicly the possibility of civil war in India and the impossibility of democracy since the Muslims would always be outnumbered three to one.<sup>57</sup> Seeking to rid itself of the increasingly volatile situation in India, the British government decided to hasten the transfer of power. On February 20, 1947, Prime Minister Atlee announced that Viscount Mountbatten, the former Commander of British forces in Asia, would replace Lord Wavell as Viceroy, with Independence to be granted no later than June, 1948.

At the time of Mountbatten's arrival in New Delhi on March 24, 1947, the two opponents in the partition debate occupied sharply contrasting positions. Jinnah, in ten years, had transformed the Muslim League from a weak band of upper class landlords and businessmen into a force whose power could no longer be ignored. He was, wrote Nanda, "at the zenith of his influence."<sup>58</sup> Gandhi, on the other hand, had largely withdrawn from the game of power politics, resorting instead to the spiritual instincts of the Indian masses.<sup>59</sup>

Mountbatten arrived in India still hopeful of preserving her unity. He quickly arranged meetings with the political leaders in an effort to assess the state of affairs. Gandhi returned to the capital from Bihar for a series of interviews, and on April 1 made a startling proposal. He asked the Viceroy to disband the Interim Cabinet and invite Jinnah to appoint an administration entirely of his own choice. The Congress, Gandhi indicated, would cooperate fully, as long as Jinnah's government pursued policies in the best interests of all Indians, with Mountbatten being the sole arbiter of what was best. Gandhi apparently made his proposal in all sincerity, and he evidenced some shrewdness since the plan would preserve India's unity by compelling Jinnah to follow policies meriting Hindu support. Jinnah's acceptance was highly unlikely, however, since he would still have to deal with a Hindu majority. And in a letter April 11 Gandhi informed Mountbatten that the Congress leaders rejected the plan.<sup>60</sup>

Lord Mountbatten first met Jinnah April 5. Typically, the Muslim leader was more formal and reserved than Gandhi; the Viceroy later told his secretary, "My God, he was cold. It took most of the interview to unfreeze him."<sup>61</sup> The following evening, Jinnah and his sister dined with the Mountbattens. The Muslim leader reportedly "harped on Moslem massacres and described the horrors at length," while claiming that the Congress Party would do anything to "deprive me of Pakistan."<sup>62</sup> In his effort to convince the new Viceroy of the necessity of partition, Jinnah understandably concentrated on the unending communal rioting. Mountbatten's secretary observed that, by April of 1947, the British were fearful of "a complete disintegration of law and order both in the Frontier and the Punjab, not to speak of other northern Provinces."<sup>63</sup> Certainly, as Nanda observed, violence had become the strongest argument in Jinnah's case for partition:<sup>64</sup> every hostile act lent support to his contention that Hindus and Muslims were irreconcilably antagonistic cultures.

In the hope of curtailing the lawlessness in northern India, Mountbatten proposed that a joint Peace Appeal be issued. Even this suggestion produced contention, since Jinnah agreed to sign only if Gandhi alone signed for the Hindus, whereas the latter, lacking any official capacity, felt that Acharya Kripalani, the Congress President, should also sign. Jinnah balked, and at the Viceroy's urgent request, Gandhi consented. To underscore his belief that all Indians were brothers, Gandhi signed in Urdu, Hindi, and English, whereas Jinnah used only English. Their appeal, released April 15, read :

We deeply deplore the recent acts of lawlessness and violence that have brought the utmost disgrace on the fair name of India and greatest misery to innocent people, irrespective of who were the aggressors and who were the victims.

We denounce for all time the use of force to achieve political ends, and we call upon all the communities of India, to whatever persuasion they may belong, not only to refrain from all acts of violence and disor-

der, but also to avoid both in speech and writing, any words which might be construed as an incitement to such acts.<sup>65</sup>

Gandhi later suggested that his signature represented nothing significant, since he had never favored violence anyway. Jinnah perhaps gained a slight tactical advantage from the appeal, since the dual signatures accepted by implication a distinct dichotomy between Hindus and Muslims. The League's newspaper, *Dawn*, capitalized on this fact by asking on April 18 :

Why is it necessary that two should make such an appeal if it is not recognised that there are two peoples, two nations, who would respect their own respective leader only ?<sup>66</sup>

In any case, the appeal went largely unheeded, as far more Indians died in communal clashes after its issuance than before.

Unsuccessful in his efforts to dissuade Indian leaders from their drift toward partition, Gandhi relied increasingly on his propensity for the super-natural. He seemed driven by an almost mystical confidence that the spiritual energy generated at his daily prayer meetings might somehow preserve India's unity. Typical of this outlook was his comment on April 10 :

If our record is clean, the world's judgment will overtake Pakistan and Pakistan will topple under the weight of its own iniquity. A Satyagrahi conquers the whole world by his love.<sup>67</sup>

Gandhi's outdoor prayer meetings normally included readings from the *Koran* and *Bhagabad Gita*, chanting, the singing of Hindu hymns accompanied by rhythmic clapping by the congregation, and a short discourse on some topic of current interest.<sup>68</sup> But as communal tensions rose during the Spring of 1947, Gandhi encountered persons objecting to the use of Islamic scripture. His handling of these "objectors" represented a unique adaptation to a hostile audience. Should even one person object to the *Koran*, Gandhi would dismiss the entire congregation, which often numbered in the thousands. Assuming that sufficient faith would disarm any opposition to his ecumenical approach, Gandhi explained :



I find that the objectors are only a handful. If I hold the prayer by bearing them down by our superior numbers, it will not be a triumph of devotion but of the devil. The end of prayer is to establish peace in the hearts of men, not to suppress or overwhelm the minority.<sup>60</sup>

In early April, objectors forced the cancellation of prayers on three successive days. On the fourth day, two objectors again protested, but retracted after a member of the Hindu Mahasabha (a radical group normally opposed to Gandhi's accommodation to Islam) pleaded that they show displeasure in a way other than by disrupting prayer. The meeting continued without interruption, and in his discourse the eccentric leader suggested that the patient weaning of objectors illustrated how soul-force might yet prevent partition :

Their opposition has helped me to turn the searchlight inward as never before. You might be tempted to ask what I mean by giving so much of my time and energy to such trifles, when negotiations are in progress with Lord Mountbatten on which hangs the fate of the nation. Let me tell you, for me there is no big, no small. They are all of equal importance. *In Noakhali, in Bihar, in Punjab, in Delhi, even in this prayer ground the battle of undivided India is being lost and won daily.* The experience here today has provided me with the key to success elsewhere.<sup>70</sup>

Gandhi's spiritual experiments, dramatic though they were, proved ineffectual in persuading India's leaders to abandon partition. Indeed, by early May Congress members seemed resolved to a division of the country, provided the non-Muslim areas of the Punjab and Bengal remained in India. Those two great provinces would, therefore, themselves have to be partitioned. Jinnah criticized the prospect of a "truncated, or mutilated, moth-eaten Pakistan," but finally agreed after Mountbatten insisted that the only alternative was to keep India completely united.<sup>71</sup>

During the Viceroy's negotiations on May 4, 1947, the two old antagonists met face-to-face for the first time since

September, 1944, as described by Mountbatten's secretary :

By a freak of chance the interviews overlapped, and Mountbatten had the political insight and social finesse to bring the two leaders together for their first meeting in three years. But once the formalities of greeting were over the encounter baffled Mountbatten's calculations. For Gandhi and Jinnah, with their chairs far apart, were quite unable to raise their voices sufficiently, so that they seemed to be like two old conspirators engaged in a long-distance dumbshow.<sup>72</sup>

At the urging of the Viceroy, another meeting between the two Indians was set for Tuesday, May 6 at Jinnah's Delhi residence on Aurangzeb Road. Sardar Patel expressed opposition to the meeting, claiming it would only enhance the Muslim's prestige. Gandhi countered that humility would not hurt his cause, and that he would willingly plead "seventy times seven" times if necessary.<sup>73</sup>

The Gandhi-Jinnah meeting on May 6 lasted for nearly three hours, and apparently transpired in a friendly spirit.<sup>74</sup> A statement released to the press and obviously drafted by Jinnah summarized the conversation :

We discussed two matters ; One was the question of division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, and Mr. Gandhi does not accept the principle of division. He thinks that division is not inevitable, whereas in my opinion not only is Pakistan inevitable, but is the only practical solution of India's political problem.

The second matter which we discussed was the letter which we both have signed jointly appealing to the people to maintain peace; we have both come to the conclusion that we must do our best in our respective spheres to see that that appeal of ours is carried out and we will make every effort for this purpose.<sup>75</sup>

Gandhi's report of their meeting, contained in a letter to Lord Mountbatten May 8, illustrated the continuing stalemate between the power politician and the seeker of truth :

I told him that my opposition to Pakistan persisted as before and suggested that in view of his declaration

of faith in non-violence, he should try to convert his opponents by reasoning with them and not by show of force. He was, however, quite firm that the discussion of Pakistan was not open to discussion. Logically, for a believer in non-violence, nothing, not even the existence of God could be outside its scope.<sup>76</sup>

Gandhi felt that the prospects of power had demoralized both the Congress and the Muslim League who, with the British, conducted negotiations even as violence continued. Clinging to his early belief that the British created the divisiveness in India, Gandhi pressed for an immediate end to British rule. In early May, he told a Reuter's correspondent : "the British will have to take the risk of leaving India to chaos or anarchy...If the British were not here, we would still go through the fire no doubt. But that fire would purify us."<sup>77</sup> In a conversation with two Socialist leaders May 6, Gandhi restated his belief that the Congress should not accept the evil of partition, but rather tell the British to quit unconditionally :

We shall then pitch our non-violence even against League's violence. We shall settle with the League by offering our innocent blood to be spilt without spilling any and we will succeed.<sup>78</sup>

Such confidence in the power of *ahimsa*, in a country gripped with communal tension, seemed more of an idealist's dream than a realistic solution to India's dilemma.

With most Congress leaders already reconciled to the likelihood of partition, Gandhi unswervingly resisted it. In the *Harijan* of May 18, he reiterated his view that no division should occur while the British remained, while violence continued, or without a direct plebiscite of all the people involved :

Can you describe Pakistan to me ? What reply can be given to an unknown premise ? I have tried to understand what it is and have failed. And if the Punjab and Bengal today are hall-marks of Pakistan, then it can never exist.....The ultimate decision of division or partition of provinces and all such matters are for the people to settle among themselves after the British have withdrawn their power.<sup>79</sup>

Gandhi's assumed failure to understand the meaning of Pakistan was an example of circular reasoning : since Pakistan did not exist, it could not be known, and if unknown, it could not be agreed to, and if not agreed to, it could never come into existence. Such coyness obviously overlooked the political realities of the moment, and Jinnah retorted that if Gandhi did not know what Pakistan meant, then why was he so vehemently opposed to it ?<sup>80</sup> Utterly frustrated in his loss of control over Indian politics, Gandhi made statements possessing a kind of metaphysical quality, as during prayer meeting in Delhi on May 28 :

If we confront madness by sanity, their madness will go, the Pakistan demand will go, or the whole of India will become Pakistan—if Pakistan means what its name implies, the land of the pure.<sup>81</sup>

Thus, just as Jinnah had for years kept the goal of Pakistan a vague political abstraction, so Gandhi viewed partition in moral abstractions by using such words as evil, iniquity, purity, and purification. His language reflected a deep spiritual distress brought on by the impending division. Having awakened earlier than usual on June 1, Gandhi reportedly lay in bed musing in a low voice :

Today I find myself all alone. Even the Sardar and Jawaharlal think that my reading of the situation is wrong and peace is sure to return if partition is agreed upon.....They did not like my telling the Viceroy that even if there was to be partition, it should not be through British intervention or under British rule... They wonder if I have not deteriorated with age...I shall perhaps not be alive to witness it, but should the evil I apprehend overtake India and her independence be imperilled, let posterity know what agony this old soul went through thinking of it. *Let it not be said that Gandhi was party to India's vivesection...*<sup>82</sup>

While Gandhi agonized, India's political leaders planned partition. Mountbatten finally arrived at a plan calling for the voters of the Muslim majority provinces to decide on the formation of Pakistan, with the non-Muslims in the Punjab

and Bengal having the option to remain in India, thus partitioning those provinces. The two new nations would both enjoy Dominion status in the British Commonwealth.<sup>83</sup> On June 2, India's leaders met at the Viceroy's house in New Delhi to finalize acceptance of the plan. Jinnah implied agreement, but refused to sign without checking with his League Council.<sup>84</sup> Gandhi attended but said nothing since he was observing a day of silence.<sup>85</sup>

At another meeting the following day, Mountbatten averted a clash between League and Congress leaders after Jinnah accused Gandhi inciting the public at his prayer meetings. Jinnah assured the gathering that minorities would be protected in Pakistan and that no distinctions would be made on the basis of religion.<sup>86</sup> That evening Mountbatten broadcast the Independence and Partition plan on All-India Radio. He was followed by Nehru, Jinnah, and Sikh spokesman Baldev Singh, who all praised the viceroy for seeking a fair and equitable transfer of power. Nehru ended his broadcast with "Jai Hind" ("Victory to India") and Jinnah closed with "Pakistan Zinda-bad" ("Long live Pakistan"). However he said these words in such a clipped voice that "some startled listeners thought at first that the Quaid-e-Azam had thrown dignity to the winds and pronounced 'Pakistan's in the bag'."<sup>87</sup>

Between the announcement of the June 3rd Plan and Independence Day on August 15, bureaucratic preparations for partition posed a formidable task.<sup>88</sup> One perplexing problem, which triggered a brief interchange between Gandhi and Jinnah, involved the fate of the Northwest Frontier Province. With a population 92% Muslim and surrounded by Muslim territory, the logical place for the province was Pakistan. However, the province had a Congress ministry led by Gandhi's close friend, Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan, and in the 1945-46 elections the Congress won 60% of the province's assembly seats. Cognizant of this perplexing situation, Gandhi urged Mountbatten to induce Jinnah to go to the area and convert its officials by making Pakistan sufficiently attractive to warrant their support. The viceroy suggested that the two Indians correspond directly ; on June 13, Jinnah answered Gandhi by

stating that he could go to the province only upon assurances that the Congress would not interfere in any way. Gandhi interpreted such a condition as meaning that the Congress must desert its loyal supporters, and he tersely replied that "I cannot ask the Congress to commit harakiri."<sup>89</sup> The issue was finally resolved when the province voted overwhelmingly to enter Pakistan after Ghaffer Khan and his followers boycotted the election because they were not given option of forming a separate Pathan state.<sup>90</sup>

While Jinnah and other government leaders struggled with the hasty preparations for partition, Gandhi persisted in his belief that India was still one nation. Speaking in Bombay June 14, he admitted that his own failing health and inability to prevent violence made it impossible for him to lead a movement against division. He rejected the suggestion that he undertake a protest fast, claiming that his inner voice had not spoken. Instead, he called on the government leaders to extract some good out of this evil, and urged the masses to prove Jinnah wrong by living together in peace.<sup>91</sup> In the *Harijan* of June 22 he wrote :

The division of India...is now a certainty so far as man can see. I ask you not to grieve over it. I have never believed in Quaid-eAzam Jinnah's two-nation theory and never will. Change of religion can change nationality. I am as much of Pakistan as of Hindustan. If you act in like manner, Jinnah Saheb will not be able to prove his theory in spite of the geographical division of India.<sup>92</sup>

Thus, Gandhi obviously found it very difficult to rationalize partition. At a prayer meeting in New Delhi July 12, he remarked :

15th August is the deadline for the division of India and the transfer of power from Britain to Indian hands. As a matter of fact, the division is a settled plan already. But God can upset the plans of men. An earthquake can destroy the whole of India before the appointed day. A foreign invasion may upset man's pretty and petty plans. But, humanly speaking, Pakis-

tan will be a legally established fact on the 15th of August.<sup>93</sup>

Consistent with his unfailing belief in the brotherhood of all Indians, Gandhi took a conciliatory approach to Pakistan. Chiding Jinnah's suggestion that Hindus and Muslims were enemies, Gandhi maintained that such a concept was antithetical to Islam.<sup>94</sup> In response to calls for a strong Indian military to resist possible attack from Pakistan, he said the best preparation consisted in purging oneself of the inherent weaknesses of selfishness and disunity.<sup>95</sup> Provided justice and tolerance were practiced in the new nation, Gandhi claimed he would be its citizen also :

If the Pakistan flag, whatever its design, represents all its inhabitants equally, irrespective of religion, it will command my salute as it should yours. In other words, the dominions must not be enemies one of the other.<sup>96</sup>

He also defended the militant Muslim cry, "Allah-o-Akbar" ("God is Great") as a soul-stirring religious truth.<sup>97</sup> Such conciliation seemed incongruent in a land seething with communal suspicion, and associates estimated that in the summer of 1947 ninety-five per cent of Gandhi's mail was hostile.<sup>98</sup> Hindus felt he was soft on Islam, while Muslims knew he opposed the creation of their homeland. Gandhi was an isolated soul; his rhetorical for the moment, at least, had completely misfired.

Jinnah, meanwhile, was assuming his greatest heights of personal power. He at once became Governor-General of Pakistan, president of the Constituent Assembly, and president of the country's only significant political party, the Muslim League. As the undisputed center of power in Pakistan, he now set out to unify its citizens. On August 11, four days before Independence, Jinnah addressed the new Constituent Assembly. One biographer called it "the greatest speech of his life" for its compassionate and libertarian tone :

You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with

the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State...Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the State.<sup>99</sup>

This sentiment, that communal distinctions should be submerged in political unity, is exactly what Gandhi had been arguing for the past ten years. The preservation of national unity, which had been one of Gandhi's primary goals prior to Partition, became a major objective for Jinnah after Partition.

Once in power, therefore, Jinnah made an about-face in his rhetorical approach to Hindu-Muslim relations. Whereas his case for partition rested on the assertion that the two groups were inherently incompatible, he now denied that premise by calling for equal citizenship and complete safeguards for Pakistan's minorities. This fundamental change lends credence to the interpretation that Partition resulted, not from any irreconcilable religious issue, but from the desire of middle and upper class Muslims to gain economic and political power.<sup>100</sup>

Events in India soon justified Gandhi's fear that partition would not bring peace. The boundaries dividing the Punjab and Bengal were announced August 17. As Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims began scrambling into their respective territories, massive rioting erupted. On August 31, after a tour of the Punjab, Prime Minister Nehru wired Gandhi to leave Calcutta and come help "in curing insanity and bringing solace to this ruined and heart-broken Province."<sup>101</sup> Calcutta, however, had its own troubles, and Gandhi decided to fast in protest of the violence. On September 1, he told reporters :

What my word in person cannot do, perhaps my fast will. It may touch the hearts of all the warring factions in the Punjab if it does in Calcutta. I therefore begin fasting from 8 : 15 tonight to end only if and when sanity returns to Calcutta.<sup>102</sup>



Within three days calm returned to Calcutta, and the fast was broken after communal leaders signed a statement agreeing to prevent any future strife.

Gandhi returned to Delhi, and found the city racked by riots and under martial law. Indicative of the frenzy were the shouts of "Gandhi Murdabad" ("Death to Gandhi") when he sought to have the *Koran* read at a prayer meeting in mid-September; as he left, stones were thrown at Gandhi's car.<sup>103</sup> In the months following partition, Gandhi showed signs of severe depression; he had restless nights, often talked in his sleep, and admitted to dreams of being besieged by Hindu and Muslim crowds: "Sleeping or waking I can think of nothing else."<sup>104</sup>

Gandhi obviously felt that Jinnah shared much of the blame for the sub-continent's chaos. On September 14, the old prophet chided Jinnah for failing to sympathize with the suffering of non-Muslims.<sup>105</sup> At a prayer meeting on September 26, Gandhi suggested that while he did not believe in war, India's government might go to war against Pakistan if human rights were not granted.<sup>106</sup> In October, Shaheed Suhrawardy of the West Bengal Muslim League went to Karachi, with Gandhi's encouragement, in an unsuccessful effort to secure Jinnah's approval for proposals insuring minority rights. On October 11, Gandhi wrote directly to Jinnah:

Shaheed Saheb has reported to me your reactions to my endorsement on the suggestions drafted by him. I am sorry to learn about it...In my opinion some such agreement as suggested by Shaheed Saheb should precede any move for hearty cooperation between the two States. What is wanted no doubt is like mind, like word and like action between the two.<sup>107</sup>

No reply to that letter has been recorded,<sup>108</sup> but Gandhi's belief in the transcendent unity of India remained firm, as illustrated in his letter to Suhrawardy October 27:

Hindus and Muslims are not two nations. Muslims never shall be slaves of Hindus nor Hindus of Muslims. Hence you and I have to die in the attempt to make them live together as friends and brothers, which they are.

I cannot escape the conclusion that the mischief commenced with Quaid-e-Azam and stil continues...I have only one course—to do or die in the attempt to make the two one. <sup>109</sup>

Any efforts to reunite the two communities were impeded by Jinnah's attitude following Partition. Just as Gandhi viewed the partition demand as a source of the conflict, so Jinnah charged India with attempting to destroy Pakistan. On October 24, in his message celebrating Id-ul-Azha, the Muslim festival of sacrifice, Jinnah remarked :

Our new born State is bleeding from wounds inflicted by our enemies. Our Muslm brethren in India are being victimised and oppressed as Muslims for their help and sympathy for the establishment of Pakistan. <sup>110</sup>

At a large Lahore rally on October 30, he declared ;

We have been the victims of a deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of elementary principles of honesty, chivalry, and honour. We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. <sup>111</sup>

Jinnah had earlier argued that the creation of Pakistan would enable the two nations to live together peaceably without competition ; his words following partition portended no such peace. Indeed, the two nations were near war in a dispute over Kashmir, a Muslim-majority area whose Hindu Maharaja had decided to join India. <sup>112</sup>

Burdened not only by the tremendous economic and social problems facing Pakistan, Jinnah also faced his own deteriorating health. Three months after Partition, a *Life* magazine photographer described him as gripped by a "paralyzing inability to make even the smallest decisions, by sullen silences striped with outbursts of irritation, by a spiritual numbness concealing something close to panic underneath." She also noticed his "unsteady step, listless eyes, the white-knuckled nervously clenched hands." <sup>113</sup>

Nor was Gandhi any happier. By the end of 1947, his secretary characterized him as "the saddest man that one could

picture,.....spiritually isolated from his surroundings and from almost every one of his colleagues, who now held positions of power and prestige in the Government.”<sup>114</sup> Depressed over the police-state atmosphere, the belligerency generated over the Kashmir issue, and the continuing Hindu intimidation of Muslims in the Delhi area, Gandhi resorted to another fast—the seventeenth and last of his life. He drew up a list of eight demands on which Hindus and Muslims must agree ( and all eight favored Muslims ), or he would fast unto death.<sup>115</sup>

Gandhi's extraordinary use of this non-verbal technique of persuasion again worked magic. During his fast, which lasted January 13-18, 1948, communal leaders agreed to all of his demands, including the payment of the 550 million rupees due to Pakistan. Peace returned to Delhi. Thousands of spectators filed past his weakened body as it lay on display in the Birla House. Hundreds of telegrams expressed concern for his survival. A ceremony of Parsi, Muslim, Japanese, and Hindu scriptures and Hindu and Christian hymns signalled the end of the fast.<sup>116</sup>

Plans were in preparation for Gandhi to visit and tour Pakistan.<sup>117</sup> But he never had the opportunity, for on January 30, while walking to the platform for his daily prayer meeting, he was killed instantly by three bullets fired by Nathuram Vinayak Godse, a member of the extremist Hindu Mahasabha Party which was angered at Gandhi's continuing conciliation toward Muslims. Jinnah acknowledged the “loss to the Hindu nation,” but such restrained condolences suggested a lingering communal bitterness on his part.<sup>118</sup> In the following months, Jinnah continued to urge selfless dedication among Pakistan's citizens, and in March he toured East Pakistan in an effort to foster unity within the bisected nation.<sup>119</sup> His health steadily worsened, however, and on September 11, less than eight months after Gandhi's murder, Jinnah succumbed to tuberculosis.

During the final years preceding partition, the interaction between Gandhi and Jinnah grew increasingly oblique. They met and corresponded with each other only a few times after 1944, and even then a third party usually instigated the con-

tact. Jinnah's legalistic temperament was well-suited to the intense negotiations and constitutional maneuvers prior to Independence. While he publicly disclaimed violence, the case for Pakistan nevertheless benefited greatly from the chain reaction of communal riots after August, 1946. Meanwhile, Gandhi largely withdrew from politics, concentrating instead on his experiments with moral righteousness. Unwavering in his belief that partition represented a sinful untruth, he finally became isolated even from his former Congress colleagues whose pragmatic tendencies overcame their dedication to the principle of unity. To the very end, Gandhi and Jinnah remained separated by the ideological ocean which had divided them for so many years.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (London : John Murray, 1954), p. 152.
2. See Istiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi : University of Karachi, 1965), pp. 227-30.
3. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, II ( Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964 ), p. 166.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
5. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi : The Last Phase, I* (Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1956 ), p. 129.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
7. S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi : Their Role in India's Quest For Freedom* ( Calcutta : K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1966 ), p. 213. As already noted, Jinnah frequently characterized Muslims faithful to the Congress Party as "traitors."
8. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan* ed. Anand T. Hingorani ( Karachi : Anand T. Hingorani, 1947 ), p. 172.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
10. Pyarelal, Gandhi's personal secretary, commented that Jinnah's admission that other minorities ( such as Sikhs, Untouchables, and Christians ) would likely vote with the Congress contradicted Jinnah's own frequent allegation that the Congress represented only caste Hindus. Pyarelal also quoted from Dr. Jayakar's July 19 letter to Gandhi, which claimed that Jinnah sought "parity between Muslims and all other interests put together, i. e., 50 for Muslims, 50 for all the rest of India—a mathematical monstrosity that 27 equals seventy-three." Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi, I*, 137.

11. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 185. For the full texts of Jinnah's correspondence with Wavell and statements on the Simla Conference see pp. 175-90.

12. This point is made by S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 215, and by Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, I, 137.

13. Quoted in Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, I, 126.

14. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 192.

15. Gandhi's interest in health dated back to his school days, when he wrote essays defending vegetarianism. During 1945-46, he would often see scores of village peasants daily, and usually prescribed repetition of Ramanama, sunbaths, and simple diets of butter milk, fruit, and fresh water. Gandhi gave the same prescription to most patients, believing that all ailments sprang from a common cause, and could thus be cured by a common remedy. He viewed the role of the physician to be the invoker of the all-healing principle latent within each person, and his health theories bear striking resemblance to aspects of Christian Science. See Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, I, 144-50.

16. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 196.

17. Quoted in Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York : E. P. Dutton 1969 ), p. 515.

18. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 218.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 245 and 244.

24. The Congress won out-right majorities in eight of India's eleven provinces, and formed a coalition ministry with the Sikh and Unionist Party in the Punjab. Despite its overwhelming showing among the Muslim electorate, the League was able to form ministries in only the Sind and Bengal, since Muslims held less than a majority of seats in most provincial assemblies. While Jinnah claimed victory, some critics of partition still denied that the elections represented Muslim opinion, pointing out that only a fraction of India's population had been eligible to vote. For analyses of the elections, see I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi : University of Karachi, 1965 ), pp. 242-47, Anup Singh, "Verdict at the Polls," *Asia and the Americas*, XLVI (May, 1946 ), 208-11.

25. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, I, 71.

26. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 276-78.

27. The members of the three-man mission were Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, and Albert V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty.

28. For the full text of the Cabinet Mission Report, see M. L.

Gwyer and A. Appadorai ( eds. ), *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, II ( London : Oxford University Press, 1957 ), pp. 577-84.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 579.

30. The Congress Party disliked the weak central government envisioned by the Mission, felt the rights of the Sikhs were not adequately met, and objected to parity for the League in an Interim cabinet. The League, meanwhile, insisted that it must have the right to nominate all Muslim members in the Interim cabinet, and claimed the right to later secede from the Union. As the British sought to reinterpret and clarify their proposals with explanatory statements May 25 and June 16, the distrust among Indians only multiplied. For a sampling of historical accounts of the developments related to the Cabinet Mission, see Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (New York : Longmans, Green, 1960), pp. 162-90 ; William Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 156-60 ; Vidya Dhar Mahajan, *Fifty Years of Modern India (1919-1969)* (Delhi : S. Chand, 1970), pp. 257-68 ; and A. K. Majumdar, *Advent of Independence* (Bombay ; Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963), pp. 211-57.

31. For further details on Jinnah's views of the Mission plan see M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 287-314, and Mary L. Becker, "The All-India Muslim League, 1906-1947 ; A Study of Leadership in the Evolution of a Nation," (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1957), pp. 378-80.

32. For further description of Gandhi's views, see Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, I, 200-45, and Louis Fischer, *Gandhi : His Life and Message for the World* ( New York : Mentor, 1954 ). pp. 156-60.

33. Jinnah frequently mentioned the July 10 statements as proof that the Congress cared little for Muslim rights. Many historians interpret Nehru's remarks as unwise, and one writer called them "perhaps the worst of all indiscreet statements that were ever made by any politician." S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, p. 228.

34. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 314.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 318. *Id-ul-Fitr* is the period of feasting and celebration following the annual Muslim month of fasting, *Ramazan*. Just as Gandhi used his prayer meetings to comment on political matters, so Jinnah used religious occasions for political purposes—suggestive of a strong interplay between religion and politics in India.

36. One pamphlet reportedly pictured Jinnah with sword in hand and read, "Be ready and take your swords.....O Kafer ! [Unbeliever] .....your doom is not far and the general massacre will come !" Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, I. 253.

37. Richard D. Lambert, "Hindu-Muslim Riots" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1961), p. 173.

38. Quoted in D. G. Dalton, "Gandhi During Partition : A Case Study in the Nature of Satyagraha," *The Partition of India, Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947*, ed. C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (London : Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 228.

39. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity* (Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1949), p. 359.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 360-62.

41. Gandhi's reference to "Mother Hind" supports the observation made in Chapter I indicating a feminine emphasis in Hinduism. Indeed, Jinnah frequently belittled his opponents as being tied to "Bharat Mata," the Hindi words for "Mother India."

42. Jinnah felt Wavell's invitation to Nehru only vindicated his assertion that the British would betray Muslim security to the political power of the Congress. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 168.

43. For the texts of the significant documents related to negotiations concerning the Interim government, see Gwyer and Appadorai (eds.), *Speeches and Documents*, II, 640-55.

44. Jinnah antagonized the Congress by appointing a Scheduled-caste Hindu as one of the League's five members on the Interim cabinet. Liaquat Ali Khan became Minister of Finance, a strategic office from which he could obstruct any government activity deemed unfavorable to Muslims. For accounts of the mutual distrust rampant in the Interim government, see C. M. Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* ( New York : Columbia University Press, 1967 ), pp. 83-114, and V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* ( Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1957 ), pp. 318-49.

45. For documentation of the rioting and first-hand descriptions by a British commander charged with maintaining law and order, see Francis Toker, *While Memory Serves* ( London : Cassell, 1950 ).

46. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 374.

47. D. G. Dalton, "Gandhi During Partition.....," p. 239. Gandhi viewed the partition issue as a contest between righteousness and iniquity, and his rhetoric was highly reminiscent of that of the Old Testament prophets. For example, this quotation is nearly identical with Isaiah 40 : 3, "The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness,..."

48. For more detailed descriptions of Gandhi's trek through remote areas of rural India, see Louis Fischer, *Life and Message*, pp. 164-67, and Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, I, pp. 353-704.

49. The "reluctant witness" is defined as one "who furnishes evidence against his own interests or prejudices." Austin J. Freeley, *Argumentation and Debate* ( San Francisco : Wadsworth Publishing, 1961), p. 75.

50. For the full text of Jinnah's statement, in which he also bemoaned the "cold-blooded butchery" of Muslims by Hindus, see M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, pp. 359-61.

51. For discussions of Gandhi's references to Jinnah in specific villages, see M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, pp. 440, 457, and 508, and *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, pp. 202 and 206.

52. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 436.

53. In a conversation with Sarat Chandra Bose at Srirampur on November 24, 1946, Gandhi reportedly implied that Jinnah may have instigated the well-organized Muslim raids in Noakhali. Cited in Lambert, "Hindu-Muslim Riots," p. 184.

54. M. K. Gandhi, *To the Protagonists of Pakistan*, p. 215.

55. Gandhi made this point in an article published in the December 19 issue of *Harijan*. See Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 485.

56. The Congress objected to the weak federation recommended by the British, the League refused to join the Constituent Assembly without assurances of the Pakistan groupings, and the British indicated they could not free India until the two parties cooperated. The abortive London meetings are discussed in Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, pp. 202-04.

57. In Jinnah's address to cheering Muslims in Methodism's Kingsway Hall on December 14, Nehru replaced Gandhi as the League President's primary scapegoat. See Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, pp. 383-94. As Gandhi increasingly withdrew from Congress politics, the Jinnah-Nehru confrontation sharpened. Nehru had earlier described Jinnah as ignorant of modern political and economic realities and the promoter of "reactionary ideologies." See Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: John Day, 1946), pp. 393-97.

58. Bal Ram Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi; A Biography* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1958), p. 502.

59. Evidence suggests that by Mountbatten's arrival, Congress Party leaders had already abandoned Gandhi's refusal to grant partition. In January, the Congress Working Committee, against Gandhi's advice, voted in favor of participation in the sectional groupings in a belated and futile attempt to save the Cabinet Mission Plan. In early March, the Committee passed a resolution agreeing to the partition of the Punjab without even consulting him. In a letter two weeks later, Nehru explained to Gandhi that "now a time for decision has come. Indeed this is the only answer to partition as demanded by Jinnah." Sardar Patel similarly concluded that partition and a strong central government was a lesser evil than the weak center and continual threat of civil war. Besides, reasoned Congress leaders, the two Pakistan extremities might eventually reenter the Union anyway. For discussions of the Gandhi-Congress cleavage over the partition issue, see Louis Fischer, *Life and Message*, p. 167; Pyarelal, *Last Phase*, II, 35 and 83; and A. K. Majumdar, *Advent of Independence*, pp. 264-66.

60. Pyarelal, *The Last Phase*, II, 79-84. Obviously the plan super-



seded any normal political behavior, but Gandhi was no normal politician. An American magazine editorialized: "the strangest man in the world has made the strangest political proposal in modern times." "Gandhi Proposes a Jinnah Government," *Christian Century*, LXIV ( April 23, 1947 ), 516.

61. Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten* ( London : Robert Hale, 1952 ), p. 56.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

64. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 502.

65. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 605.

66. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, pp. 86-88.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

68. For a more detailed description of the physical and emotional environment of these gatherings, which somewhat resembled the early American camp meeting, see Paul Hutchinson, "Gandhi's Prayer Meeting," *Christian Century*, LXIII ( November 6, 1946 ), pp. 1335-36.

69. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 95.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 96. The italics are Pyarelal's.

71. This analysis is documented in Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten*, p. 80 and Louis Fischer, *Life and Message*, p. 170.

72. Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission*, p. 84.

73. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 169.

74. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 613.

75. Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission*, p. 85.

76. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 169.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

79. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 610.

80. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, II, 215.

81. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 204.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-11. The italics are Pyarelal's.

83. Mountbatten secured British approval for the plan during a trip to London May 18-31. On May 22, Jinnah proposed a 800-mile corridor to link Pakistan's two sections. He dropped the idea after Mountbatten assured him that insistence on the corridor might negate the creation of Pakistan.

84. Throughout the negotiations, Jinnah maintained ambiguity on what he would accept, probably to satisfy his followers that he was bargaining for the best possible terms. Jinnah's equivocation is discussed in B. N. Pandey, *The Break-up of British India* ( London : Macmillan, 1969 ), pp. 201-02.

85. Gandhi frequently observed Mondays as a day of silence as an aspect of self-control. Pyarelal described this practice as a "speech-fast." *Mahatma Gandhi*, I, p. 107.

86. Allen Campbell-Johnson, *Mission*, p. 105.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
88. First, the wishes of the Muslim provinces had to be ascertained. Then the Punjab and Bengal had to be partitioned with the boundaries drawn by two commissions under the direction of Sir Cyril Radcliffe. The more than 500 princely states had to be incorporated. The assets, records, government property, armed forces and civil service personnel had to be divided, and all of this in only 73 days. For a fuller discussion of the staggering administrative problems of partition see C. M. Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, pp. 160-221.
89. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 268.
90. See Pandey, *The Break-up of British India*, p. 204.
91. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 251-53. Gandhi was thus self-contradictory about the possibility of some good resulting from evil. When a Christian missionary suggested in 1946 that God can use sin for good ends ( as in the Crucifixion ), and that therefore Pakistan should be conceded in order to preserve a federal union, Gandhi adamantly retorted : "Pakistan is sin.....I'm surprised that you, a man of God, would approve a thing which is sin." E. Stanley Jones, *Mahatma Gandhi ; An Interpretation* ( New York : Abingdon Press, 1948 ), p. 44.
92. M. K. Gandhi, *The Way to Communal Harmony*, ed. U. R. Rao ( Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1963 ), p. 313.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
94. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 661,
95. *Ibid.*, p. 673.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 704.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 727.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 660.
99. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 197.
100. This view can be found in Margaret Bourke-White, *Halfway to Freedom* ( New York : Simon and Schuster, 1949 ), p. 94 ; Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* ( New York : John Day, 1946 ), p. 399 ; and Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India, A Social Analysis* ( London : Victor Gollancz, 1946 ). pp. 273-74.
101. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 394.
102. Louis Fischer, *Life and Mission*, p. 178.
103. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 441.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 453. Perhaps Gandhi's dreams resulted partially from his physical condition. The deprivation of food, as in fasting, lowers the body's supply of blood sugar and can cause hallucination and illusion. Phillipa Pullar, *Consuming Passion* (London : Hamish Hamilton, 1971 ), p. 42.
105. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 764.
106. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 476.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 480.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 480.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 484.

110. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches by Quaid-i-Azam Mahamed Ali Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan* (Karachi : Pakistan Government, n.d. ), p. 18.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

112. When secessionist Muslim elements in Kashmir challenged the Maharaja's power, guerilla tribesmen from Pakistan entered the state to support them. Troops from India were then sent in to defend the area. The United Nations imposed a cease-fire in 1949, but all-out war erupted in 1965, and tension has remained high ever since. See Alastair Lamb. *The Kashmir Problem ; A Historical Survey* ( New York : Praeger, 1967 ).

113. Bourke-White, *Halfway to Freedom*, pp. 99-101.

114. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 681.

115. Among Gandhi's demands were payment of the 550 million rupees promised to Pakistan as part of the partition agreement but which Congress leaders refused to pay, the restoration of 117 mosques in Delhi which had been converted to other uses, an end to the economic boycott of Muslims, and safe passage for Muslims on streets and trains

116. Additional discussions of Gandhi's fasting can be found in Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 701-46, and E. Stanley Jones, *Mahatma Gandhi*, pp. 108-21. Gandhi once admitted to Jones that fasting was a form of coercion : "Yes, the same kind of coercion which Jesus exercises upon you from the cross." ( p. 110 ).

117. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi*, II, 758.

118. E. Stanley Jones, *Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 16.

119. Many of Jinnah's speeches after Partition were ceremonial in nature. He received foreign ambassadors, spoke at public receptions, and inaugurated commercial and cultural events. For the texts of his official utterances see Jinnah, *Speeches by Quaid-i-Azam Mahamed Ali Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan* (Karachi : Pakistan Government. n. d.).

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

#### SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

**MOHANDAS GANDHI** and **Mohammed Ali Jinnah** were unmistakably two of the most important leaders in modern India. Inspired by his successful campaign for Indian rights in South Africa, Gandhi returned home in 1915 and later led his nation's quest for Independence. His saint-like approach to politics and endless crusades for social reform won him a global admiration bordering on deification. Jinnah, too, attracted a large following. A tireless spokesman for minority rights, he finally became the symbol of Muslim regeneration in India. Through his efforts, the map of Asia was redrawn in 1947, and millions of Muslims continue to revere him as the Father of Pakistan.

The lives of these two figures bore some striking similarities. Both came from Hindu, Gujarati-speaking ancestry. Both were British-trained lawyers who spent long periods outside of India. Both established political power through a political party: Gandhi via the Congress Party and Jinnah through the Muslim League. Both were associated with a major poet: Gandhi with Tagore and Jinnah with Iqbal. Each man was the target of attempted assassination by a fanatic of his own religion. Their respective followers gave to each a laudatory title: "Mahatma" (Great Soul) Gandhi and "Qaid-e-Azam" (Great Leader) Jinnah. Both suffered from poor health, and they died in the same year (1948).

But despite these similarities, Gandhi and Jinnah personified opposite polarities in Indian politics. Their orientations to life stood in vivid contrast. The deeply-spiritual Gandhi viewed the world in terms of universal principles and moral truths. His ascetic habits, simple dress, and prayerful introspection reflected the struggle to purify his own soul. Jinnah,

on the other hand, was a worldly, westernized aristocrat, cold and austere, pragmatic and clever. His mind worked not on the basis of ethical idealism, but from the skilled tactics of a shrewd parliamentarian.

As early as 1920, Gandhi and Jinnah came into direct clash over the course of the Indian nationalist movement. Gandhi, supported by the powerful Congress Party, launched a program of non-violent non-cooperation, based on his philosophy of *satyagraha* (truth-force). Jinnah objected to mass disobedience, preferring reasoned constitutional reforms. For the next fifteen years, Jinnah endured considerable frustration over his inability to persuade the Congress to abandon its militant opposition to British colonialism.

Beginning in 1935, Jinnah dedicated his energies to developing Muslim solidarity behind the Muslim League. Waging a strenuous campaign, he warned India's Muslims of their impending enslavement unless they united in opposition to the headstrong, Hindu-dominated Congress Party. Communal competition became his obsession. After March 23, 1940, when the Muslim League passed the historic "Lahore Resolution" calling for a separate Islamic nation, Jinnah unswervingly pursued the creation of Pakistan.

Jinnah's crusade rested on the premise that Muslims represented a nation totally distinct from Hindus and were, therefore, entitled to a sovereign homeland. Gandhi could never agree that differences in religion altered the common nationality of all Indians. Moreover, he was frustrated because the communal conflict within India weakened any united effort to win Independence. During the decade between 1937 and the formation of Pakistan on August 15, 1947, these two antagonists engaged in an extended debate. The face-to-face "Talks" of September 9-27, 1944 highlighted their years of interaction.

This study reveals that in their debate over Partition, Gandhi and Jinnah resorted to arguments and assumptions typifying their polarized feelings concerning Hindu-Muslim relations. The following chart summarizes some of the major points of disagreement :

*JINNAH**GANDHI*

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. The Congress Party stands for Hindu rule.   | The Congress Party is a national body standing for Indian independence.                                 |
| 2. The Muslim League is the sole representative of Indian Muslims.   | The League is only one among many Muslim political parties.   |
| 3. Gandhi speaks only for Hindus.  | Gandhi speaks for all Indians.  |
| 4. The communal issue must be settled before independence or else the Hindu Congress would subject Muslims to slavery. | Independence must be achieved first and then any domestic problems can be solved by Indians themselves. |
| 5. Indian unity is a myth resulting from the imposition of British rule.   | India is a united nation ; the British presence has caused the present divisiveness.                    |
| 6. The myth of a united India can only lead to endless strife, giving the British an excuse to stay.                   | Muslim communalism is weakening the nationalistic efforts of Congress, thus prolonging British rule.    |
| 7. Hindus and Muslims are irreconcilably antagonistic.   | Indian Muslims are merely converted Hindus.   |
| 8. Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations.  | A person's nationality does not change just because he changes religion.                                |
| 9. Both groups could progress better if in charge of their own destiny.  | Partition would not materially benefit Muslims.   |
| 10. The creation of Pakistan would lead to peace by ending communal competition within a single state.                 | Two communally-based nations could go to war against each other.  |

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 11. Ireland-Britain and Burma-India are precedents for partition.                                     | There are no historical precedents for a religious group to call itself a nation.                   |
| 12. Government and religion cannot be separated in India.   | Secular government is not concerned with matters of faith.  |
| 13. Gandhi does not understand the yearnings of Muslims.  | Partition is opposed to the spirit of Islam.  |
| 14. Gandhi must first accept the principle of partition and then the details will resolve themselves. | Various details can be discussed but the principle can never be agreed to because it is an untruth. |
| 15. Pakistan must be a totally independent, sovereign nation.   | A separate Muslim state can exist as long as it remains within the Indian nation.                   |
| 16. Muslims have an inherent right to a homeland.   | India is the homeland of all religious groups.  |
| 17. No non-Muslims can have any say in determining the future of the Muslim nation.                   | Any separation must have the approval of all of the people in the affected area.                    |

The foregoing chart illustrates the intensity of the Gandhi-Jinnah cleavage. Indeed, one is almost tempted to share the frustration of an observer who, at the height of the partition debate, facetiously remarked that the only thing they had in common was "excessive thinness."<sup>1</sup> Jinnah emphasized the differences between the two religions, and capitalized on factors in Indian history, such as the deeply entrenched caste system, which perpetuated Hindu-Muslim provincialism. Gandhi concentrated on what the two groups shared, pointing to various areas of life in which they were barely distinguishable. Thus, one must conclude that the diversity and ambiguities of Indian society provided sufficient evidence to make both positions appear credible.

Jinnah recognized that to achieve the goal of Pakistan, he needed to create a clear dichotomy in Indian politics. Toward this end, he travelled extensively throughout India seeking to consolidate Muslim opinion behind the League. In rallying the masses Jinnah relied heavily on emotional appeals. He emphasized the pride and self-respect of Muslims and recalled the days of Moghul greatness. He frequently spoke of the heritage of Islamic culture, approvingly referring to the *Koran*. He rarely missed the opportunity to issue a message to Muslims on major Islamic holidays. Although not an especially devout Muslim himself, the League president seemed attuned to the strong sense of group solidarity latent within the Muslim community.

While religious emotion formed the foundation for the Pakistan demand, Jinnah did not advocate partition for any theological objectives. Clearly, his motivation was political. He sought to mobilize Muslims in order to effectively challenge the power of the Congress Party. Jinnah consistently portrayed that body as Islam's great enemy, charging its Hindu leaders with a fascist desire to eternally enslave the Muslim minority. He blatantly claimed that, without Pakistan, India's Muslims were doomed to a fate worse than that of the Jews in Nazi Germany. Thus, Jinnah played heavily upon fear—the fear of Hindu domination—as a major rhetorical weapon.<sup>2</sup>

Jinnah also resorted to an endless ridicule of Gandhi as the greatest single threat to Muslims. Due to his own pronounced Hindu character, Gandhi became a perfect scapegoat. Jinnah never tired of recounting his adversary's unrestrained enthusiasm for Hindu beliefs and culture. Much to the consternation of Congress leaders, Jinnah promoted a communally based dichotomy in Indian politics by repeatedly juxtaposing himself as the Muslim counterpart of the Hindu Gandhi.

Much of Jinnah's success in mobilizing the Muslim masses sprang from his organizational activities on behalf of partition. Working through the Muslim League, Jinnah engineered rallies, marches, and celebrations aimed at solidifying Islamic sentiment. The League waged an extensive propaganda cam-



paign on behalf of Pakistan, and published reports of alleged atrocities by Congress provincial governments. While many Hindu leaders languished in British detention during 1942-45, Jinnah used those years to strengthen his following. Sizable League victories in the 1945-46 elections firmly established his political prominence, providing the base of power he needed to achieve Pakistan.

Gandhi also approached the debate with a high degree of emotional intensity. Like Jinnah, he described his involvement in the partition issue as a matter of life and death. Out of a profound respect for all religions, Gandhi characterized the effort to turn Muslims against Hindus as unmitigated evil. He chose emotionally charged verbs such as "cut, carve," and "vivisect" to describe the act of partition. Several times he pleaded that his own body be cut to pieces before the knife be applied to "mother India." In addition, his non-verbal rhetoric, such as his fasts for communal harmony, represented a largely emotional appeal to the sympathy of the masses.

This study of Gandhi supports the contentions of the Asian scholars discussed in Chapter 1, who characterized Hinduism as an intuitive, synthesizing tradition concerned with discovering universal truths and cosmic wholeness. Throughout the partition debate, Gandhi maintained a conciliatory approach to Jinnah, always trying to minimize their cleavage. For example, Gandhi often referred to his Muslim friends in South Africa, in the Khilafat Movement of the 1920's, and within the Congress Party itself. In 1940, he attempted to portray Jinnah as uniting non-Congress elements in a non-sectarian coalition. In 1944, he attributed their talks to a mutual effort at reaching a common solution. During his walking tours of 1946-47, he frequently quoted from Jinnah's peace appeal, noting its universal significance. Even after Partition, Gandhi stoutly rejected the principle of disunity.

In the years immediately preceeding Partition, the Gandhi-Jinnah interaction grew increasingly oblique. Jinnah became deeply involved in the political negotiations which formed a new nation whose leadership he assumed. Gandhi moved to the periphery of decision-making, remaining close to India's

public in an effort to stop communal hatred. By the time of India's Independence and simultaneous creation of Pakistan, both the two antagonists seemed weary and disillusioned. Gandhi's dream of a free, united India was shattered. Jinnah was left with what he earlier described as mutilated, moth-eaten remnants of the Muslim areas, and his new nation was divided by great cultural differences and nearly a thousand miles of alien territory. Weakened by years of poor health, the two septuagenarians appeared incapable of meeting the needs of new nations requiring strong and vigorous leadership. Within thirteen months after Partition, both Gandhi and Jinnah were dead.

#### AN EVALUATION OF THE DEBATE

Since the Gandhi-Jinnah confrontation involved a forensic contest between two opponents, the rhetorical critic may justifiably, and perhaps inevitably, seek to determine who won. The assigning of victory and defeat is a difficult task in any interpersonal dispute, but especially so in one involving the fate of nations. Any assessment of the partition debate must take into account not only the arguments and appeals of each protagonist, but also the impact of Partition on the later history of Asia. At least three different judgements can be drawn, depending on one's level of interpretation.

First, the results of the debate warrant the conclusion that neither advocate won, in the sense that neither man converted his opponent. Both Gandhi and Jinnah stated several times during the decade of their dispute that each sought to persuade the other. Both men, in fact, publicly expressed disappointment at not having changed their adversary's position.<sup>3</sup> Admittedly, Gandhi made statements which, if taken out of context, would appear to condone the creation of Pakistan. However, such statements were always accompanied by hypothetical and conditional terms negating any acceptance of the principle of division. Indeed, even after Partition he spent considerable effort urging Hindus and Muslims to disprove Jinnah's two-nations theory by living together in peace.

The mutual failure in persuasion underscored the fact that the debate constituted an interesting illustration of dogmatic

thinking. In their unswerving devotion to a given view, each man demonstrated elements of dogmatism, a trait not uncommon in most debates, particularly in clashes of political or religious belief.<sup>4</sup> Motivated by his utter intolerance of a Hindu-dominated government, Jinnah emphatically admitted that he would not compromise the Pakistan demand. And even after most of his Congress associates capitulated to partition, Gandhi remained adamantly opposed to it. By branding India's division an evil and a sin, he essentially removed it from the realm of rational debate. Neither advocate succeeded in weakening his opponent's belief in the rightness of his own position.

At a second level of interpretation, one might justifiably conclude that Jinnah clearly won the debate. Pakistan *was* created, and that was his goal. He became the ruler of the world's second largest Islamic nation (after Indonesia). Even Gandhi's own biographer conceded : "The cold and immaculate Jinnah had triumphed over Gandhi."<sup>5</sup>

In arguing for a change in India's apparent unity, Jinnah successfully shouldered the burden of proof in the partition debate.<sup>6</sup> To win, he had to prove that India's Muslims represented a united political force in opposition to the Hindu-dominated Congress Party. This he accomplished by effectively employing emotional appeals well-adapted to the Muslim population. Uncompromising Congress policies between 1937 and 1942 lent credence to his alarming charges that an independent India would mean a Hindu dictatorship. With the abstract goal of Pakistan, he offered an attractive alternative to alleged Muslim slavery, and the 1945-46 elections confirmed his position. Even when established as a prominent politician, he also had to prove that Hindus and Muslims could not live together in one country. The debacle of the Interim government and widespread communal violence of 1946-47 seemed to confirm that, too.

A number of strategic maneuvers helped Jinnah create a religious dichotomy in Indian politics. For example, by bargaining Muslim support of the war effort, he gained British sympathy for minority safeguards. In keeping Muslims aloof

from the 1942 "Quit India" campaign, he demonstrated that the Congress did not represent his followers. His face-to-face meetings and joint peace appeals with Gandhi reenforced the contention that Hindus and Muslims had separate spokesmen. Jinnah was especially clever in turning negotiations with the British to his own advantage. The apparent failures of the Cripps Proposals in 1942, the Simla Conference in 1945, and the Cabinet Mission in 1946 actually represented tactical victories for Jinnah. Each failure further established him as the voice of Muslim opinion while indicating that little constitutional progress could be made without an accommodation of his demands.

In further stating the case for Jinnah's victory, one could argue that Gandhi had been his own worst enemy in his pursuit of communal unity. For he, after all, had injected religion into politics ever since the 1920's. In an effort to mobilize the masses, he had consciously manipulated Hindu symbols and values in campaigning against British colonialism. Noted Penderel Moon :

This Hinduising of the national movement, which Gandhi's leadership promoted and symbolised, was injurious and ultimately fatal to Hindu-Muslim unity. But Gandhi failed to see the danger. Conscious only of his own goodwill towards the Muslims he was obstinately blind to the adverse effects on Muslim opinion of his own pronounced Hinduism. His basic concepts, his moral values and ideals, even his fads and foibles, were of Hindu origin ; in his writings and speeches he constantly employed language, imagery and symbolism undisguisedly derived from Hindu sources ; and he often appeared to evince as much interest in the reform of Hinduism as in the attainment of Independence, and indeed more or less to equate them.<sup>7</sup>

The irony of the Mahatma's inevitably spiritual ( and therefore, Hindu ) approach to politics was also emphasized by Gunnar Myrdal : "...Gandhi more than anyone else...helped to transform Jinnah from a keen Indian nationalist into the architect of Pakistan."<sup>8</sup> In his efforts to appeal to Muslim

opinion, Gandhi only increased his Hindu image. For example, he often claimed to be as much a Muslim or a Jew as a Hindu, because his faith embraced all religions. Such a contention unmistakably reflected the absorptive and transcendent characteristics typical of Hinduism but largely absent in Islam. Thus, the very nature of his attempts to gain Muslim sympathy marked Gandhi as a Hindu.

Perhaps the major cause for Jinnah's victory lay in the nature of political debate itself. In the partition controversy Jinnah was playing at his own game. Schooled in law and a parliamentarian by inclination, he adjusted readily to the demands of intense negotiation. Gandhi, on the other hand, tried to carry a moral crusade into the political arena. Even as communal riots in 1946-47 foredoomed Indian unity, Gandhi viewed the chaos as a laboratory for his experiments with *ahimsa*. His moral idealism seemed hopelessly out of place in a struggle of power politics.

But on a third level of analysis, one could argue that Gandhi won the debate, in the sense that his was the greater wisdom. Partition, after all, did not solve the communal problem, it simply internationalized it. The gross weakness of Jinnah's logic was underscored by Wilfred Smith, who wrote in 1946 :

If Muslims in the present India, constituting a minority of 23.5 per cent, deserve the right to secede, how can one visualize a Pakistan with non-Muslim minorities of 40 per cent and more ?<sup>9</sup>

If Hindus and Muslims could not live together in India because they were totally antagonistic cultures, as Jinnah argued, how could they then live together in Pakistan, as he said they would ? And if differences in culture formed a basis for nationhood, as he maintained, then East and West Pakistan should not logically have been united in one country. Indeed, emergence of Bangla Desh in 1971 confirmed the absurdity of the creation of a bisected Pakistan.

The folly of Partition was further illustrated by the severe administrative, economic, and social disruption which it unleashed. As Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs scrambled toward

"their" side of the new boundary, massive violence erupted. An estimated 600,000 persons were killed, and the migration involved up to fifteen million people. In his lurid depiction of the slaughter following Partition, Mosley concluded that "there took place, murder, looting, burning, and raping such as the world has not seen since the days of Jenghis Khan."<sup>10</sup> Gandhi had predicted that granting Jinnah's demand would not necessarily bring peace, and two years after Independence Jawaharlal Nehru admitted that had he foreseen the dire consequences of Partition, he would not have agreed to it.<sup>11</sup>

The economic hardships of Partition were acute, especially for Pakistan. Short in trained civil servants, the new nation had to arrange the transfer of commercial and trading interests, establish a currency and finance system, and promote new industry. Programs for agricultural development and land reform were largely absent. While producing large amounts of cotton and jute, Pakistan was cut off from the processing mills, most of which were in India.<sup>12</sup>

Blessed with hindsight, numerous historians have vindicated Gandhi by acknowledging the tragedy of Partition. For example, Majumder called it "an unmitigated evil for all concerned."<sup>13</sup> Brown described it as "a subcontinental disaster."<sup>14</sup> D'Cruz labelled it "a monumental folly."<sup>15</sup> But perhaps one of the most significant recognitions of the havoc created by India's division was Jinnah's own assessment, contained in his Id-ul-Fitr Message to the Pakistan nation August 27, 1948, just two weeks before his death :

The blood bath of last year and its aftermath—the mass migration of millions—presented a problem of unprecedented magnitude. To provide new moorings for this mass of drifting humanity strained our energies and resources to breaking point. The immensity of the task very nearly overwhelmed us and we could only just keep our heads above water.<sup>16</sup>

Gandhi's instinct rebelled against the irrationality of Partition. He correctly perceived that the establishing of two antagonistic neighbors could endanger the future peace of Asia. He recognized that the strength and progress of any pluralistic

society requires the subordination of religious differences to a sense of common purpose and brotherhood ; Jinnah immediately acclaimed that truth, too, once he had achieved Pakistan. But communal passions and the prospects of power blunted India's capacity for logical decision-making in 1947. Gandhi became a prophet without honor in his own country, a voice of moral conscience in a land gone mad with extremism. And although his own emotionalism sometimes camouflaged Gandhi's demonstration of the illogic of Partition, he nevertheless personified the wiser path of toleration and reason. George Bernard Shaw's witticism aptly summarized the uncompromising Muslim demand : "Pakistan is not rational, it is national."<sup>17</sup>

While one's assessment of the winner in the Gandhi Jinnah debate depends on the critic's orientation and level of interpretation, several additional observations might warrant general acceptance. For example, both of the antagonists seemed somewhat naive in their respective positions. In pleading that India must first achieve independence and then settle any domestic disputes, Gandhi tended to overlook the depth of the communal cleavage. His own spirituality caused him to underestimate the partisan susceptibilities of the Indian masses, and thus to minimize the internal divisiveness which would have plagued India had it remained united. Similarly, Jinnah portrayed partition as the cure-all for India's problems without offering specific plans for its efficient execution. His references to "independent zones" in the late 1930's and early 1940's were vague at best, and the hasty preparations for division in the summer of 1947 further indicated a lack of realistic planning and foresight.

As the partition debate wore on, it became increasingly apparent that Gandhi's persuasive task was harder than that of his opponent. Jinnah appealed primarily to a Muslim audience, urging unity and solidarity within that group. Gandhi's audience was far more heterogeneous since he sought to unify all Indians. The greater diversity of his audience meant a more difficult task in persuasion, for he had to combat not only the communal message of the Muslim League but

also the centrifugal forces of Hindu extremists such as the Mahasabhis. Gandhi was caught between the communal crossfire. Jinnah made good advantage of the situation, frequently quoting Mahasabha propagandists as proof that even Gandhi's fellow Hindu rejected communal harmony.

Still another advantage for Jinnah was the presence of the British. The colonial policy of separate electorates, inaugurated with the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, helped promote communally-based politics in India. And the British refusal to leave India in the early 1940's provided Jinnah the time he needed to consolidate power. Thus while the British officially opposed partition, their continued presence ultimately contributed to its consummation.

Students of the partition debate will also note the dramatic change in Jinnah's approach to politics. As a young lawyer he had opposed Gandhi's methods of mass persuasion. In his campaign for Pakistan, however, Jinnah himself made good use of techniques designed to consolidate the masses in concerted action. Under his leadership the Muslim League sponsored public demonstrations, floated banners picturing Islamic symbols, and promoted the waving of black flags to protest the Congress entry into the Interim government. The adoption of Direct Action Day in 1946 was probably the most dramatic League effort to involve the masses in political action. One might even assert that Gandhi, in a sense, taught his opponent the tactics of mass persuasion. At least he had set the example.

The advocates in this debate operated from two widely contrasting views of human nature. Gandhi appeared to perceive man as essentially good. Motivated by a belief in the potential perfectability of all people, he consistently appealed to the best instincts of his listeners, hoping that the realization of truth-force in their individual lives might wean the opposition. Jinnah's orientation was far more pessimistic. He viewed men, especially Hindus, as untrustworthy and even evil by design. Somewhat reminiscent of Machiavelli, he believed that leaders should develop power through group identification and collective force rather than by infusing private morality into the body politic.<sup>18</sup> Such a philosophical framework



helps explain Jinnah's rhetorical strategy of appealing to partisan pride and fear.

The partition debate unmistakably hinged on two conflicting concepts of nationhood. Gandhi's broad, secular, Indian nationalism challenged Jinnah's more narrow, sectarian, Muslim nationalism. Gandhi exhibited sound logic in rejecting his opponent's assertion that religion alone determined nationality, for if that were true, "then there were many nations in India."<sup>19</sup> And if Islam were some great monolithic nation, as Jinnah's position implied, how could one explain the many separate nation-states in the Arab world ?

While cultural distinctions between Hinduism and Islam were inevitably tied to the Gandhi-Jinnah confrontation, their dispute more closely mirrored the political power struggle between the Muslim League and the Congress Party. Religion seemed merely a convenient method of choosing sides. Ultimately, the test of nationhood is not necessarily based on logic, historical precedents, or even cultural affinities : "...nationalities turn into nations when they acquire power to back up their aspirations."<sup>20</sup> And by 1947, Jinnah and the Muslim League had garnered sufficient power—both in popular support and through the threat of civil war—to achieve Pakistan.

While this study has been limited to the Gandhi-Jinnah debate over Indian Partition, such a complex issue easily lends itself to other areas of investigation. The following suggestions might be pursued further by both the student of Asian history and the rhetorical critic.

A similar analysis could be made of the clash between Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru which ran concurrent with the Gandhi dispute. Their confrontation lacked some of the brotherly feeling provided by Gandhi. Jinnah and Nehru more closely resembled each other in temperament, and their disagreements were at times undisguisedly harsh.<sup>21</sup> Jinnah's relationship to other Congress Party leaders, such as Vallabhbhai Patel, Abul Kalam Azad, and Chakravarti Rajagopalachari might also be studied.

Another topic of investigation could be the nature of Muslim League propaganda. Pamphlets, newspapers, and

numerous orators assisted Jinnah in spreading charges of Hindu treachery to the Muslim masses. Indeed, India in the 1940's seemed to be a living laboratory of revolutionary propaganda.

The rhetoric of the extremist Hindu Mahasabha Party was another element in the partition debate worthy of study. Its vicious tirades about Hindu supremacy significantly aided Jinnah in that they widened the communal gulf by promoting the theory that Hindus and Muslims could not, and should not, coexist. Joining the Mahasabhites in their anti-Muslim crusade was the Rashtriya Sevak Sangha ( R.S.S. ), a militant paramilitary group openly dedicated to communal violence.

Still another task would be to assess Jinnah's role in the partition movement. Historians differ as to whether or not his leadership was indispensable to the creation of Pakistan. Certainly his role was central, and Mosley contended that "Pakistan was the one-man achievement of Mohammad Ali Jinnah."<sup>22</sup> However, Symonds argued that Muslim nationalism was sufficiently strong that even "if there had been no Jinnah, it still seems probable that there would have been a Pakistan."<sup>23</sup> Perhaps this dispute is one of history's unanswerables.

Another topic meriting additional attention is the extent to which present-day politics in India reflect religious allegiances. Are some of Jinnah's ideas and arguments still evident in the public utterances of Pakistani leaders? To what extent have military and strategic considerations caused Indian leaders to forsake Gandhi's premises? In what ways do centrifugal tendencies, such as language riots and demands for Pathan autonomy, present continuing impediments to the cultural and national unity of the subcontinent?

The emergence of Bangla Desh as a nation in 1971 provides another possibility for fruitful research. The roots of the conflict which led to the secession and war over East Pakistan can be traced directly to the partition movement of the 1930's and 1940's. Undeniably, the rhetoric of partition advocates exhibited a West Pakistan bias. On April 24, 1943, Jinnah declared that "the Punjab is the cornerstone of Pakistan."<sup>24</sup>

As late as May, 1947, the Press reported that Jinnah would agree to dropping the Bengal from his plan if the entire Western zone were conceded to him.<sup>25</sup> Even the geographical areas denoted by the acronym, Pakistan, all were in western India. There was no "B" for the Bengal, even though that section contained the larger population.

Gandhi's extraordinary use of non-verbal forms of communication deserves further study. Certainly his fastings, marches, days of silence, clothing, and spinning wheels distinguished his methods of persuasion. But perhaps non-verbal symbols, like language itself, carry meaning only within a given cultural context. For example, Gandhi's fasts seemed uniquely suited to India, where hunger and famine are common elements of life. But in the United States, where much of the population is concerned with obesity and over-weight, fasts seem to elicit little public sympathy. The 1972 fasts by Dick Gregory to protest American involvement in the Vietnam War and by Cesar Chavez to dramatize the plight of migrant farmers attracted scant notice. The cultural determinants of non-verbal communication represent an important and promising area of inquiry.

Future research might draw some interesting comparison between the plight of America's racial minority and India's religious minority. Certain black nationalists have closely echoed Jinnah's rhetoric. Indeed, some of their argumentation sounds nearly identical. In 1965, Black Muslim Elijah Muhammad said: "We must unite ourselves as a nation of people."<sup>26</sup> Militant separationist Max Stanford declared in 1968 that "Black people in America are a nation within a nation." And he called on Negroes to demand, as their homeland, the territory of southern states stretching from Virginia to Louisiana.<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, Islam has attracted some blacks in the United States, including Malcolm X and Mohammed Ali. In addition, Gandhi's example of non-violent protest has been adapted to the Negro struggle, notably, but by no means exclusively, in the techniques of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Finally, the Pakistan crusade could be examined in a comparative analysis with other national movements. Are certain elements common to the struggle for nationhood? For

example, Jinnah's appeal to "inherent rights" closely resembled Thomas Jefferson's claim of "inalienable rights" in the American colonies. Jinnah's use of Hindus as a scapegoat recalled a similar tirade against the Manchus in Sun Yat-sen's Chinese nationalism. The creation of Israel as a religious state in 1948 invites a comparison to Pakistan, as does the use of religious differences to mask economic and political issues in Northern Ireland. And whether in Biafra or Bangla Desh, nationalist rhetoric seems to produce violence, and this, too, was consistent with Pakistan's experience. Clearly, the world continues to grapple with the potent cry, "We are a nation !"

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Krishnalal Shridarani, *The Mahatma and the World* (New York : Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 189.
2. Fear has long been recognized as a powerful motivational tool of persuasion. Aristotle advised that to incite fear in his listeners, "...the orator must make them feel that they really are in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to others..." Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, *Great Books of the Western World*, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, IX (Chicago : Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 629.
3. Gandhi and Jinnah were thus exceptions to the rule. Debaters usually do not attempt to convert each other, realizing the utter futility since each is convinced that he has found the truth. Their usual target is the audience. This point is made in Jon Eisenson and Paul H. Boase, *Basic Speech* (3rd ed. ; New York : Macmillan, 1975), p. 304.
4. Dogmatism generally involves a closed cognitive system, absolutistic beliefs, and patterns of intolerance toward certain groups or ideas. However, some theorists distinguish between dogmatism and both rigid thinking and extreme ideas based on intellectual conviction. See Milton Rokeach, "Political and Religious Dogmatism : An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," *Psychological Monographs*, LXX, 18 (1956), pp. 1-43.
5. Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York : E. P. Dutton, 1969), p. 528.
6. In a debate, "the burden of proof rests on the man who seeks to change the *status quo*. He must provide good and sufficient reason for a change and must convince those who render the decision." Austin J. Freeley, *Argumentation and Debate* (San Francisco : Wadsworth Publishing, 1961), p. 17.

7. Penderel Moon, *Gandhi and Modern India* (London : English Universities Press, 1968), p. 276.
8. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama : An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, I (New York : Pantheon, 1968), pp. 236-37.
9. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India : A Social Analysis* (London : Victor Gollancz, 1946), p. 267.
10. Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London : Widenfield and Nicholson, 1961), p. 243. A highly dramatic description of Partition can be found in Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight* (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1975). Khushwant Singh's novel, *Train to Pakistan* (New York : Grove Press, 1956) provides a fictional portrayal of the tragic period. And Margaret Bourke-White viewed Partition from the perspective of a photographic journalist in *Halfway to Freedom* (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1949).
11. Louis Fischer, *Gandhi : His Life and Message for the World* (New York : Mentor, 1954), p. 171.
12. For a thorough discussion of the economic consequences of Partition see Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, I, pp. 231-341. Further documentation of the disruption unleashed can be found in Aloys A. Michael, *The Indus Rivers : a Study of the Effects of Partition* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1967) and Keith Raymond Sipe, "Karachi's Refugee Crisis : The Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Partition-Related Migration," unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Duke University, 1976.
13. S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi : Their Role in India's Quest for Freedom* (Calcutta : K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1966), p. xvii.
14. William Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 129.
15. Edward D'Cruz, *India : Quest for Nationhood* (Bombay : Lalvani Publishing House, 1967), p. 114.
16. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, II (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 568.
17. Quoted in Mary L. Becker, "The All-India Muslim League, 1906-1947 ; A Study of Leadership in the Evolution of a Nation" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1957), p. 4.
18. Enlightening discussions of the contrasting world-views represented by Gandhi and Jinnah can be found in A. B. Shah, "Gandhi and the Hindu-Muslim Question," *Gandhi, India and the World*, ed. Sibnarayan Ray (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1970), pp. 188-208, and Anthony Parel, "Gandhian Satyagraha and Machiavellian Virtue" *The Meanings of Gandhi*, ed. Paul F. Power (Honolulu : University Press of Hawaii 1971), pp. 183-99.
19. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York : John Day, 1946), p. 396.
20. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication : An Inquiry*

*into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge : Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and New York : John Wiley, 1953), p. 79.

21. For the text of the extensive Jinnah-Nehru correspondence in 1938, see Kailash Chandra, *The Tragedy of Jinnah* (Lahore : Varma Publishing, 1943), pp. 139-192. A thorough rhetorical analysis of Nehru was Agnes G. Doody's "Words and Deeds : An Analysis of Jawaharlal Nehru's Non-Alignment Policy in the Cold War, 1947-1953" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1961).

22. Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, p. 247.

23. Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London : Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 193.

24. M. A. Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, I (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), p. 476.

25. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi : The Last Phase, II* (Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1958), p. 178. For analysis of the political and cultural tensions associated with the division of Pakistan see G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1974) ; Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis : India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh ; a Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 War* (New York : Praeger, 1975) ; Indira Gandhi, *India and Bangla Desh : Selected Speeches and Statements, March to December, 1971* (New York : Humanities Press, 1972) ; and Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh : an Unfinished Revolution ?" *Journal of Asian Studies* XXXIV (August, 1975), pp. 891-911.

26. John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier and Elliott Rudwick (eds.), *Black Nationalism in America* (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 411.

27. Ibid., pp. 514-15. For a discussion about and a sampling of the rhetorical strategies of black separatists see James L. Golden and Richard D. Rieke, *The Rhetoric of Black Americans* (Columbus, Ohio : Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 277-452.

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## INDEX

- A.**  
 Abbasid Caliphate 23  
 Afghanistan 6, 112 fn.  
 Ahmad Khan, Syed 15, 24  
 Ahmad Shah Durrani 7  
 Ahmedabad 35, 45  
 Akbar 7  
 Al-Afghani, Said Jamal-ud-din 112 fn.  
 Al-Azhar University 23  
 Ali, Chaudhuri Rahmat 42  
 Ali, Maulana Mohamed 39, 46  
 Ali, Syed Amir 15  
 Aligarh University 15, 60, 75, 82  
 All India Radio 132  
 Allah 8, 9, 118, 134  
 Allahabad 17, 62, 77  
 Amritsar 45  
 Amritsar Massacre 18, 32  
 Arabia 8, 58  
 Arabic language 8, 23  
 Aristotle 163 fn.  
 Arya Samaj 63  
 Attlee, Clement 119, 124  
 Ataturk, Kemal 19, 62  
 Aurangzeb 7  
 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam 60, 93, 109, 115, 160
- B.**  
 Baluchistan 17, 18, 74, 117  
*Bande Mataram* 9, 58  
 Bangladesh 27 fn., 84 fn., 161  
 Battuta, Ibn 6  
 Bell, Alexander Melville 30  
 Benares University 76  
 Bengal 7, 12, 13, 16, 18, 108, 119, 145 fn., 162  
 Besant, Annie 15, 45  
*Bhagavad Gita* 22, 30, 70, 127  
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 112 fn.  
 Biafra 163  
 Bihar 123, 124, 125, 128  
 Birla, G. D. 86 fn.  
 Black Muslims 162  
 Blavatsky, Madame Helena 30  
 Bombay 13, 19, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39, 41, 44, 45, 47, 61, 81, 94, 107, 120, 133  
 Bose, Subhas Chandra 1, 61  
 Brahmo Samaj 15  
 British Broadcasting Corporation 26 fn.  
 Buddhism 9  
 Burke, Kenneth 50 fn.  
 Burma 89, 90
- C.**  
 Cabinet Mission 119-121, 155  
 Calcutta 19, 39-41, 46, 61, 121, 135-136  
 Caste system 6, 10, 48  
 Charisma 34-36  
 Chatterjee, Bankimchandra 9  
 Christianity 9, 14, 33, 37, 53 fn., 66, 69, 138, 145 fn.  
 Churchill, Winston 51 fn.  
 Civil disobedience 2, 46, 81, 102  
 Clive, Robert 11  
 Colonialism 10-15, 17-19  
 Communalism 5, 13, 65, 158-159  
 Confucianism 9  
 Cripps Mission 77, 155  
 Curzon, Viceroy 13
- D.**  
 Dacca 16, 19  
*Dawn* 89, 127  
 Debate  
     appeal to fear 73, 151

- appeal to pride 68, 151
- assumptions contrasted 159-160
- audience adaptation 73, 74, 124, 153
- burden of proof 154
- circular reasoning 131
- definitions contrasted 160
- dogmatic thinking 154
- evidence, lack of 74
- fallacious reasoning 156
- faulty analogy 72, 89-90
- humor 67
- logic in 160
- logical deductions 70, 78-79
- parallel phrasing 98
- persuasive tasks 158
- reluctant evidence 123
- rhetorical question 74
- ridicule 151
- scapegoating 75, 151
- strategy of dichotomy 60-61, 151, 154-155
- symbol-directed orientation 91-92
- word choice 59 60, 72-73, 152
- Delhi 40, 48, 88, 120, 128-129, 131, 136, 138
- Desai, Bhulabhai 114, 116
- Desai, Morarji 1
- Din Ilahi* (Divine Faith) 7
- Durand Line 112 fn.
- E.
- East India Company 11-12
- East Pakistan 27 fn., 156
- Elizabeth I 11
- Elphinstone, Lord 13
- G.
- Godse, Nathuram V. 138
- Gandhi-Irwin Pact 34
- Gandhi, Kasturbai 29, 92, 109fn.
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand
  - arguments against Partition 149-150
  - assassinated 138
  - brahmacharya* (celibacy) 50 fn.
  - Childhood 29
  - clothing 34, 44
  - education 30
  - fasting 33, 34-35, 135-138
  - Harijan* 35, 52 fn., 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 121, 122, 130, 133
  - hostility toward 127, 134, 136
  - Indian Opinion* 43
  - "inner voice" 65, 79, 117
  - Navajivan* 46
  - non-cooperation 19, 32, 45
  - non-violence (*ahimsa*) 32, 124, 130
  - personality 35-36
  - prayer meetings 35, 123, 124
  - as public speaker 31, 35, 44
  - Salt March 34
  - Satyagraha* (truth-force) 32, 43, 127, 148
  - Sevagram 78, 114
  - South Africa 31-32, 34, 43
  - spinning wheel (*charkha*) 34, 66
  - swaraj*, theory of 34
  - "Talks" (1944) 92-109
  - vegetarianism 30, 140 fn.
  - as victor 156-158
  - Young India* 35, 45, 47
- Ganges River 9
- Genghis Khan 157
- Gokhale, Gopal 15, 35, 47
- Government of India Act 43, 56
- Gujarati language 37, 43-45, 93
- H.
- Hassan, Syed Wazir 39
- Hastings, Warren 12

- Hegel 29  
 Himalayan Mountains 9  
 Hindi language 45, 58, 63, 78, 126  
 Hindu Mahasabha Party 19, 41, 63, 68, 75, 128, 138, 159, 161  
 Hinduism  
     beliefs 8-10  
     customs 5-8  
     as female doctrine 9, 58, 142 fn.  
     renaissance 14-15  
 Hiroshima 166  
 Hitler, Adolph 51 fn., 84 fn.  
 Home-Rule League 15, 46  
 Hubli 70  
 Hume, Alan Octavius 15  
  
 I.  
     *Id-ul-Azha* 137  
     *Id-ul-Fitr* 141 fn., 157  
     Imad-ud-din 5  
     Indian National Congress Party  
         breaks with Gandhi 125  
         founded 15  
         ignored Muslim appeals 56-63  
         Jinnah resigns 40  
         Non-Cooperation Movement 45  
         Quit India Campaign 81, 155  
 Iqbal, Muhammad 1, 17, 18, 42, 57, 58, 62, 123  
 Ireland 89, 163  
 Irwin, Viceroy 47-48  
 Isaiah 142 fn.  
 Islam  
     beliefs 8-10  
     defined 70  
     expansion of 5-6  
  
 J.  
     Jafar, Mir 12  
     Jamiat-ul-Ulema 16, 40  
     Jesus 30, 146 fn.  
     Jews 57, 117, 151, 156  
     Jinnah, Fatima 42  
     Jinnah Mohammed Ali  
         arguments for Partition 149-150.  
         assassination attempt on 109 fn.  
         childhood 37  
         death 138  
         education 37-38  
         Fourteen Points 41  
         Governor-General of Pakistan 134  
         Lahore speech (1940) 66-69  
         Lucknow speech (1937) 57-59  
         marriage 41  
         as public speaker 38  
         Punjab speech (1941) 72-74  
         rejects Hindu-Muslim unity 56-58  
         resigns Congress Party 40  
         "Talks" (1944) 92-109  
         Two-nation theory 68, 78, 90, 98  
         as victor 154-156  
         Western influence on 43-44  
     Jinnah, Ruttanbai 41, 45  
     *jizya* (poll tax) 7  
     Judaism 9  
  
 K.  
     *Kafirs* (infidels) 8  
     Karachi 37, 86 fn., 136  
     Kashmir 18, 137  
     Kasim, Mir 12  
     Khaksars 16, 19, 109 fn.  
     Khan, Abdul Ghaffer 132  
     Kheiri, Jabbar 16  
     Khilafat Movement 18, 33, 46  
     King, Martin Luther, Jr 51 fn., 162

*Koran* 23, 57, 67, 69, 70, 127, 136,  
151

Korzybski, Alfred 110 fn.

Kripalani, Acharya 126

Krishak Sabha 16

*Kulturkampf* 69

## L.

Lahore 40, 48, 66, 137

Lahore Resolution 2, 66-67, 71,  
73, 82, 94, 148

Liaquat Ali Khan 1, 42, 114,  
142 fn.

London 12, 15, 30, 37, 42, 44,  
124, 144 fn.

Lucknow 39, 44, 58, 59

Lucknow Pact 18, 39

## M.

Macdonald, Ramsey 51 fn.

Machiavellianism 58, 159

Mahmud of Ghazni 6

Mahriqi, Inayatullah 16

Mao Tse-tung 51 fn.

Marathas 7

Mazangavi, Rafiq Sabir 109 fn.

Mecca 9

Meerut 26 fn., 63

Menon, Krishna 120

Mohammed (The Prophet) 23,  
37, 57, 123

Momins 16

Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms  
14, 27 fn., 32, 45

Morley-Minto Reforms 13, 159

Mount Everest 36

Mountbatten, Earl 124-126,  
128-130, 131-132

Muslim League

attended by Gandhi 33

constituency 41

"Day of Deliverance"  
(1939) 64

"Direct Action" 120, 121, 159

electoral weakness 56

founded 16

growth of 91

Jinnah joins 39

Jinnah leads 42

reports of atrocities 63

wins 1945-46 elections 118

## N.

Nadir Shah 7

Nagpur 46, 75

Nakamura, Hajime 10, 22

Nanak, Guru 7

Naoroji, Dababhai 15, 38, 39

Nehru, Jawaharlal 1, 5, 24, 48,  
56, 85 fn., 91, 109 fn., 120,  
122, 124, 131, 132, 135, 157,  
160

Nehru Report, Motilal 41

New Delhi 51 fn., 119, 123, 125,  
133

Noakhali 122-124, 128

Non-verbal communication  
34-35, 158-159

Northwest Frontier Province  
17-18, 74, 118, 126, 132

## O.

Oliver, Robert T. 22, 28fn., 51fn.

Orissa 7

## P.

Pakistan 2, 4

word coined 42, 77, 80, 88,  
91, 96, 116, 117, 122, 124,  
127-128, 130-131, 133-134,  
157-158

Partition

accomplished 132-135

defined 4-5

problems created by 132-  
133, 156-157

Vagueness of proposals  
84 fn., 91-92, 98-99, 158

- Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 1,  
120, 129, 131, 143 fn., 160
- Pathans 101, 161
- Patna 62
- Peacock Throne 7
- Peshawar 118
- Petit, Jehangir 44
- Pitt, William 26 fn.
- Plassey, Battle of 12
- Poona 35, 117
- Punjab 7, 16, 18, 72, 74, 101, 119,  
122, 124, 126, 128, 135, 140  
fn., 145 fn.
- Pyarelal 139-141 fn., 143-146 fn.
- Q.
- “Qaid-e-Azam” defined 64
- Quetta 117
- Qutb-ud-din 6
- R.
- Radcliffe, Cyril 145 fn.
- Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli 22
- Rai, Lajpat 19, 68
- Raja Dashir 5
- Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti 1,  
71, 73, 92-93, 160
- Rajkot 30, 31
- Ramakrishna, Sri 15
- Rashtriya Sevak Sangha 161
- Rhetoric  
Asian 20-21  
criticism of 3  
cultural 20  
Indian 21-22, 24, 152  
Islamic 23-24
- Riots (Hindu-Muslim) 1, 19, 57,  
121, 122, 126, 135, 156-157
- Round Table Conferences 24
- Rowlatt Acts 18, 32, 40
- Roy, Rammohun 15, 24
- Ruskin, John 32
- S.
- Sanskrit language 8, 20, 22
- Sapir, Edward 20
- Sapru, Tej Bahadur 72
- Saraswati, Dayananda 15
- Sen, Keshub Chunder 15
- Sepoy Rebellion 12-13
- Shakespeare, William 38, 91
- Shaw, George Bernard 158
- Shintoism 9
- Sikhs 7, 14, 101, 119, 135
- Simla Conference 115, 155
- Simon Commission 14, 89
- Sind 5, 17-18, 74
- Singh, Baldev 132
- Suhrawardy, Saheed 136
- Sun Yat-sen 163
- T.
- Tagore, Devendranath 15
- Tagore, Rabindranath 27 fn.,  
50 fn.
- Taoism 9
- Tata, J. R. D. 86 fn.
- Thoreau, Henry David 32
- Timur (Tamerlane) 6
- Tolstoy, Leo 32
- U.
- Untouchability 48, 72, 76
- Upanishads* 21, 22, 32
- Urdu language 42, 45, 62, 76, 78,  
93, 126
- V.
- Victoria, Queen 12
- Vivekananda, Swami 15
- W.
- Wavell, Lord 115, 116, 122, 125
- Whorf, Benjamin Lee 20
- Wilson, Woodrow 41
- World War I 45
- World War II 63, 104
- Y.
- Yeravada 88
- Z.
- Zamindaris* 12, 91













